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Following is the 26th Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, October 1, 1988–March 31, 1989.

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Chapter One

General Assessment of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a continuing framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, scientific, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to the goal of genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective remains to preserve and strengthen this process by pressing for full implementation of the Final Act as well as the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents and by looking for further ways at future CSCE meetings to realize the objectives of the CSCE process.

The Final Act recognizes that followup meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The second followup meeting, held in Madrid from November 11, 1980, until September 9, 1983, adopted a concluding document which confirmed and elaborated upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It included significant new provisions in the area of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism. The third and most recent CSCE followup meeting, which took place in Vienna between November 4, 1986, and January 19, 1989, also adopted a concluding document setting important new human rights standards and mandating a far-reaching series of followup activities to be held in advance of the next full followup meeting in Helsinki in 1992.

This is the 26th semiannual report submitted by the President to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe under the provisions of Public Law 94–304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys the implementation of CSCE principles during the period October 1, 1988, through March 31, 1989. The purpose of the report is to assist the commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's efforts to assess both the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and promoting human rights.

Review of Implementation

Although many aspects of Soviet and East European implementation of CSCE commitments in the areas of human rights and economic cooperation remain seriously flawed, there have been once again during the current review period significant improvements in a number of areas. Soviet implementation of the Helsinki, Madrid, and Vienna agreements improved significantly during this review period.

On February 15, as scheduled, the Soviet Union ended its illegal occupation of Afghanistan. On the domestic front, the Soviet leadership's drive for *glasnost* and "democratization" continued to open up Soviet society. The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies were the most competitive and open in Soviet history and stimulated political activism.

By the end of 1988, the Soviets reported they had released all political and religious prisoners convicted solely under Articles 70, 142, 190.1, and 227 of the Soviet criminal code. However, reliable Western sources believe there may still be some individuals being held either in prison camps or psychiatric hospitals under these articles. The Soviets had also entered into negotiations with the U.S. to create a mechanism for reviewing cases of those suspected of having been convicted on trumped-up criminal charges for political reasons.

Despite some positive developments, Soviet implementation remained unsatisfactory, in large part because most gains have yet to be institutionalized or given a firm legal basis. The drafting of new laws to bring Soviet legal theory in line with international standards of human rights has fallen behind schedule. Draft laws on the press, freedom of conscience, courts, social organizations, and emigration, as well as a new criminal code, are not expected until later this year. Thus, human rights in the Soviet Union remain a political policy not a legally guaranteed state of affairs.

The nationality problem sharpened over the past 6 months. Violence led to the declaration of states of emergency throughout most of Armenia and Azerbaydzhan and to crackdowns on nationalist activists. Elsewhere—particularly in the Baltic states, but also in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldavia—Moscow tolerated growing national self-assertion, although it has recently underscored its concern about "extremists" and "ultra-reformers" who attack the very basis of Soviet socialism and "internationalism."

Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions showed improvement, but overall performance still fell below acceptable standards. Most notable has been the increased access of foreigners to Soviet organizations and, to a lesser extent, commercial and scientific information. This openness, however, remains inconsistent and pales beside the access to information and officials that is standard in the West. Working conditions for resident business representatives did not change. Despite eased visa requirements, visiting and new-to-market firms have been adversely affected by the severe shortage of housing and office space and by ongoing changes and reorganization in Soviet foreign trade.

Significant improvements continued to be seen in Soviet policies toward family reunification, although again problems remained. Jewish emigration has stayed at the high levels reached during the last reporting period and a number of long-standing Jewish *refuseniks* were given permission to emigrate. It appears that first-time Jewish applicants were granted permission in the large majority of cases. New applications for emigration to the U.S. are being received at a rate of over 2,000 a month.

The Soviet Government continues to view the dissemination of information as a tool to shape public attitudes in support of current policies. Under *perestroika* and *glasnost*, however, official media organs have greater leeway in determining what to publish. As a result, journals and newspapers today reflect a much wider variety of opinion than in the past. By mid-Decem-

ber, the Soviets had ended all jamming of Western radio broadcasts.

Overall cooperation in the field of cultural and educational exchanges was good during the period, although there was some evidence that the expansion of bilateral exchanges was beginning to weigh heavily on the Soviet infrastructure. Especially in academic exchanges, there was a growing problem of timely notification of both scholars and institutions, as well as timely issuance of visas. Because of Soviet "restructuring" and cutbacks in personnel, there has been a steady deterioration in the administrative aspect of conducting many academic exchanges. On the positive side, Soviet institutions during the period demonstrated continued openness toward exchanges with the U.S.

For Romania, the most dramatic manifestation of its policy toward its CSCE commitments came at the end of the Vienna followup meeting in January, when it accepted the Concluding Document, but stated it did not intend to abide by those provisions to which it had previously objected. In the months since the end of the Vienna meeting, the Government of Romania has rejected repeated attempts to exercise the human dimension mechanism set forth in the Vienna Concluding Document.

As for general policy toward ongoing CSCE commitments, during this reporting period the Romanian Government continued to give active support for the confidence- and security-building aspects of CSCE and to emphasize the first six Helsinki principles as key elements in its own national and foreign policy. The Romanian Government's performance continued to fall far short of its CSCE commitments in most other areas. The Vienna Concluding Document has not yet been published in Romania, and the ability of Romanian citizens to know and defend their rights is severely limited. Individuals who have spoken out, including six former high government officials, have been subjected to harassment, house arrest, or even imprisonment. During the reporting period, three Romanian journalists and several printers were arrested for attempting to print a pamphlet criticizing the regime.

The degree of religious freedom has not changed, with the practice of religion circumscribed and controlled by the government. There was no change during this reporting period in several longstanding cases of churches which have been unsuccessful in obtaining government permission to expand.

There continues to be widespread concern over the government program to "systematize" or modernize rural areas. The plan calls for the elimination of nearly half of Romania's 13,000 villages, but elimination has to date only been implemented in an area close to Bucharest. Urban "systematization" is continuing in Bucharest and other cities. Residents have little or no voice in the decision to apply the policy and have been forced to move against their will. During this reporting period, government policies continue to erode the ethnic identity of the Hungarian, German, and other minorities.

Romania's overall performance in Basket II did not improve during this reporting period. Suspension of Romania's most-favored-nation (MFN) status became effective July 3, 1988. Romania adjusted its export product mix somewhat to compensate for the loss of MFN. Even so, Romania's 1988 U.S. trade surplus was down 8.5% from 1987 levels. Romania continued its past policies designed to maximize exports and restrict imports in order to retire swiftly its foreign debt, which caused declines in productivity in many sectors. Major exports of agricultural products and a strict austerity program continued to result in severe shortages of basic foodstuffs for the Romanian people. Official information shows steady growth in the economy, but these figures have little credibility even in Romania. The government continued its policy of restricting access by business representatives and others to all but those with approval to have contact with foreigners. Normal plant visits by business representatives have remained difficult to obtain in many cases, even though this demonstrably has led to reduced Romanian exports and less efficient use of imports.

Romania's performance in the field of human contacts did not improve. While there was some increase in the number of people granted permission for short-term family visits, there was no significant improvement in the number of people granted emigration approval. The U.S. Embassy is aware of nearly 2,500 qualified applicants who have not yet received permission to emigrate to the U.S.

Romania seeks a more favorable image outside Romania, in part by limiting the activities of visiting Western journalists, expelling them when they engage in activities the Romanian Government does not sanction and refusing entry to those who have written unflattering material in the past. Romanian officials commonly assert that negative coverage of Romania is part of an "anti-Romanian campaign" supported by Hungary and the West. No American correspondents were able to secure journalist visas during this reporting period, but a few entered on tourist visas.

Although the number of Romanians taking part in the Fulbright program has risen significantly this year (a total of 13 Romanian grantees are expected to travel for the 1988–89 academic year, as compared to one in 1987–88), academic experts continue to have difficulty obtaining exit permission, and the Romanian Government has continued to limit the number of individuals traveling on other cultural exchange programs. Regulations barring most contacts between Romanians and foreigners are being more vigorously enforced. Romanians who persist in seeing foreigners are subject to harassment, interrogations, and fines.

Poland has one of the better records among the Warsaw Pact states in terms of overall compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents. Political developments during the period under discussion, however, open possibilities that Poland could still improve its CSCE performance in the next reporting period.

Those developments can, almost without exception, be encompassed within the broad category of the roundtable talks. Those negotiations, which began on February 6 after months of delays and reversals and lasted 8 weeks, brought together representatives of the opposition and the authorities to negotiate, candidly and in great detail, on the most pressing political, economic, and social problems facing Poland. The roundtable consisted of three main teams dealing with political reform, trade union pluralism, and economic issues, as well as numerous subgroups and working groups dealing with more narrowly defined topics. On April 5 participants reached agreement on a broad range of measures which, if fully implemented, will introduce a significant degree of pluralism and democracy into Poland's political and economic system. Provisions of the agreement include democratic elections to a new upper house of parliament, greatly expanded opportunities to form independent associations and guaranteed access for the opposition to the mass media, including the right to publish its own newspapers.

That the roundtable agreement represents such an important potential step forward, however, indicates the unsatisfactory degree to which civil liberties are currently institutionalized in Poland. Many of the restrictions on Poles' rights of free expression and free association remained in the legal code during the reporting period, although the amendment of many such laws was agreed upon in the course of the roundtable negotiations. In the interim these laws were often inconsistently and incompletely enforced. Some student protests which occurred during the reporting period met with a harsh response from police, especially in Krakow and Gdansk. The issue of workers dismissed or demoted because of their participation in

strikes in April–May or August 1988 remained inadequately resolved, with a number of workers awaiting the opportunity to return to their former places of employment. Finally, the death, in unclear circumstances, of two priests known for their opposition activism raised in the minds of some Poles questions of how far opponents of the roundtable process might go to undermine the chance for success in those talks.

Indeed, even if the roundtable accords were universally accepted in Poland—they have come under harsh criticism from elements of both the government and the opposition—implementing the agreement would present a challenge. A number of independent variables, most notably the state of Poland's trouble-plagued economy, have the potential to interfere with, or even prevent, the full realization of the agreement's provisions.

Compared with other Warsaw Pact states, Hungary has a relatively good record of overall compliance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents. During the reporting period there was, on balance, significant further progress in Hungary's human rights record. This included the peaceful turnover of government leadership and some of the largest peaceful mass demonstrations organized by unofficial groups since 1948. A dozen new independent organizations, including two of the four independent unions which negotiate on behalf of their members, were founded and became established. Although differences over the pace of reform have surfaced within the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party leadership, political reform is maintaining a steady pace and appears to have the implicit support of Gorbachev. The party Central Committee announced that pluralism in Hungary would be developed within a multiparty framework, and the regime has established a dialogue at several levels with independent opposition groups.

Three political parties (Social-Democratic, Smallholders', and National Peasant Parties) were reestablished during this reporting period. The regime started the exhumation of Imre Nagy and fellow victims of post-1956 reprisals and announced that it will allow reburial ceremonies on June 16, the 31st anniversary of his execution. Opposition meetings and *samizdat* activities continued, for the most part without official disruption. The National Assembly has approved an outline of the new Hungarian constitution to replace the Stalin-era document adopted in 1949. It has also approved important new laws on rights of assembly and free association and on strikes. It is taking steps toward augmenting the power of the judiciary and introducing a series of new laws on trade unions, political parties, and the press.

A dramatically liberalized passport law facilitated 11 million trips abroad by Hungarians in 1988, including a threefold increase in travel to Austria.

On the negative side, the police intervened in an overwhelming show of force to disrupt the democratic opposition's November 15 demonstration in support of refugees from Romania. Some of the human rights achievements registered to date are reversible by the regime, which still debates key decisions regarding the future role of the Communist Party in the workplace and in the armed forces, and the degree of representative democracy to be allowed in Hungary. Especially during the second-half of the reporting period, obtrusive deployment of the coercive power of the police has become increasingly rare, but the November 15 police actions demonstrate the absence of institutionalized guarantees of civil liberties in Hungary. Moreover, the apparatus' use of methods which violate the Hungarian constitution and current norms of individual privacy—particularly the use of wiretaps and the opening of mail—remains widespread. In March, over 40 members of independent organizations and parties, including the Community Party, received anonymous death threats by mail.

In the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), progress in CSCE Final Act implementation continues to come slowly. Where positive movement occurred in this reporting period, it usually appeared to be influenced by East German attempts to comply with Vienna Concluding Document commitments. The overall situation with respect especially to human rights and fundamental freedoms (Principle Seven) and humanitarian cooperation (Basket III) remains unsatisfactory, however, and improvements in the areas of travel and emigration to the West, for example, and limited relaxation in cultural areas were paralleled by continued tension between the Protestant Church and the state and by increased incidences of shooting at the wall.

A long-awaited law regulating travel and emigration was enacted in December 1988 and came into effect January 1. Under this law, individuals will have the right to judicial review of negative decisions after July 1. Additional amendments enacted in mid-March further broaden the rules for private visits in an attempt to address popular criticism that the new laws were proving more restrictive than the practice of the past several years. Generally speaking, however, family reunification, binational marriages, emigration, and travel to the West remain privileges rather than rights for G.D.R. citizens, and there is widespread skepticism among East Germans that the new provisions will result in broader travel and emigration in 1989.

The easing of G.D.R. practice prior to the new law permitted record numbers of East Germans to travel West in 1988. West German authorities estimate there were 5 million visits by G.D.R. citizens to the West in 1988. The travelers included some 1.4 million persons under retirement age. By comparison, only 60,000 individuals under pension age were permitted to travel just 3 years ago. At the same time the number of East Germans allowed to emigrate to the Federal Republic in 1988 increased to 30,127 after 1987's low of 12,706. It is still too early to determine how the new regulations will affect 1989 totals, although the G.D.R. leadership has indicated that the travel levels will at least remain steady, and at least 12,000 individuals were allowed to emigrate in the first-quarter of this year.

There has been no relaxation of G.D.R. vigilance along the heavily guarded frontier and at the sector-sector demarcation line in Berlin. In spite of the installation of a sophisticated early warning system, isolated cases of successful escape are reported. The number of unsuccessful escape attempts is a matter of conjecture. By mid-1987, there were reports that the practice of opening fire on would-be escapees had been virtually suspended, except in cases of military or police deserters or self-defense. Though the Minister of Defense stated in a September 1988 interview that there is no shoot-to-kill order, there has been an increase in shooting incidents at the wall in this reporting period, and in one case a civilian was killed. The government has not clarified its policy, and it is difficult to determine if the policy has, in fact, been modified.

Lutheran Church-state relations continue to be strained. G.D.R. authorities have censored church newspapers in this reporting period and approximately 50 church-based activists were briefly detained in October when they tried to demonstrate peacefully against this policy. Both the Protestant Church and the government have worked to keep lines of communication open, however.

Czechoslovak performance on CSCE implementation over the past 6 months remained seriously flawed, as major shortcomings continued to exist in implementation of Principle Seven of Basket I on fundamental human rights. Although some positive developments did occur, the period witnessed a marked increase in the frequency of events in which the authorities employed force and a variety of judicial and nonjudicial measures, such as threats, interrogations, short-term detentions, and the denial of passports to try to stifle inde-

pendent political, religious, and cultural activities. The single most significant event of the period was the trial and conviction of Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakia's foremost human rights activist, on charges brought against him in connection with demonstrations that occurred in Prague in January commemorating the suicide of Jan Palach in 1969. Havel was given an 8-month prison sentence.

On confidence-building and associated measures, the Czechoslovak Government met all the requirements mandated by the Stockholm CDE [Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe] agreement for notification of a military exercise held on its territory during February–March of this year. In addition, the Czechoslovaks published, in advance, information concerning a military exercise which, presumably, did not meet the threshold for notification under CDE.

Conditions for foreign business representatives remain far from ideal. However, some improvement may be in the offing as the limited economic reconstruction reforms Czechoslovakia has enacted start to take effect. Statistics and other commercial and economic information is limited. Czechoslovakia has a poor record on the issue of divided families. On other freedom of movement issues, its performance leaves much to be desired. Opportunities for Czechoslovak citizens to travel have increased somewhat but remain restricted. The country maintains tight border controls. There has been very little visible improvement in Czechoslovak performance concerning the dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information during the reporting period. Overall bilateral relations in the field of culture and education have sustained a fairly high level of activity, in part due to the implementation of a bilateral cultural, educational, and scientific exchange agreement concluded in April 1986 and renewed in 1988.

Bulgaria has not been in compliance with its CSCE commitments under Principle Seven of Basket I, although as before, the country substantially met its obligations under Principles One–Six and Eight–Ten of that basket. The government continued to deny its citizens certain human rights and fundamental freedoms: restricting the flow of information; maintaining legal barriers to freedom of movement within and without the country; hampering freedom of assembly; and harassing the members of various independent human rights groups through measures including harassment, detention, internal exile, and de facto expulsion from the country. Measures actively hostile to the practice of Islam continued, and Bulgaria maintained its denial of the existence of the country's substantial and severely repressed Turkish minority. With regard to Baskets II and III, Bulgarian performance has generally been more positive. It has also made good progress in the area of family visit and reunification cases.

The Bulgarian Government's professed readiness for dialogue on international terrorism continued to exclude the actions of "national liberation" groups. Bulgaria remained unprepared to make a general condemnation of terrorism or to criticize terrorist groups by name. It did, however, issue a statement declaring itself to be "deeply concerned" over the death threat to author Salman Rushdie, calling on the "interested parties" to reach an acceptable agreement in connection with the general atmosphere of international cooperation.

Bulgaria enacted further economic reform measures aimed at decentralization and greater economic freedom. Continuing economic problems, including a growing level of hard currency debt, spurred the government's interest in expanding trade and business contacts with the West. It concluded loan and expertise agreements with a number of West European countries. Access to economic information and decisionmakers remained limited, however. Bulgarian officials actively pursued foreign economic opportunities and continued to press for accession to GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. The outcome of the economic reform effort is far from certain, and the degree of continued involvement of the government and party in the economy equally unclear. As the reforms are being enacted almost totally from the top down, there is a large amount of confusion, misinformation, and apathy at lower levels.

Bulgaria's generally cooperative attitude and an ongoing bilateral consultation process resulted in the resolution of a number of divided family cases on the U.S. Embassy's list. Other NATO countries also reported favorable developments in this sphere. Legal restrictions on travel and emigration remained in place, however, resulting in the continuing and gradual addition of new cases. Despite the continued increase in Bulgarians traveling abroad, legislation on the universal issue of passports remained an unfulfilled promise during the reporting period.

The Bulgarian Government displayed greater openness in airing social problems such as drug addiction, prostitution, and juvenile crime. It ceased jamming Radio Free Europe in December 1988, though jamming of Turkish broadcasts continued. Recent congresses of writers, artists, and other "intellectuals" did, for the first time, feature open and lively debate on a variety of sensitive topics. On the other hand, the regime continued to discipline those members of the press who strayed beyond acceptable government parameters in the field of *glasnost*, and it conducted an active propaganda campaign against dissidents and outspoken members of the intelligentsia. Although selected Western films and plays continued to be widely shown, there was no improvement in the dissemination of noncommunist printed information. The complete text of the Vienna Concluding Document was published in early March in the newsweekly *Po Sveta* published by the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency with a relatively limited circulation and in abridged form in the daily newspaper *Fatherland Front*.

The Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting

The Vienna CSCE followup meeting, which opened on November 4, 1986, was concluded on January 19, 1989. Thanks to the unity and persistence of the NATO countries, and with the valuable contribution of the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries, the conference ended with significant advances across the board for the CSCE process. The unexpected length of the conference reflected the difficulty encountered in reaching a consensus agreement on the Concluding Document, on the schedule of followup activities to take place in advance of the next followup conference and on next steps in the areas of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

U.S. goals for the Vienna conference had been an improved implementation of CSCE human rights commitments by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the strengthening and expanding of those commitments and significant post-Vienna followup activities in the area of human rights to balance results in the security and economic dimensions. All of these objectives were met.

In the all-important area of human rights, the Vienna meeting gave additional impetus to noteworthy progress by the Soviet Union and certain East European states in meeting their human rights commitments. Emigration from the Soviet Union and some East European countries increased, and travel restrictions were eased. Jamming of foreign broadcasts was cut back sharply, and in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, important steps were taken in the direction of introducing more democratic election procedures.

The Vienna Concluding Document itself incorporated a far-reaching set of new CSCE commitments, including the most

comprehensive statement of human rights commitments ever achieved in an East-West framework. Signatory states committed themselves to respecting the rights of CSCE monitors, allowing direct and normal reception of foreign radio broadcasts and maintaining the integrity of private postal and telecommunications services. Delegations accepted time limits for resolving applications for family reunification and emergency travel and expanded rights of free religious practice in many important respects. Participants agreed as well to introduce a review mechanism through which CSCE states can make inquiries regarding specific human rights cases which must be answered by the receiving state. During the current review period this mechanism was implemented by several countries, including the U.S., with mixed results.

Human rights figure prominently as well in the agreed schedule of followup activities for the period in advance of the next full followup meeting in Helsinki in 1992. Delegations in Vienna agreed to convene a conference on the human dimension of the CSCE, consisting of three meetings during that period to address human rights concerns. The first is set for this June in Paris, the second for Copenhagen in 1990, and the third for Moscow in 1991. The U.S. joined in endorsing the Moscow meeting on the basis of human rights improvements already made by the Soviets and with the expectation and indication that progress will continue. The U.S. decision was also based on a firm expectation that there will be free and open access for nongovernmental organizations and individuals concerned with human rights at the Moscow meeting.

The series of experts' meetings will also address, among other topics, environmental problems (Sofia, 1989), economics (Bonn, 1990), and culture (Krakow, 1991). The planned information forum convened in London shortly after the close of the current reporting period.

On security issues, all 35 participating states agreed to expand the results of the Stockholm conference on security- and confidence-building measures through a new round of talks, to begin in Vienna on March 9. Conclusion of the Vienna meeting also cleared the way for the opening of an autonomous negotiation among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on conventional arms reductions designed to achieve stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces. The resulting Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), to be conducted within the framework of the CSCE process, was to begin in Vienna on March 9.

In Basket II, covering economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation, CSCE states agreed to publish more comprehensive, comparable, and timely economic and commercial information. They also committed themselves to cooperation in combating AIDS [acquired immune deficiency syndrome], to promoting rational use of nonrenewable energy resources and to reducing environmental pollution, particularly with regard to sulphur emissions. They agreed to work toward becoming parties to the Vienna convention and Montreal protocol on protecting the ozone layer. The final document also calls for respecting the human rights of scientists and environmental activists.

Finally, participants in Vienna strengthened the commitments already formulated in Madrid against international terrorism, with calls for extradition or prosecution of those accused of terrorist acts.

Chapter Two

Implementation of Basket I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The first section or "basket" of the Final Act has two main parts. The first part is the declaration of 10 principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating states agree to observe in their relations with one another and with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating states endorse certain confidence-building measures that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament. This basket of the Final Act was updated and enhanced at the Stockholm meeting of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which ended in 1986. Participants in Vienna agreed to convene a new round of CSBM talks this year.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

Principle One: Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle Two: Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Principle Three: Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle Four: Territorial integrity of states;

Principle Five: Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle Six: Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Principle Seven: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle Eight: Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle Nine: Cooperation among states; and

Principle Ten: Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The Madrid Concluding Document contains complementary principles which strengthen and extend the Final Act. These include pledges to take effective measures against terrorism; to prevent territories from being used for terrorist activities; to assure constant, tangible progress in the exercise of human rights; to reaffirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and freedoms; to consult with religious organizations in order to enhance individual freedom to practice and profess religion; to consider favorably applications for registration by religious communities; to ensure respect for the rights of workers freely to establish and join trade unions and the

right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities; and other rights.

The Vienna Concluding Document took these principles a step further. Participating states adopted considerably expanded commitments to prevent and suppress international terrorism. In the area of human rights, they pledged to alter national legislation to give effect to human rights commitments and to publish and disseminate the Final Act and Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents, as well as all laws and procedures relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms. They agreed to prevent discrimination against persons or the families of persons seeking to exercise their human rights and to provide an avenue to appeal governmental decisions. On religious freedom, CSCE states accepted a commitment to permit religious communities to establish, maintain, and independently manage their places of worship and to allow parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children according to their own beliefs. The Vienna meeting also made a special call for the protection of national minorities.

Implementation of Principle Seven

The implementation record of the Soviet Union and East European countries remains unsatisfactory, particularly with respect to Principle Seven. This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, as well as the right to "know and act upon" one's rights.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country does not necessarily imply their absence.

Soviet Union. On February 15, 1989, in accordance with the Geneva accords, the Soviet Union withdrew the last of its troops from Afghanistan, ending over 9 years of occupation which had violated the Helsinki Act principles regarding respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, refraining from the use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, and nonintervention in internal affairs. The Soviet Union, however, continues to provide vital military support to the regime it installed in Afghanistan, which is fighting to prevent a transfer of power to a more representative government. Moreover, the Soviet occupation has left a legacy of severe social and economic problems: tens of thousands of mines laid by Soviet and Afghan forces remain in place, posing a deadly threat to Afghan civilians; a massive number of refugees must be repatriated; the Afghan economy must be reconstructed and revitalized.

Soviet performance in the field of human rights (Principle Seven) improved considerably during this reporting period. Emigration continued to rise, although it remained restricted almost exclusively to Armenians, Germans, Jews, and Pentecostals. Restrictions on private travel abroad continued to be loosened, as did restrictions on entry visas for former Soviet citizens.

While work on a new criminal code continued, draft "Principles of Criminal Legislation" were published December 16, 1988, and opened to public discussion. The principles would limit to six the crimes punishable by capital punishment, abolish internal and external exile as forms of punishment, reduce the number of types of labor camps from three to two, and bring Soviet criminal legislation better into line with international agreements. Final adoption of a new criminal code, however, is not expected until late this year. Meanwhile, the "political" and "religious" articles continued in force and local authorities continued to threaten prosecution under them.

By the end of 1988, the Soviet authorities announced there were no persons in confinement solely on Article 70, 142, 190.1 or 227 charges. Reliable Western sources, however, believed that Nikolai Golub and Gennady Kucher were being held in labor camps at that time under Article 190.1. Another prisoner, Eduard Kritsky, was arrested earlier in prison camp under the same article. His sentence was extended for "habitual disobedience of camp officials' orders."

In December the Leningrad authorities launched an investigation of several members of the unofficial "Democratic Union" under Article 70. So far, formal charges have not been lodged. An unknown number of political or religious prisoners convicted on trumped-up charges or forcibly committed to psychiatric hospitals remains. Reliable dissident sources put their number at 100–250. U.S.-Soviet negotiations to set up a mechanism to review such cases are continuing.

Article 190.3 investigations were also initiated, notably in Sverdlovsk and against four Georgian activists. Official and semi-official attacks on political dissenters continued to take place as well. On February 12, for instance, the central press launched assaults on Valeriy Senderov, Sergey Grigoryants, and Lev Timofeyev, three prominent Moscow-based political activists.

Unofficial groups and publications continued to flourish, although official criticism of some of them, particularly those with nationalist overtones, grew sharper toward the end of the review period. Late last year, Moscow cracked down on Armenian and Azerbaydzhan national activists. In December and January, the 11 members of the Karabakh committee and several other leading Karabakh activists were arrested. They were transferred to Moscow, pending completion of a criminal investigation under Article 74 ("Violation of National and Racial Equality"). Within dissident and liberal intellectual circles the activists are widely considered to be political prisoners. A number of committees for their defense have sprung up.

While the diminishing number of political and religious prisoners signaled progress, the lack of legal protection of individual rights continued to permit the arbitrary use of power by Soviet authorities. The number of individuals complaining to the U.S. Embassy about a variety of abuses of power continued to rise, in part a reflection of both greater freedom of expression and access to the embassy and in part a decrease in fear of contact with foreigners. It is an indication that abuse of power, especially at the local level, continued to be a serious problem.

Recently released political prisoners reported that conditions in prisons and labor camps continued to be deplorable, with inadequate diet, poor or no medical treatment, beatings, repeated sentencing to punishment cells, and few or no family visits or correspondence allowed. The Soviet press has begun to criticize camp conditions and incompetent or abusive personnel.

Reform of Soviet psychiatry continued. In March the World Psychiatric Association decided to readmit the Soviet Union on a provisional basis. The Soviet Union withdrew from the association in 1983 when expulsion appeared imminent. The transfer of psychiatric hospitals from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health, though initiated, had not been completed by the end of the review period. No significant change in the leadership of Soviet psychiatry has occurred since 1983.

A U.S. team of psychiatrists and legal experts visited Soviet psychiatric hospitals in February and March and examined current and former psychiatric patients suspected of having been confined for political reasons. They have made no public statement of their findings pending

the publication of their report, expected in early June.

There were no reports of long-term confinement in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons, although short-term confinement or threats of confinement continued to be used to harass dissidents. Among new cases reported during this period was that of Anatoliy Ilchenko, who was committed to a hospital in December in Nikolayevsk, Ukraine. He was reportedly told by a local doctor that he was being committed in order to prevent him from talking with the U.S. delegation about his previous confinement. However, he was examined by the U.S. delegation at their request and was released shortly afterward.

A some other individuals confined in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons were released during this period, including Nadir Agayev, Grigoriy Aleksandrov, and Valeriy Timokhin. Despite these releases, the system still makes it too easy for "troublesome" people to be put away with no legal recourse. Reforms to date have made that less frequent, but it continues to happen.

The new law on psychiatry that entered into force March 1, 1988, has not yet resulted in any criminal trial of a Soviet psychiatrist for wrongful commitment. The law continues to be criticized for providing for no legal review of forced commitment and for making it so difficult to bring charges of wrongful commitment against a psychiatrist as to render it virtually impossible.

The transfer of special psychiatric hospitals, now called "hospitals with strict observation," from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health had been effected in part at the end of the reporting period. While most such hospitals have been formally transferred to the Ministry of Health, they were still not entirely integrated into that ministry.

Individuals continued to be removed from the "register" (*uchet*) of mentally ill, which carries with it various restrictions on one's activity, and Soviet officials expressed their desire to greatly limit the register's scope. That remained a problem, however.

The Soviet leadership's pursuit of the "democratization" of Soviet society, along with the policy of *glasnost*, continued to improve the ability of Soviet citizens to criticize their government and its policies. The Soviet press published numerous articles critical of various aspects of Soviet society and politics, as well as some articles written by non-Soviets presenting foreign opinion. This development was paralleled by the greater willingness among the public to discuss formerly taboo topics. Dissidents also received the opportunity to air their views publicly. Andrey Sakharov's electoral platform, for example, was published in the Soviet press. Other leading dissidents, such as Lev Timofeyev, Sergey Grigoryants, and Father Gleb Yakunin, regularly addressed informal groups such as the "Memorial Society" and the "Moscow Tribune" along with mainstream Soviet intellectuals.

The March 26 election of 1,500 deputies to a new institution, the Congress of People's Deputies, marked the first broadly competitive elections in Soviet history, even though some 85% of the candidates were Communist Party members and the Communist Party remained the only party. Voters rejected some 20 regional party first secretaries, among the most powerful politicians in the country. A candidate member of the politburo was also rejected.

The limits of what was permissible to print continued to expand. A widely read Leningrad journal published an article on reform that criticized Gorbachev by name. Another journal began to serialize a revised version of Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge*, a monumental criticism of the Stalin era, long-banned in the Soviet Union. The professional journal of Soviet historians also began to serialize a long-banned and powerful indictment of Stalin and the system he created written by a former political prisoner, Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko. Newspaper, magazine, and TV/radio discussion of social and economic problems became franker.

Unofficial groups and publications continued their rapid proliferation. Estimates of unofficial groups now range upwards of 60,000, double the number in the last reporting period. The groups focused on a wide range of subjects, from such "acceptable" interests as foreign language study to political activity. Of note were two groups that sprang up to monitor Soviet compliance with the Vienna Concluding Document, one focusing on compliance in Siberia the other on compliance with regard to Jews. "Spilka," a Helsinki monitoring group based in Lvov, was among several that were active in observing Soviet compliance with CSCE principles.

The number of unofficial publications also increased sharply. Several publications, notably *The Express Chronicle* and the *Bulletin of the Christian Community*, now have extensive networks of correspondents throughout the Soviet Union. These have proven particularly effective in disseminating information during major events, such as the crisis in Armenia, and in reporting up-to-date information on the human rights situation.

Unofficial groups in several areas, particularly the Baltics, gained broad popularity and came to act increasingly like political parties. Many popular front organization candidates in the Baltic states won election to the new Congress of People's Deputies. Several unofficial groups, including the "Democratic Union," the "Memorial Society," and the "Fellowship of Russian Artists," held national conferences.

Official reaction to the growth of such groups varied widely. In general, Soviet authorities tolerated the groups while trying to coopt them. The *Komsomol* organization was particularly vigorous in such efforts at cooptation, although generally with limited success. At the same time, some official reactions were highly critical. In Kazakhstan, for instance, the Republic first secretary blasted unofficial groups as dangerous organizations.

The Soviets continued applying the July 29 RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] law on demonstrations selectively. While many large unauthorized demonstrations took place, local authorities in several cities denied many groups permission to hold gatherings.

Freedom to profess one's religion remains severely restricted in the Soviet Union. There are insufficient numbers of places of worship and clergy to meet public needs because of official restrictions. Local authorities still have the right to refuse to register religious congregations and to deny them adequate premises. KGB influence over official religious activities remains extensive. Soviet legislation on religion is said to be under review, but it is not yet clear how substantial the reform will be. New laws on religious communities and freedom of conscience will reportedly appear by midsummer.

The new electoral law promulgated last December allows clergymen to participate fully in the electoral process, granting them for the first time in Soviet history the right to serve as deputies in soviets at all levels. Several clergymen ran in the March elections to the Congress of People's Deputies and at least two Russian Orthodox metropolitans, Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Aleksey of Leningrad and Novgorod, were elected.

The situation of Soviet Jews continued to improve in some areas. In the cultural realm, one noteworthy event was the February 22 opening of the Solomon Mikhoels Jewish Cultural Center in Moscow. Cultural centers were also opened in other cities, including Vilnius and Riga and promised in Dushanbe. Further, much fanfare surrounded the opening of the Academy of World Civilization, whose fields will include Judaic studies. Nevertheless, efforts to open such a center in Leningrad met with stonewalling from local officials. Further, some *refuseniks* complained that the Mikhoels Center does not constitute an

independent voice for the Jewish community, and its precise purposes and plans remained somewhat undefined. A Judaic studies center also opened in Moscow in February. It represents the first such center in over 60 years.

Unofficial Hebrew-language teaching continued to spread, with Soviet authorities placing no significant barriers in its way. Among the principal limitations to its growth is the small number of qualified teachers. About 100 teachers belong to an organization of Hebrew-language instructors, though many have only a basic knowledge of the language.

Jewish emigration has remained at the levels reported during the last review period. Many Jews were able to travel abroad to visit relatives given the lessening of Soviet travel restrictions.

For *refuseniks* the situation was mixed. Until the Vienna followup meeting concluded, the Soviets were resolving large numbers of *refusenik* cases. In December 1988, for instance, 200 *refuseniks* were given permission to leave, including Yuriy Chernyak and Yuliy Kosharovskiy. Also among those to receive "temporary" exit permission was Georgiy Samoilovich, a long-time *refusenik* suffering from a serious case of malignant cancer. Until April 3, on the very eve of Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom, the Soviet authorities had continued to deny Samoilovich permission to emigrate or travel abroad on "security grounds," despite strong pressure from the U.S. and British Governments.

Nevertheless, numerous *refuseniks* continued to be denied permission to emigrate. By one authoritative count, some 650 *refusenik* cases remained unresolved in the Soviet Union as of mid-March. Further, after the Vienna meeting concluded, very few *refusenik* cases were favorably resolved and several first-time applicants were refused.

Several new *refusenik* groups sprang up, including one to monitor Soviet compliance with the Vienna Concluding Document and another to monitor the activities of the Soviet passport agency (OVIR). Soviet officials even held formal meetings with members of the latter group to discuss emigration issues, reflecting a new approach to *refusenik* groups, which in the past had been disregarded or harassed.

Instances of anti-Semitism continued to occur, and public expressions of anti-Semitism remained high. Soviet officials, however, did not give their imprimatur to such sentiments, as their handling of the anti-Semitic *Pamyat* organization indicated.

The balance sheet for Christians was mixed. On the positive side, Russian Orthodox Christmas services (January 6–7), at least in Moscow and Leningrad, were allowed to proceed without official interference. The authorities made no effort to prevent believers and the curious of any age from attending. In Lithuania, Christmas (December 25) was declared a public holiday. The impact was minimized, however, since Christmas fell on a Sunday.

In January, Konstantin Kharchev, the Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, told Russian Orthodox activists that 809 Russian Orthodox congregations had been registered in 1988, that four new seminaries would be opened to help overcome the shortage of priests, and that two new monasteries—near Novgorod and Ryazan—would be returned to the Russian Orthodox Church.

In conjunction with the millennium celebrations last July, the Russian Orthodox Church said it would publish 100,000 copies of a jubilee edition of the Bible. It also received permission to import 150,000 Bibles in Russian and 100,000 in Ukrainian and 500,000 prayer books in Russian. Dissident sources, however, claim that few of these items have been made available to laymen.

In August 1988 it was announced that there were no longer any customs regulations restricting the importation of Bibles and other literature because of their religious content, although laws against speculation continued to limit the numbers that could be imported. Individuals can now receive religious literature through the mail. Many have already received small packages of such literature. According to the Slavic Gospel Association, over half a million Bibles have been sent into the Soviet Union. Many such packages, however, fail to make it to the addressee. Whether those packages are being seized officially or whether individuals with access to the mails are stealing the books for resale on the black market (Bibles in Russian fetch as much as 200 rubles) is not known.

The authorities allowed a number of unofficial religious groups to hold seminars and conferences with minimal interference. The editors of two unofficial religious publications, *Vybor* (*Choice*) and the *Bulletin of the Christian Community*, have been allowed to rent halls to discuss their journals with interested readers.

Russian Orthodox deacon Vladimir Rusak and Lithuanian Catholic priest Sigitas Tamkevicius were both released from labor camps last fall.

On the negative side, the Ukrainian Catholic Church (Uniates) are still subject to severe repression, even though Soviet officials in Moscow claim that their legal status is under review and have received Uniate delegations. As in the last reporting period, the authorities in western Ukraine began to use the decree on demonstrations and meetings as grounds for breaking up Uniate services as unauthorized meetings and demonstrations. A number of Uniate clergymen and activists have received administrative sentences of up to 15 days and fines for participating in services.

Many Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals, and Seventh-day Adventists continued to be sentenced for refusing to perform military service on religious grounds. Some have been sentenced to new terms having already served one or more terms for the same offense. At the same time, reports have surfaced indicating some persons have been permitted to satisfy draft requirements by service in units which do not bear arms.

The Soviet authorities continued to exert steady pressure to encourage Muslim inhabitants of central Asia and Azerbaydzhan to abandon their religion. Although a few mosques were opened and a new religious school is scheduled to be opened in Baku shortly, the number of mosques and clergymen remained inadequate. U.S. authorities have received no new reports of arrests of Muslim clergymen or laymen for religious activities.

Soviet authorities continue to deny Hare Krishna the right to register except in Moscow and Riga. And in Moscow, the authorities failed during the reporting period to provide the group with a meeting place. The Hare Krishna gathered on Arbat Street in the center of Moscow and were regularly detained and fined for distributing religious literature at that location. There have also been reports of beatings by militia, including one incident on December 7. In a positive development, a group of about 60 Hare Krishna from around the Soviet Union were permitted to travel to India for 2 months in February. U.S. authorities know of no Hare Krishna in prison or labor camps at this time.

The process of russianization in Ukraine continued, but a number of unofficial groups that foster Ukrainian language and culture held founding conferences during the review period, including the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian language society and All-Ukrainian Historical Enlightenment Memorial Society. One common demand is the adoption of Ukrainian as the official language of the Republic. The Soviet Government is sensitive to both religious and nationalist dissent in Ukraine, and repression still tends to be harsher than in other areas. Nevertheless, the authorities have allowed greater scope for Ukrainian cultural activity and have tolerated a number of Ukrainian *samizdat* journals.

A number of Ukrainian political prisoners were released during the review period including Helsinki monitor L.G. Lukyanenko as well as G.V. Badzo, D.D. Mazur,

M.I. Matusevich, and G.F. Nichiporenko. Ukrainian activists Vyacheslav Chornovil, Mikhailo Horyn, Ivan Hel, and others continued to be subjected to harsh press attacks in Ukrainian newspapers.

Lvov authorities endeavored to head off a demonstration to mark Human Rights Day on December 10 by detaining up to 30 activists and warning others to stay away. Some 10,000 persons still showed up and listened to speeches despite the authorities' efforts to drown them out. In Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk, authorities allowed small meetings to mark Human Rights Day, while in Odessa the authorities detained the organizers and prevented any such meeting.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose forced annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940 has never been recognized by the U.S., have long resisted assimilation of Russian language and culture. Under *glasnost* and "democratization," public expressions of nationalist sentiment continued to grow during this review period. Last October, all three Baltic Popular Fronts held founding congresses. Membership in each numbers in the tens of thousands and includes numerous communists. In Estonia, party members reportedly make up the majority.

Last fall major campaigns against proposed amendments to the U.S.S.R. constitution were launched in the three republics because of the widespread belief that the amendments would further limit the Republics' sovereignty. In November, the Estonian Supreme Soviet rejected the amendments and declared Estonia "sovereign." Although Moscow declared the Estonian act unconstitutional, it has done nothing so far to impose its decision. Meanwhile, Estonia and the two other Baltic states are redrafting their constitutions to enhance their independence from Moscow.

Language laws that would enhance the status of the local language have been passed in Estonia and Lithuania and are under consideration in Latvia.

Ethnic tension increased in all three republics during the review period but did not explode into violence. Russian-dominated fronts have emerged in opposition to the popular fronts, reportedly with Moscow's encouragement if not active support. The Russian-dominated fronts have denounced the language laws as discriminatory and have decried local nationalism.

Interethnic strife in the Caucasus over the Karabakh issue exploded into violence in mid-November. By official admission, Armenians and Azerbaydzhanis were killed in violence in Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhan, and in northern Armenia. Late in November, states of emergency were declared throughout the region, including Yerevan and Baku. Demonstrations and rallies were banned, and activists in both Baku and Yerevan were detained. At the end of the review period, the states of emergency remained in effect.

In January, the Supreme Soviet set up a Committee of Special Administration, headed by A.I. Volskiy, in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous *oblast*. Under this arrangement, the *oblast* is directly subordinate to the central government, although technically it remains a part of Azerbaydzhan. The arrangement is reportedly a temporary measure to calm the region until a permanent solution to the Karabakh question can be worked out.

Evicted from the Crimea in 1944, Crimean Tatars continue to pursue their twin goals of return to their homeland and reestablishment of a Crimean autonomous region. The authorities have so far refused to satisfy either demand, preferring instead to take measures to meet the national and cultural needs of Crimean Tatars in their current places of residence.

On November 6–8, some 80 Crimean Tatar activists held a strategy session in the Crimea. They drew up rules and a program for a Crimean Tatar national movement, which they then distributed to "the people" for discussion. Later this spring, the activists plan to hold a founding conference for the movement, after which they will try to register the movement officially.

During the review period, two Crimean Tatar political prisoners were released, S. Kadyrov (who had completed his sentence) and R. Ablayev.

National activism rose sharply in Moldavia during the review period, as a number of unofficial groups, including the Democratic Movement and the Mateyevich Club, began to push their demands in regular Sunday meetings in Kishinev. At present, attention is focused on the language issue. National activists are demanding that Moldavian be adopted as the Republic's official language, that the Latin script be reinstated for Moldavian and that it be officially acknowledged that Moldavian and Romanian are the same language. The authorities created a commission to review these demands. At the same time, the central press, most recently in *Pravda* on March 29, has criticized the activists' goals and methods.

The right of Soviet workers freely to establish and join trade unions remains severely circumscribed, though officially tolerated independent unions appeared for the first time. These independent unions were confined to very specific industries (e.g., gold mining and airline pilots) and may be tolerated because they do not challenge the official line, at least not outside their specific fields. Official trade unions showed signs of becoming more assertive and protective of worker interests, but overall they remained confined to such issues as vacations, day care, and the like. New councils of workers' collectives took on the role of representing labor before management and even selecting management. There were reports of councils challenging management and ministry decisions, with positive results. Over time, these workers' councils may develop into effective instruments for representing worker interests, at least within individual firms.

In the context of *glasnost*, the Soviet press spoke more openly about socioeconomic problems and revealed a number of them for the first time. Unemployment was admitted for the first time since the early 1930s. Despite a major government program to boost apartment construction, housing problems increased and the number of people on waiting lists for improved housing grew. In 1988, the government approved the sale of apartments to their residents. This measure has had little effect because implementing instructions have not been issued. Inflation, now estimated at 5%–7% per year, has hit the pocketbooks of pensioners and all others on low, fixed incomes. Discussion of pension reform has intensified and the Soviet press has focused attention on the plight of the poor and elderly. Growing shortages of food and consumer goods also affected the elderly and the poor, who are less able to shop at expensive farmers' markets and weekend fairs. Proposals to index pensions to inflation and establish special stores for the poor have been advanced. To date, little has happened to address these problems. Retail price reform has now been postponed, something which will aid the poor and pensioners, but will also undermine prospects for growth.

A decision to ban cooperatives from most health care fields, made in the name of equality for all and an end to after-hours use of equipment, was a negative step which closed off one hopeful area in Soviet health care. However, the overall cost of health care remained low. Soviet education remained essentially free, though fixed, low stipends created some problems for students, given the level of inflation. No change in the Soviet system's provision of equal rights to men and women took place. Women work in virtually all professions but seldom rise to top-level administrative and political positions.

Romania. While the Romanian constitution contains guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the government's observance of basic rights

continues to be poor. The Romanian Communist Party and the Government tolerate no significant opposition and all forms of mass media are tightly controlled. Freedom of conscience is seriously limited by the widespread belief that any criticism of the leadership or political system will be reported to the police and will be punished. Freedoms of association and assembly are limited by these same fears and by government policies that allow meetings and assembly only for officially approved purposes. The right of the individual to know and act upon his rights is limited.

Neither the complete text of the Vienna Concluding Document nor even selected portions of it have been published or circulated. Press coverage of the Vienna conference focused on Romania's objection to general human rights provisions but never described individual provisions of the Vienna Concluding Document. Several CSCE member countries have attempted to activate the human dimension mechanism of the Vienna Concluding Document vis-a-vis Romania by requesting information on cases of humanitarian interest. The Romanian Government has rejected these approaches and refused to accept the diplomatic notes transmitted on the subject.

Effective executive, legislative, judicial, and/or administrative remedies for addressing human rights violations do not exist. The judiciary is limited to "defending the socialist order and personal rights, educating citizens to the respect of the law" and applying sanctions to reeducate lawbreakers and prevent further infractions. No court has the authority to review the constitutionality of laws. Theoretically, judges are independent and subject only to the law. The outcome of politically sensitive cases, including those involving freedom of expression or religion, however, appears predetermined and, at times, contradict evidence offered during the trial. There does not appear to be any effective mechanism whereby individuals can raise alleged human rights violations. Many criminal laws are open-ended enough to ensure that persons coming under official scrutiny may be charged with some offense—for example, "parasitism" if a person is unemployed but not guilty of any other offense. The ability of an accused person to conduct his or her defense effectively can be severely limited, especially in politically sensitive cases. Independent lawyers often refuse to handle such cases. Court-appointed attorneys appear to concentrate on apologizing for the defendant rather than conducting an effective defense.

No groups exist in Romania to promote or protect human rights or to observe and promote the implementation of CSCE provisions. Groups are not permitted to exist for other than officially approved activities. Individuals, such as Doina Cornea, who attempt to speak out in defense of human rights suffer severe harassment by the government. Often their movements are restricted, they are kept under strict surveillance, and are sometimes jailed for several days at a time. In January three journalists and at least one typesetter were arrested for allegedly attempting to publish a document critical of the Romanian Government. Six former government/party officials, who signed a letter criticizing Ceausescu's policies, have been subjected to interrogation and harassment and reprisals against family members. Individuals from outside Romania are not permitted to meet with Romanians to discuss human rights. In December a group from the Frankfurt-based International Organization for Human Rights, which had hoped to discuss human rights, was expelled by the Romanian Government, which labeled the group's activities "incompatible with its tourist visa status."

The government is pressing plans to "systematize" or modernize rural areas by eliminating about half of Romanian villages and developing designated agro-industrial centers. According to authorities, one goal of the plan is to equalize the living standards of rural and urban areas. Despite Romanian Government statements that no person will be moved involuntarily, it appears that in those areas where the plan has already been implemented, the population has had no voice in the decision, and there is no clear mechanism through which residents can make their views known or protest the implementation of the plan. At present, "systematization" is being implemented primarily in urban centers, often displacing the population on very short notice and destroying important cultural and historic monuments. The few Romanians who have made public statements protesting "systematization" have suffered reprisals.

The government's drive to repay its foreign debt has been accompanied by a severe domestic austerity program. Continued exports of agricultural products have also imposed severe shortages of basic foodstuffs on the Romanian people.

The practice of religion in Romania continues to be circumscribed by the government. Romania recognizes 14 denominations, though one of these, the Roman Catholic Church, enjoys only de facto recognition. Among the denominations not recognized by the government are the Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists, Eastern Rite Catholics (Uniate), and the Nazarenes. Members of those unrecognized denominations continue to meet illegally at the risk of arrest and prosecution. There have been no known recent attempts by these denominations to seek official recognition. The press campaign against the institution of religion continues. Religious activists are generally kept under scrutiny by the authorities and are occasionally subject to loss of jobs and social benefits, as well as other forms of harassment.

Government actions restrict the evangelically oriented Protestant faiths more than the Romanian Orthodox Church (to which a large majority of Romanians belong) or other long-established denominations. The growth of these activist, proselytizing churches in Romania during the last 15 years has led to continued friction between their congregations and the government. Romanian control over clergy salaries, building permits, seminary admissions, and printing of religious materials is routinely used to limit the activities of these organizations.

Theological training is available in Hungarian for the Catholic and Hungarian reformed denominations and in German for the Lutheran denomination. Individual churches hold youth groups and Sunday school classes in the languages of the congregation. The Baptists, the Seventh-day Adventists, and the Pentecostals also maintain seminaries. Admissions to the seminaries are controlled by the government, however, and many denominations assert that they are not permitted to train enough seminarians to meet their needs.

Religious believers are permitted to possess religious materials for their personal use. It is not uncommon, however, for police to search an individual's home and confiscate religious literature alleging that it is intended for distribution. Government control over the production and distribution of all printed materials limits the freedom of religious faiths to produce, import, or disseminate religious publications and materials. The Orthodox Church has been permitted to print enough Bibles to meet its needs.

Government controls over building permits restrict the ability of religious communities to establish and maintain places of worship. A replacement has still not been located for the large Seventh-day Adventist church in Bucharest demolished in 1986. The Oradea Second Baptist Church has also not received permission to expand or to build a new structure on land it bought for that purpose. Pressure continues on the Pentecostal Church in Bistrita, which was threatened with demolition in 1987 when it attempted an unauthorized expansion after having waited several years for a building approval. The church's leader, Alexandru Murza, has faced increasing pressure from government authorities and was recently told he must

report for military service, a tactic commonly used to deter an activist church leader.

Romanian nationalism remains an important force in this country, which has always had a large number of ethnic minorities. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, the government apparently seeks to integrate and absorb these minorities into a single Romanian culture. Government efforts to centralize and economize by combining education, social and cultural facilities have resulted in a substantial loss of ethnic minority group cultural opportunities (especially for ethnic Hungarians and Germans). Gypsies continue to form an underclass of Romanian society.

Primary schooling is still available in minority languages (Hungarian and German as well as Czech and Serbian). As the minority populations emigrate or are dispersed, it becomes more difficult for them to muster the number of pupils required by law to form a class in a minority language. In some cases, even though the legal minimum is met, the schools are unable to provide an appropriate teacher. For high school classes, a minimum of 26 students is required in order to have a class in a minority language, and such classes are not always provided even when the minimum is met. The Hungarian community, in particular, has voiced complaints about the decreased opportunities for high school study in their native language. During this reporting period there have been increasing complaints from the Hungarian community that Hungarian language schools have been closed and that ethnic Hungarian students have been forced to attend high school in Romanian language communities. Reports also persist that Hungarian-speaking teachers are assigned to ethnic Romanian areas while teachers who speak only Romanian are brought into ethnic Hungarian communities. Some books and periodicals are published in Romania in minority languages, but access to foreign publications in minority languages is extremely limited. Romania continues to deny any form of discrimination against Hungarians or other ethnic minorities.

Once arrested, a person may be held without trial for up to 1 month before a hearing, but the prosecutor may obtain an extension for an additional 3 months. After this, the court may order further extensions in 30-day increments. There is no limit set by law on the total length of time a person may be held prior to trial. There is no provision for bail. The law also provides for preventive detention. Persons detained for investigation often are held incommunicado. They are detained for varying periods of time, sometimes as long as several days, and then released without charge. Such arbitrary detention may be repeated several times, and the person may be called back repeatedly and threatened with further harassment or punishment. This treatment is particularly common for religious activists and former political prisoners.

There are numerous reports that persons are mistreated while in Romanian prisons or police custody and that police authorities act brutally to obtain information. Persons detained for questioning are often held incommunicado and kept for long periods without sleep, food, or access to toilet facilities. Witnesses also report incidents in which police have administered severe beatings to persons arrested for minor infractions.

Although Amnesty International in 1987 reported a decline in the abuse of psychiatric treatment as a form of punishment, other sources assert that the practice continues, inter alia through the administration of drugs to prisoners. Religious activist Nestor Popescu remains interned in a psychiatric institution. He was arrested for creating a disturbance in August 1987 while seeking to speak with an official at a Western embassy.

Trade unions independent of the party are prohibited, and workers do not have the right to form their own associations, elect representatives, or affiliate with international organizations except through the official unions, grouped in the General Confederation of Romanian Trade Unions (UGSR). Attempts to form independent groups or unions are quickly and ruthlessly suppressed. Romania's labor code is silent on the right to strike, except to elaborate procedures by which the union leadership is required to mediate disputes between the workers and management, with recourse to the courts when the dispute cannot be settled. In practice, sanctions available to the party and the union make it unlikely that such disputes will reach the courts. Workers who have been dismissed from their jobs may sometimes take their case to civil court. In the past, the government's reaction to actual strikes, or to advocacy of the worker's right to strike, has been harsh repression. During this reporting period Romania's treatment of workers attempting to exercise their rights was the subject of a complaint by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) to the International Labor Organization (ILO).

Poland. The current reporting period was dominated by the roundtable talks between government and opposition, which ran from February to the beginning of April. In these intensive negotiations, representatives of the authorities and a broad cross-section of the opposition (with Solidarity predominating) considered fundamental questions concerning the future political, economic, and social configuration of Poland.

The agreement which emerged contains important provisions aimed at creating a more democratic and pluralistic political and economic order in the country. These points include, though are not limited to: the legalization of Solidarity, Rural Solidarity, and the Independent Students' Association (NZS); the creation of an upper house of parliament, the Senate, to which elections (scheduled for June 1989) are to be entirely free and democratic; and free, democratic elections to just over one-third of the constituencies in the lower house of parliament, the *Sejm*. The government promised that the current, less than fully democratic electoral law will apply only to the June 1989 parliamentary elections (with the new parliament to devise the next electoral law). The authorities also undertook commitments to liberalize the laws governing censorship, to permit an opposition daily and weeklies for Solidarity and Rural Solidarity, and to provide access for the opposition to limited amounts of time on state radio and television. They agreed as well to a greatly liberalized law on associations, expanded opportunities to establish nonstate schools, elimination from the criminal code of sections used to punish persons for political offenses, societal monitoring of environmental protection measures, and the elimination of the *nomenklatura* system of party-approved managers and officials from the national health care system.

The agreement did not satisfy all of the opposition's concerns. Important unmet demands include the elimination of the *nomenklatura* system from the economy and the education system, the lifting of restrictions on the underground press, and the introduction of a degree of genuine authority and autonomy to local governments. If fully implemented, the agreement could transform Poland into a real experiment in how a communist state might evolve into a more democratic and pluralistic society.

The complicated and at times dramatic chain of events through which the roundtable negotiations came about demonstrates that the democratizing processes those talks were designed to serve are still far from institutionalized in Poland. At the close of the previous reporting period, Solidarity had accepted Interior Minister General Czeslaw Kiszczak's proposal for such discussions. However, procedural wrangling ensued, with disagreements over what topics the roundtable would examine, how the talks would be orga-

nized, and who could—or, more importantly, could not—take part. These disputes arose, many in the opposition felt, from the government's reneging on the previously proposed terms for the roundtable. While articles in the official news media branding senior Solidarity advisers Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron as unacceptable extremists also contributed to activists' sense of bad faith dealings, the roundtable suffered what seemed to be its mortal blow in the government's surprise October 30 announcement that the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk would be closed within 3 months as unprofitable.

The November 30 televised debate between Lech Walesa and the leader of the officially sanctioned National Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), Alfred Miodowicz, dramatically reinvigorated the roundtable process. In that program, which the Polish authorities broadcast live without censorship of any kind, Walesa eloquently described Solidarity's goal of a pluralistic, democratic Poland and effectively destroyed any chance for opponents to succeed in depicting him or the banned trade union as dangerous or radical. Ten days later Walesa traveled to Paris at the invitation of French President Mitterrand, where his trip was accorded the attention usually given a visiting head of state.

At the 10th Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) plenum, which took place December 20–21, Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski acknowledged the opposition's enhanced stature, telling the delegates that "not only has the position of Walesa changed for the better in public opinion, but also support for reactivating Solidarity has grown. . . Such are the new realities which we cannot ignore." Extensive portions of the second part of the plenum, which took place January 16–18, were televised, and viewers were able to watch sometimes heated debates between party officials on whether, and under what terms, Solidarity should be legalized. Those who favored dialogue with the opposition prevailed, though not without difficulty, and a January 27 meeting between Walesa and Kiszczak cleared the way for the opening of the roundtable on February 6.

Both government and opposition representatives agreed the roundtable talks were an unprecedented development in an East European country. The actual discussions were carried out in three main roundtable groups devoted to political reform, economic and social issues, and trade union pluralism, and in 12 subgroups and additional working groups covering issues ranging from local self-government and the mass media to youth, mining, and housing policy.

Though the Polish mass media are largely state-owned (there are some church and private publications) and are subject to censorship, they nevertheless remain among the most candid official news sources in Eastern Europe. This was evident throughout the reporting period, especially during the time of the roundtable discussions. At the opening plenary session of those talks, which was broadcast live, opposition activists were able to address uncensored remarks directly to the Polish people. Coverage of the talks became a regular feature of newspapers and television, with the latter broadcasting an "at the roundtable" segment, in which government and opposition representatives were able to describe the day's work in the groups and subgroups. Official Polish media also reported on the press conferences of Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz, who for many years was treated as a nonperson and was once reviled in the government-owned press.

Opportunities for Poles to engage in political, trade union, and professional association activity were, not surprisingly, in a state of flux during the reporting period. While most former restrictions against such activity remained in the legal code, in many instances these laws were not enforced; thus, in practice, citizens' actual potential to exercise rights of free speech and free association often went beyond the letter of the law. The Polish Government's inconsistent record in such areas can be seen, for example, in the issue of independent associations. During the reporting period the authorities denied registration to an independent journalists' union and an independent students' association. Subsequently, at the roundtable, the government explicitly agreed to legalize the latter and promised to revise the existing law on associations in such a way that groups such as the former could appear. Likewise, during the reporting period the authorities permitted the registration of a political discussion club in Warsaw, an independent economic society, an association to foster the development of private schools, an association of Poles and the relatives of Poles who had been deported to Siberia during the Stalinist era and other groups. Competing U.S.-Polish friendship societies were also formed.

On February 15 a *Sejm* deputy announced in parliament that the Polish Christian Democratic Labor Party, which had voluntarily suspended operation in 1946, would reconstitute itself. His statement was reported in the official Polish news media. Of the various new groups formed or legalized during the reporting period, the one with perhaps the greatest long-term significance was the Citizens' Committee Affiliated with the Chairman of Solidarity, which was established on December 18. This group, which was created to work out programs addressing the most pressing problems in Polish political, economic, and social life, constituted the greater portion of the opposition's negotiating team and advisory experts at the roundtable talks. The agreements reached in that forum reflect the intensive preparatory work carried out by the Citizens' Committee. The Citizens' Committee is also set to play the leading role in developing an opposition list of candidates for the June parliamentary elections.

Events of the reporting period confirm that churches in general, and the Roman Catholic Church in particular, remain an important element of Polish society and political life. The Polish Government allows a high degree of religious freedom. Churches are free to preach, proselytize, build, and, to a lesser extent, publish. The Roman Catholic Church continues to broadcast Sunday Mass on state-run radio. The small Protestant groups do so on a rotating basis. The government also allows religious gatherings, such as pilgrimages and conferences, without significant interference. The Roman Catholic Church is the predominant religious force and the single largest independent institution in Poland. A substantial majority of all ages and social groups participate regularly in Catholic religious services. The next largest community is the Orthodox Church which claims approximately 800,000 adherents. Whatever social prejudice against the Orthodox may exist, it does not appear to be government-inspired. Approximately 24 other religious denominations exist in Poland and are permitted to practice their faiths freely as long as they avoid activities considered political.

While the Catholic Church in Poland eschews direct involvement in politics per se, the Polish Episcopate played a central role in bringing about the roundtable process in the interest of national reconciliation. The Roman Catholic church also continues a wide variety of social programs aimed at improving living conditions and enhancing the quality of life. Central to this mission is the Ministry for Working People which carries out a wide range of independent activities at local parishes throughout Poland. This work frequently involves cooperation with the opposition—for which individual priests may have paid a price.

Strikes and other protests occurred during the reporting period, although nothing on the scale of the widespread labor unrest which took place in April–May and August 1988. During those previous waves of strikes, the relegalization of Solidarity was prominent among the demands. With that issue on its way to resolution at

the roundtable talks, however, the protests which occurred in February and March focused exclusively on economic issues. Those strikes affected the postal service, bakeries, the transportation industry, and mining, among other industries. Opposition activists suspected that at least some of those protests were instigated by the official trade union OPZZ in an effort, with Solidarity on the threshold of legalization, to demonstrate its credentials as an authentic defender of the workers' interests. Meanwhile, the issue of workers being fired or demoted for their participation in the 1988 strikes remained inadequately resolved. Despite government assurances, some workers were still awaiting the chance to return to their former places of employment. At the roundtable talks the authorities promised legislation to address the issue of politically motivated dismissal of workers.

Protests by young people also took place during the reporting period. Some students were temporarily detained for taking part in demonstrations which occurred at various Polish universities. The most notable of these protests took place at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow in late February, which were harshly put down by the police. Most of the student protests, however, did not result in such confrontations with the police. At Walesa's personal request, one youth leader detained for taking part in an earlier protest was released in order to participate in the roundtable subgroup on youth.

Hungary. The legacy of past economic reform efforts is still the key to Hungary's relatively tolerant domestic policies, relaxed cultural atmosphere, and relatively high living standards, which rank with those in Czechoslovakia and the G.D.R. However, the Hungarian Government must cope with widespread unhappiness over rising prices, the imposition of income and value added taxes, and declining living standards, together with resistance to austerity measures and popular skepticism that the government has the will or capacity to turn the situation around. Economic hardships are distributed unevenly: industrial wage increases appear to be running behind the level of inflation, while skilled workers are still able to supplement their wages in the second economy, and a growing class of private entrepreneurs continues to consume conspicuously.

During the past 6 months, Hungary continued to enjoy its reputation as one of the best performing of the Warsaw Pact states. Although its observance of the 10 Helsinki Final Act guiding principles and the corresponding Madrid and Vienna provisions was generally good, certain problems remain.

A stable, complex church-state relationship continued during the reporting period. All faiths willing to make minimal concessions—recognizing the government and accepting socialism—are recognized. Islamic and Mormon communities were granted legal recognition during the reporting period. The regime is consulting with the leaders of recognized denominations in drafting a new law governing church-state relations scheduled for implementation in 1990. This excludes Jehovah's Witnesses and small sects which on principle will have nothing to do with the government. The state, explicitly or implicitly, places numerical restrictions on several aspects of church activities (number of students in schools, number of religious orders, new church construction, etc.). The Reverend Billy Graham will visit Hungary this summer, and the Vatican has tentatively set 1991 as the year in which the Pope will visit the country. During the reporting period major church services of all principal denominations have been televised, and Hungary's good record of cooperation with the country's Jewish community (less than 1% of the population) continued. Additionally, the Hungarian-Jewish cultural federation was established independently of official organs.

The Justice Ministry announced the release, on March 1, of all 73 conscientious objectors in Hungarian prisons. Citing clemency as the reason for their release at that time, Justice Minister Kulcsar explained that the conscientious objectors will be pardoned when the new law on alternative military service takes effect as expected on July 1. In accordance with the proposed law, young men who object to armed military service will be able to request, subject to the approval of a citizen's committee, to be detailed for nonarmed military service or civilian service. Nonarmed military service consists of 24 months' service in a nonarmed branch of the army and another 12 months' service in the nonarmed reserves. Civilian service consists of 36 months' work at places designated by the state office for wages and labor.

The Hungarian People's Army political officer announced that although the Communist Party remains the party of the army (about 75% of officers and noncommissioned officers are party members), new recruits belonging to other parties will be allowed to participate in those parties' activities while on leave. Senior party leaders, however, have equivocated on this issue, suggesting that the party will retain its role at workplaces and in the armed forces and police.

During the past 6 months, significant changes in the political realm have been reflected in the regime's approach to human rights issues. Three well-known reformers who are members of the politburo were appointed to lead the government: Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth and Ministers of State Imre Pozsgay and Rezso Nyers.

In January the National Assembly approved the law on association granting the right for 10 or more people to form associations or parties. Political parties can and already have been formed—three pre-1948 parties have been revived. The law does not regulate the functioning of a multiparty system, and at least two independent organizations, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Association of Free Democrats, functioning as quasiparties, have refrained from establishing themselves as full-fledged political parties until the regime establishes firm guarantees of free competition. New legislation on parties will also be presented to parliament by August 1, before local council elections, to define their scope. The new constitution, which will outline the role of political parties as well, is expected at the end of the year.

A new law on assembly was also approved in January and provides that at least 3 days' notice must be given for public gatherings, which the police may ban. No affirmative permits are required under the draft law. This procedure was followed in the March 15 demonstration.

As a result, the regime did not interfere with this year's March 15 demonstrations organized by independent organizations. There was instead a dialogue between the police and demonstration organizers, and during the demonstration there was minimal police presence. The demonstrations organized by the opposition drew crowds exceeding 75,000 persons and concluded without incident. However, an earlier demonstration on November 15 in support of Romanian refugees was dispersed by police on motorcycles. Three demonstrators required medical treatment and one was hospitalized.

Other demonstrations during the reporting period fell within the bounds of official tolerance. Several were directed at halting the Bos-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube, which has drawn considerable opposition due to its probable environmental impact and questionable economic rationale. There were two other minor demonstrations near the Romanian Embassy during the reporting period, also geared to the Romanian Government's treatment of Transylvanian Magyars. On March 2, a crowd of 500 in downtown Budapest's Vorosmarty Ter answered the

call of 11 independent organizations and parties to demonstrate against the sentence imposed by Czechoslovak authorities on dissident Vaclav Havel.

The unhindered issuance of passports for most Hungarians continued during the reporting period, leaving access to hard currency as the leading impediment to foreign travel. U.S. authorities are not aware of any cases in which passports have been denied on political grounds.

Although Communist Party and government authorities continue to monitor the press, radio, and television—all of which are government-owned—control over what is actually printed or broadcasted has been reduced significantly. Apparently stimulated by Radio Free Europe (RFE) and other Western broadcasts, the official media has given attention to selected opposition events during this reporting period. The reports tend to be straightforward, if usually undetailed. Subjects have included meetings of independent organizations, popular demonstrations about the status of Romania's Hungarian minority and against the Bos-Nagymaros dam project, and limited television coverage of Central Committee meetings.

In terms of media access, the regime has promised a new law which will deregulate the radio, television, and print media. Although there was a significant erosion of the regime's control of the media during the last year, editing has distorted some of the newspaper reporting. Official, generally straightforward reporting of major opposition events is now commonplace. Recent events, however, indicate continuing persistent efforts by the regime to manipulate the media. U.S. Ambassador Palmer's interview for the government daily *Magyar Nemzet* was edited and distorted to change significantly the meaning of what he said on important topics such as the pace of reform in Hungary and on the opposition. Similarly, television coverage of the March 15 demonstrations selectively edited out some of the demonstrators' demands.

Numerous unofficial groupings were launched in 1988. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, a pan-opposition gathering, gradually institutionalized itself and held its first congress with the attendance of National Assembly President Matyas Szuros and the U.S. and several other Western ambassadors. Although four prominent individuals were expelled from the Communist Party in April 1988 for participating in the Democratic Forum, they were subsequently reinstated and the forum's meetings later in the year were attended by official journalists and reported in official newspapers and on Hungarian television. Although the regime's traditional ideology proclaims that KISZ (the ailing official youth organization) and SZOT (the official national council of trade unions) are the exclusive representatives of youth and workers, an independent union of scientific and technical workers (TDDSZ) held its national congress and formed the League of Independent Unions to support the growth of the independent union movement in Hungary. FIDESZ, an independent youth organization, held a worker's meeting on February 25 during which the establishment of Hungary's Solidarity Workers' Trade Union Federation, an independent blue-collar workers' union, was declared. Senior officials, including from the Foreign Affairs and Justice Ministries and Communist Party Central Committee secretaries, joined in the development of a dialogue with the independent opposition groups. A further pan-opposition grouping, the Network of Free Initiatives, became a functioning but undeclared political party under the name of the Association of Free Democrats and held its national congress, representing its membership of over 2,000, on March 19.

On March 22 the National Assembly passed a revised version of the law on strikes which the opposition characterized as "liberal" and devoid of the more objectionable passages in the original draft. The law, for example, permits solidarity strikes and does not limit legal strikes to those sponsored by official unions, nor does it limit strikes to workplace, factory, or national level. Members of the opposition and economists agree, however, that more action must be taken by the government to reform Hungary's economic structure before the new strike law will be fully operational.

Hungarians periodically criticize the government's policies toward refugees, especially when reports of the repatriation of refugees to Romania surface, particularly those asserting that repatriation is selectively applied to ethnic Romanians and Gypsies. The vast majority are ethnic Hungarians emigrating in response to poor economic conditions, economic discrimination, and declining opportunities for Hungarian-language education and cultural expression in Romania. Less than 10% of the refugees are ethnic Romanians. According to the government, there are 20,000–30,000 Romanian refugees in Hungary, 14,500 of whom have applied for registration as de facto refugees. Assistance efforts have been organized through local government bodies, the Hungarian Red Cross, and churches. In March, Hungary became the first East European country to accede to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. continued its policy of refusing to respect four-power sovereignty over greater Berlin and the right of freedom of movement for all people between all sectors of the city. Strict visitor controls remained in effect. East German authorities also continued to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief. The activities of the state security police (*Stasi*) are pervasive. Without judicial controls, the police may install listening devices, open private mail, and interrogate whomever they choose.

The number of political prisoners in the G.D.R. continues to climb, although estimates of the current total vary widely. Official West German sources indicate more than 1,000 are currently being held despite a 1987 amnesty.

Security agencies have blanket authority to detain and interrogate citizens on suspicion alone. Citizens who become particularly active in officially disapproved ways are sometimes subject to repeated harassment, such as recurrent police interrogations, despite the absence of formal charges. They may be arrested with or without warrants, merely for expressing dissenting views. A person held in detention has the right to a judicial review of continued detention, but in political cases this is not always effectively observed

Although the criminal procedure code sets a limit of 3 months on investigatory proceedings, prosecuting authorities appear to have no difficulty in extending this period. In most political cases, it takes longer than 24 hours—often many weeks—before interested parties are notified of the arrest. Although the code guarantees access to a defense attorney, and this right exists from the beginning of the investigative proceeding, the authorities are not required to inform a detainee, and the right is not always exercised in a timely manner. The prosecutor may monitor and restrict contacts between the defense attorney and his client. Recent developments in legal procedures have reduced the arbitrariness and extent of this practice but have not yet eliminated it.

Charges filed in clearly political cases are often based on laws which are written in vague and general language. The penal code provides, for instance, that the transmission of information "detrimental to the interests of the German Democratic Republic," even if it is not classified, may be considered treason. Laws against "anti-state agitation" and "anti-social behavior" (parasitism) are often applied selectively against citizens who become politically active. The broad and vague wording severely restricts the possibility for defense. In several instances in late 1987 and

1988, charges were dropped prior to trial in response to public outcries and church intervention. East German defense attorneys report that prisoners brought to trial under these laws occasionally have been acquitted.

Specific laws state that the life, health, and ability to work of arrestees and prisoners must not be jeopardized. A new law promulgated in December makes it a crime, with penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment, for an official performing state functions to mishandle a person psychologically or physically.

No reports were received in this reporting period of physical abuse by prison officials, although in the past prisoners have complained of cruel treatment, including the beating and hanging of prisoners by their hands for periods of up to 24 hours and have reported excessively harsh conditions and psychological strain in prisons. Recently emigrated prisoners report the selective easing of conditions within prisons. In particular, they note an improvement in the guards' behavior. However, the psychological strain and harsh disciplinary treatment continue.

Freedom of speech remains severely circumscribed. Restrictive laws relating to free expression remain on the books and public dissent can result in prison sentences. Perhaps out of a conscious effort to seem less repressive abroad, however, the authorities appear increasingly reluctant to punish dissenting speech publicly. Most persons engaging in such activities are picked up and detained briefly by the police without charges being filed, as occurred in October when activists attempted to protest state censorship of church newspapers, and in March when individuals demonstrated in Leipzig against the new travel and emigration regulations and surveillance of would-be emigrants. It is also increasingly common for the state to fine rather than imprison individuals who have attempted to exercise their right to freedom of expression—some activists staging an independent Rosa Luxemburg/Karl Liebknecht demonstration in Leipzig in January were fined 1,000 marks (approximately $540 at the official exchange rate) apiece. Individuals picked up for expressing themselves freely are usually later subjected to police harassment and intimidation.

There has been a general, but limited, relaxation of restrictions in cultural areas. A conference on fine arts last fall was reportedly lively, though not as directly controversial as the writers' congress in 1987. Long-banned books by G.D.R. writers continue to appear in East German editions, and a number of plays were staged with overtly political themes sharply critical of practices and positions inherent in socialist societies. The G.D.R. PEN organization publicly condemned a Czech court's sentencing of Charter 77 writer Vaclav Havel.

With a law passed in December 1988, the G.D.R. has given citizens the right, effective July 1, 1989, to challenge in local county courts many of the bureaucracy's actions affecting them in certain important civil code areas such as travel, emigration, property rights, compensation for damages, and applications to obtain a building permit or open a private shop or business. While the local courts may now set aside administrative decisions in these areas, the decisions of the local courts are final and those affected have no right to appeal to a higher court. Nonetheless, this is the first time persons have had the option of a judicial review of such administrative decisions.

Requests by private human rights groups in the West for information on human rights conditions continue to go unanswered, and the government discourages visits by such groups. Within the G.D.R., members of unofficial human rights groups face surveillance and harassment by the secret police and may be arrested if their activities are deemed threatening to the government. Such groups are often the only source of current information available to outside observers on human rights developments in the G.D.R. Their ability to disseminate information is restricted by official harassment.

The government-sponsored Committee for the Protection of Human Rights does not attempt to safeguard the human rights of G.D.R. citizens. Instead, it criticizes human rights conditions in other countries while claiming there are no problems in the G.D.R. East German refusal to recognize human rights problems has also meant that there are few effective executive, legislative, judicial, or administrative remedies for addressing human rights violations.

Self-determination by means of democratic elections is not possible in the G.D.R. Every 5 years, G.D.R. residents are presented with a list of candidates, most unopposed, for the *Volkskammer* and various local assemblies. Though a 1976 election law states that voting is secret, it is not, in fact, always so. East Germans who refuse to vote or who reject entire ballots may suffer reprisals. In this reporting period, foreign residents were given the legal right to vote and to run as candidates in local elections.

The constitution provides for freedom of religious belief and worship, but the state officially promotes atheism. On the whole, however, G.D.R. authorities, in practice, tolerate and even provide some financial subsidies for certain religious activity. Overt adherence to religious beliefs may result in disqualification for preferred jobs and educational opportunities, although the largest religious community, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, has had some success in pleading the cases of its members who have suffered such discrimination.

The Lutheran Church remains the only institutional forum in which divergent opinions can be expressed with relative freedom. With the exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds, groups are not allowed to organize events without official approval. Church synods and an ecumenical conference held during this period were critical of the government. At the same time, the state continued to censor church newspapers and revoked permission for the European section of the World Christian Student Fellowship to hold an international conference on peace policy. The church-state dialogue, put in abeyance by the authorities in November of 1987, has not been resumed.

With government approval, limited numbers of new churches continue to be built and old ones restored. Clergy are trained in both state universities and church-run seminaries. The government has demonstrated some flexibility in its treatment of minority religions. Relations with the Catholic Church remain steady, and those with the small Jewish community continue to improve. The government took an unprecedentedly active role in 50th anniversary commemorations of the *Kristallnacht*, the Nazi pogrom, and it is supporting restoration of Berlin's largest synagogue and the establishment of a Jewish museum and cultural center.

While the government has not rescinded a ban on organized activities by Christian Scientists, it has made no effort to interfere with those activities. Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints continue to practice their faith relatively unimpeded, and state and church representatives jointly participated in the recent dedication of a new Mormon community center. In October 1988, G.D.R. authorities agreed to allow Mormon missionaries to proselytize.

Western clergy were permitted to attend church synods and lay conventions, and some G.D.R. religious leaders were allowed to attend similar meetings in the West. In at least one case, however, the state did not permit the entry of West Germans who were to talk at a church-sponsored meeting.

While large portions of the Vienna Concluding Document, including most of

its far-reaching human rights provisions, appeared in the party newspaper the weekend after the conference ended, the wording of the published version deviated in at least one major instance from that of the official German-language text in a manner which appears to represent a clearcut breach of faith. The government has printed, but not yet distributed, 100,000 copies of the full document, all of which reproduce the same egregious translation of the version appearing in the newspaper.

Only government-controlled unions are allowed. Strikes are not permitted in the G.D.R., and union assemblies are strictly controlled by the state. G.D.R unions are a political arm of the government and are used to transmit and carry out official government and party policy.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak performance in respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms remains unsatisfactory. What is more, the current reporting period witnessed considerable setbacks in areas where some progress had been registered over the past 2 years. During this time Czechoslovak authorities consistently limited the rights of citizens to assemble peaceably and on several occasions prosecuted participants in spontaneous demonstrations, initiated criminal prosecution of persons engaged in independent publishing activities, and renewed repression of priests associated with human rights activities.

In addition to traditional forms of repression, the government began to impose fines more frequently to suppress dissent and independent activities. As a result of action by the Federal Assembly in February, fines that can be levied against persons engaged in the publication of material judged contrary to the maintenance of public order were raised from approximately $500 to $2,000.

Public demonstrations in Prague on October 28 and during the week of January 15 were forcibly suppressed. Scores of citizens were detained in the period prior to these demonstrations and many others were arrested at the scene. The most prominent cases of prosecution stemming from these events include that of Czechoslovakia's leading human rights activist, Vaclav Havel, who was sentenced to 8 months imprisonment. Additionally, Otakar Veverka was sentenced to a year imprisonment and Jana Petrova to 9 months. Activists Tomas Dvorak and Hana Marvanova spent months in detention awaiting final resolution of their cases.

In November an independently organized seminar on modern Czechoslovak history was disrupted. Local organizers and participants were taken into custody to prevent the seminar from occurring. Because of this, the U.S. refused to support a proposal then pending at the Vienna followup meeting that a CSCE intersessional meeting be held in Prague.

The regime has also shown an unwillingness to respect human rights through repeated home searches and arrests of a number of persons either involved in independent publishing activities or engaged in the preparation of petitions for forwarding to state authorities. The most prominent of these cases include Ivan Jirous, sentenced to 16 months for circulating a petition; Stanislav Devaty, charged with incitement in connection with a petition campaign; Frantisek Starek, an independent publisher who has been held for over a month; and Petr Cibulka, an archivist and distributor of tapes of independent music detained since October on charges of "unauthorized enterprising."

There have also been some positive developments during the period. Some party and state leaders have begun to speak of the need for dialogue—although narrowly defined—with sectors of the population that hold views at variance with established state policy. At least one public discussion has occurred that was jointly organized by an official organization and an unrecognized independent group. Another notable development was the authorization of a public commemoration of UN Human Rights Day that was organized by independent groups, including Charter 77.

In December, the government established an organization called the Committee of the Czechoslovak Public on Human Rights and Humanitarian Cooperation. This organization has established direct contacts with the International Helsinki Federation (IHF) and with local human rights activists to discuss human rights issues. Unfortunately, while government officials in the Ministry of Justice and under the control of the Ministry of Interior have agreed to meet with IHF officials, they have cancelled these appointments when local human rights activists were included in the IHF delegation. This demonstrates the limitations that continue to exist on the government's willingness to "respect the rights of citizens to observe and promote compliance with CSCE obligations" as provided for in the Vienna Concluding Document.

Inside Czechoslovakia, implementation of the Final Act has traditionally been monitored by a small group of private citizens who are signatories of Charter 77 and an associated group, The Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS), which gathers and publicizes information concerning individual cases of human rights abuses. However, given the limited access to information in Czechoslovakia, VONS is careful to note that its information is illustrative and not exhaustive. Charter 77 has existed for 12 years and VONS for 11, despite official persecution. During the period under review a new independent organization has been founded specifically to monitor CSCE compliance, the Czechoslovak Helsinki Watch Committee. The group is affiliated with the International Helsinki Federation. Representatives have on occasion met with officials of the locally recognized Czechoslovak Human Rights Committee.

During the reporting period, a number of chartists were serving prison terms or were in detention awaiting trial. They include Vaclav Havel, Ivan Jirous, Petr Cibulka, Otakar Veverka, Stanislav Devaty, Frantisek Veis, and Jiri Wolf. In the past some former political prisoners have been sentenced to "protective supervision." A Czechoslovak citizen subject to this regime suffers travel restrictions, curfews, and the requirement to report frequently to the police. The imposition of such a regime—intended for habitual, violent offenders—against persons who have never committed a violent crime is an infringement of fundamental freedoms.

Searches, detentions, and frequent interrogations are among the tactics used by the regime when it has decided to harass rather than prosecute. Dozens of people have been detained during the reporting period to prevent participation in a number of different independently organized events.

It does not appear that the government practices a systematic program of torture, although individual cases of abuse have been alleged.

There is no consensus among human rights activists regarding whether or not there is widespread abuse of psychiatry in Czechoslovakia. One case of possible abuse that has attracted international attention involves Augustin Navratil, a religious rights activist who was committed to a psychiatric facility against his will from late October 1988 through mid-February 1989. Western psychiatrists have examined Navratil and found his condition to be within normal parameters. Their reports to that effect were not accepted into evidence at the hearing that mandated Navratil's confinement.

Little, if any, progress was registered in the area of religious rights during the period. In contradiction to the Vienna Concluding Document, the government bans certain proselytizing groups outright (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses) and intervenes arbitrarily in the operation of all other religious bodies. However, in February, state officials did register a new sect—the Czech Apostolic Church. This church

claims some 2,000 believers. Negotiations between the state and the Vatican over the appointment of new Catholic bishops were interrupted during the period, perhaps in connection with a dispute over the content of Radio Vatican broadcasts to Czechoslovakia.

Unofficial gatherings such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions are forbidden. Religious education of children and seminarians continues to be strictly controlled. While it is true that a previously reported increase in acceptances into theological seminaries continues, this increase in the number of licensed Catholic clergy will not offset, at least for the foreseeable future, attrition within the population of priests. All clergymen require state licenses and all promotions must be approved by state authorities. Clergymen who continue to follow their calling after losing their licenses are subject to criminal prosecution. Male religious orders have been banned since 1950. The supply of religious literature is inadequate and the government actively combats efforts to supplement it with "underground" printing or unauthorized imports.

Independent organizations are not permitted in Czechoslovakia, as demonstrated by the government's continuing unwillingness to tolerate the Jazz Section or Unijazz, a successor organization, or to register SPUSA, the Association of Friends of the United States, with the National Front.

Membership in the state trade union, the Revolutionary Workers' Movement (ROH), is virtually compulsory. The ROH is under Communist Party control. Independent trade unions in the spirit of the Madrid Concluding Document are forbidden, as are strikes and other forms of independent labor activity. Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations, which are also under strict party control.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government failed to comply with Principle Seven in many respects despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience, creed, speech, press, and association. The professed policies of *glasnost* and "democratization" failed to result in substantial relaxation of government control over all aspects of society.

A burgeoning human rights movement and the founding of various independent groups during the reporting period was accompanied by government repression and harassment. Members of the Independent Society for Protection of Human Rights in Bulgaria were detained in October and prevented from meeting with Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead. Detentions continued in December, on the anniversary of International Human Rights Day, and in January, prior to a visit by French President Mitterrand. The group's chairman, Iliya Minev, and secretary, Petur Manolov, went on hunger strikes to protest government repression and confiscation of Manolov's personal documents. Following an international campaign and representations by various Western governments, the Government of Bulgaria took steps which led both men to end their hunger strikes. The government conducted a propaganda campaign against the group, however, refused to register it, and prevented its members from meeting. Many of its most prominent activists were issued passports and strongly encouraged, through various repressive measures, to leave the country. Others who remained continued to be harassed, detained, and placed under house arrest or confined to their towns of residence. The group reportedly numbers about 250 people, half of whom are ethnic Turks.

The founding in December 1988 of a Club for *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* by a group of approximately 100 intellectuals also resulted in government repression, although of a more subtle nature. A number of members were detained and questioned by the militia. One had her typewriter confiscated, and others had their telephones cut. Some who were members of the Communist Party lost their membership, many others were reprimanded, and those who spoke with Radio Free Europe were vilified in the official press. Government measures prevented the group from meeting legally and have otherwise stymied its activities.

The founding of a Turkish Democratic League for the Rights of Man was reported in December 1988. Its founders were sent into internal exile. Activists Stephan Cholakov and Rumen Tsankov Dimitrov founded the Green Mass, an alternative political party, in November 1988. Both men were arrested in January 1989. Although Cholakov was reportedly released in March 1989, no word has been heard regarding Dimitrov.

Although the Bulgarian constitution provides for freedom of worship, the authorities espouse atheism and discourage or actively inhibit religious practices. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church continued to enjoy a relatively privileged status, with many functioning churches, a seminary, and little official interference with older worshipers. The official church establishment condemned the founding, in March 1989, of a Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values by various Orthodox priests. Although the group's membership is unknown, its organizational structure includes nine men, including priest Blagoy Topuzliev. Topuzliev was also a member of the Independent Society and was forced to leave the country in March 1989.

Other religious denominations in Bulgaria have relatively small numbers of adherents. There are 10 Armenian Christian Churches in the country. The dwindling Jewish community receives some financial support from the government, which sponsored a symposium in November 1988 on the saving of Bulgaria's Jews during World War II largely attributed to the Communist Party. Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov paid a courtesy call on Pope John Paul II during a December 1988 visit to Italy, and the government has reportedly been cooperative regarding visas for priests visiting Rome. The various Protestant groups in the country, including Pentecostals, Baptists and Seventh-day Adventists, reportedly suffer continuing problems with the authorities. At a meeting in February 1989, members of the Committee for Questions of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Religious Cults characterized Pavel Ignatov and his Church of God congregation as "schismatics" and dismissed allegations of repressive measures against the group.

Religious proselytizing and the religious education of children is prohibited. The Orthodox Church publishes a weekly newspaper and has its own publishing house. No Bibles have been printed since 1982, however, and religious service books are almost impossible to find. Importation of the French newspaper *La Croix* is forbidden, although selected Catholic priests may receive the Vatican's official paper, *L'Osservatore Romano*. The Jewish community, like the Armenian community, publishes a bi-weekly newspaper of an official character. Although the importation of religious material "not in contradiction with ... national law" is technically permitted, customs officials generally confiscate undeclared religious materials.

Authorities of the official Committee for Religious Cults claim that religious and prayer groups may be organized and services conducted privately. At the same time, no church buildings may be constructed without official permission. The committee determines whether or not existing numbers of churches for various denominations are adequate. Although members of Sofia's Jewish community have said that private and foreign contributions for the restoration of the synagogue will be permitted under the auspices of the Thirteen Centuries of Bulgaria fund, U.S. authorities have yet to see publication of the law. The Jewish and Orthodox communities receive grants from the government, and the

Orthodox Church receives the bulk of its revenues from the production of candles. The government reportedly made grants in December 1988 to the three Catholic dioceses of Sofia, Plovdiv, and Ruse.

The government continued its campaign to eradicate the cultural and religious identity of the country's Turkish minority during the reporting period. The chairman of the Committee for Religious Cults, Lyubomir Popov, attempting to refute an Organization of Islamic Conference resolution in March 1989 condemning Bulgaria's treatment of its ethnic Turks, referred to the "nonexistent Turkish minority" in Bulgaria. Most mosques remained closed. The chief mufti, Nedyo Gendzhev, elected in November 1988, reportedly instructed local imams to keep people under 60 years of age out of the mosques that remain functioning. Muslim rites (circumcisions, weddings, etc.) remain forbidden. Separate Muslim burial is no longer permitted, and mixed cemeteries have been established to the reported distress of both Muslims and Catholics. Observance of Muslim religious holidays is hindered. Authorities reportedly checked refrigerators in private homes for evidence of meat from the sheep sacrifices traditionally performed during the Bayram festivities. In a newspaper interview in February 1989, the chief mufti claimed work was in progress on a third Bulgarian translation of the Koran. Copies of the Koran cannot be found in Bulgarian bookstores, and no indication has been given as to when the new translation may be published, or in what quantity.

The wearing of Turkish dress and the speaking of Turkish remained forbidden. Fines for speaking Turkish have been increased substantially for each time the language is spoken. Communication with relatives and friends in Turkey remained obstructed. Letters within Bulgaria, if written in Turkish (even with a Bulgarian address on the envelope) reportedly did not reach their destinations. Reports indicated that young children in Kurdzhali were forcibly sent to live-in nursery schools during the week, in an attempt to "Bulgarianize" them.

Many ethnically Turkish areas remained inaccessible to diplomatic and other travelers. Despite the reduction in 1988 of the permanently restricted zone, the area along the southeastern border where many ethnic Turks live remained closed. Legal emigration and travel to Turkey is severely circumscribed. There were reportedly many thousands of outstanding divided family cases between Bulgaria and Turkey left unresolved during the reporting period.

Bulgarian-Turkish relations deteriorated during the 6-month reporting period and the bilateral dialogue begun as part of the Balkan cooperation process came close to breaking down. Bulgaria continued to deny the existence of its estimated 1–1.5 million ethnic Turks. The Bulgarian press intensified its anti-Turkish propaganda campaign during the reporting period, with many strongly worded articles on reported Turkish abuses of human rights and the low standard of living in the country.

The independent trade union *Podkrepa* was founded in February 1988 for the "scientific-technical, humanitarian, and creative-artistic intelligentsia in Bulgaria." Members of the group, which reportedly numbers about 50 people, have been detained and questioned. Others have been encouraged to emigrate. Although authorities accepted the union's application for registration and legalization, the results of a court hearing regarding the registration are unknown.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PRINCIPLE VI AND ASSOCIATED MADRID AND VIENNA CONCLUDING DOCUMENT COMMITMENTS ON TERRORISM

Principle Six of the Helsinki Final Act commits the signatories to refrain "from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating state." The Madrid Concluding Document contains language strengthening this commitment and expressing determination to "broaden and reinforce mutual cooperation to combat such acts." In Vienna, participating states "unreservedly" condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that such acts cannot be justified under any circumstances. Signatories to the Vienna Concluding Document committed themselves to prevent the use of their territories for terrorist purposes, to ensure the extradition or prosecution of persons implicated in terrorist acts, and to take effective measures to suppress terrorist acts against diplomatic personnel.

Compliance by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies with the Helsinki, Madrid, and Vienna commitments concerning the prevention and suppression of terrorism was again mixed during the current reporting period. The Soviet Union and East European states remain quick to affirm their opposition to terrorism, yet members of groups with a record of terrorism reside and transit some of their countries and frequently use arms produced by them. There is still a marked reluctance to condemn groups responsible for terrorist acts or their state sponsors. The Soviet Union and East European states maintain close relations with five of the six countries that appear on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), elements of which in the past have engaged in terrorism, maintains official missions in all seven Eastern capitals.

On the positive side, Czechoslovakia called for an international convention on the export of explosives and sent experts to consult with U.K. investigators following the Pan Am Flight 103 explosion. The Soviets have also indicated they may be prepared in the future to work with others against terrorism but the extent to which such rhetoric will be translated into concrete action remains to be seen. They have also been supportive of multilateral efforts to increase airport and maritime security.

Soviet Union. Traditionally, the Soviets have viewed antiterrorism efforts in a legalistic context primarily linked to multilateral organizations. They regularly oppose taking concrete political steps aimed at terrorist acts by "national liberation movements" or against states which employ terrorism and with which Moscow has influence (e.g., North Korea). In contrast to its silence in previous years, however, the Soviet Union is now taking a more constructive approach to condemning terrorism, including denouncements of specific terrorist acts.

Bilateral antiterrorism cooperation has been included in a set of broad "transnational" issues which will be discussed on a regular basis by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In addition to governmental contacts, U.S. and Soviet scholars met in Moscow in January 1989 to discuss the modalities of U.S.-Soviet antiterrorism cooperation. They will meet again in the summer of 1989.

With regard to specifics, the Soviets have supported new legal instruments in the areas of civil aviation and maritime security. The Soviets have also been cooperative in bilateral efforts to increase airport security. The Soviets continue to seek approval of their proposal in the United Nations for a comprehensive system of international peace and security which includes a call for the establishment of a UN tribunal to investigate acts of international terrorism. This proposal, however, omits any mechanism for taking action specifically aimed at combating terrorism.

Romania. The Government of Romania officially condemns terrorism, both "state terrorism" and terrorism in support of "national liberation" movements. It also officially maintains that it seeks to prevent its territory from being used for the operation, organization, or commission of terror-

ist acts. There are unsubstantiated reports of radical Arab groups receiving training in Romania. Romania openly supports some "liberation" movements which espouse terrorism. The local PLO mission was elevated to fully accredited diplomatic status in January of 1989. Romanian authorities maintain tight security at diplomatic missions.

Poland. In its public statements the Polish Government condemns all forms of terrorism. Like its allies, however, Poland also maintains relations with states and organizations accused of terrorist activities. Poland is not known to maintain facilities for the training of terrorists, nor has it been the base of any terrorist attacks. The Polish Government is in the process of ratifying the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

Hungary. In principle, Hungary opposes terrorism as well as the identification of liberation movements with terrorism and support for terrorism. While it has been established that North Korean agents responsible for the downing of Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 858 transitted Hungary with the North Korean Embassy's support before they joined the doomed KAL flight, there is no evidence of Hungarian knowledge of or cooperation with those involved in the operation. The government appears to be responsive to most requests submitted by other governments for assistance in preventing acts of terrorism against diplomatic missions and foreign commercial interests in Hungary.

German Democratic Republic. Although publicly proclaiming its staunch opposition to terrorism, the G.D.R. nonetheless maintains close relations with states and organizations that support or engage in terrorist activities.

Foreign diplomats in the G.D.R. are effectively protected by G.D.R. security forces. A law passed in December 1988 increased the penalties for kidnaping, killing, or assaulting diplomats. The G.D.R. has complied with requests from our Embassy for security precautions and has maintained increased surveillance and security forces around certain embassies and diplomatic residential areas which might be the targets of, or involved in, terrorist activities.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia publicly maintains its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. It is difficult to determine to what extent official internal policy and actions mirror this public stance. The Western press has reported in the past that there are terrorist training camps located in Czechoslovakia and that Czechoslovak territory has been used by terrorists for transit and other purposes. During the reporting period, Czechoslovak authorities were stung by the allegation that the Czechoslovak-produced plastic explosive Semtex may have been used in the December destruction of Pan Am Flight 103. Czechoslovak officials have cooperated in the investigation of this terrorist act and proposed the conclusion of an international convention among producers of plastic explosives.

Bulgaria. The Government of Bulgaria professes readiness to cooperate against terrorist attacks. At the same time, Bulgaria has continued to support groups and states that have engaged in terrorism and to regard some people and organizations that have participated in terrorist acts as "strugglers for national liberation." In a positive step, Bulgaria expressed concern over the death threat to Salman Rushdie, author of *The Satanic Verses*, while calling on the "interested parties" to reach a sensible solution. The Bulgarian press has indicated that airport security measures to prevent hijacking have recently been implemented. There is no indication that the Bulgarian authorities have taken other measures to prevent or suppress terrorist acts.

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe was mandated in 1983 by the Madrid CSCE followup meeting as a substantial and integral part of the CSCE process, with the aim of undertaking in stages new, effective, and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament. The first stage of the conference opened in Stockholm in January 1984 and adjourned in September 1986 with the adoption of the Stockholm document, a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. In keeping with the conference's mandate, these measures are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and apply to the whole of Europe, as defined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents.

The CSBMs agreed in Stockholm include:

Notification: 42 days prior notification of military ground force activities taking place within the whole of Europe whenever they involve at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments. In the case of amphibious and airborne activities, the notification threshold is 3,000 troops.

Observation: Mandatory invitation of observers from all participating states to notified military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops. For amphibious and airborne activities the observation threshold is 5,000 troops.

Forecasting: The exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities, with large-scale activities (over 40,000) prohibited unless announced a year in advance and activities over 75,000 prohibited unless forecast 2 years in advance.

Inspection: Onsite inspection from the air or ground, or both, as the means of verifying compliance with the agreed measures, with no right of refusal. However, no state need accept more than three inspections of its territory per calendar year nor more than one inspection per calendar year from any single participating state.

The Stockholm conference also agreed on a reaffirmation of the nonuse of force principle which reflects the Western approach to security and includes references to human rights, antiterrorism, compliance with international commitments, and a denial of the validity of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine.

Implementation

Eastern implementation of the detailed provisions of the Stockholm document continues to be generally good. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states appear to be improving even beyond the progress described in the last report. Most technical difficulties cited in the initial implementation period of the Stockholm document have been overcome and correct presentation of notifications, invitations to observers, inspection requests, etc., is now routine. Notification procedures practiced by all participants met Stockholm document requirements.

In an inspection within the Soviet Union, the Soviets were cooperative and responsive to U.S. inspectors' requests. In two observations of Eastern activities, team members found that non-Soviet Warsaw Pact hosts were open and cooperative and that Soviet co-hosts were easy to deal with when their forces were not major components of an activity or when the activity was in the U.S.S.R. Although the Soviets

strictly adhered to requirements, they lacked the cooperative and flexible spirit displayed by their allies when the Soviets were major participants in an exercise outside the Soviet Union. In general, their conservative approach appears to be rooted in security concerns. They have difficulty being both careful and hospitable outside of their own country. Nevertheless, if there is a trend for this half-year reporting period, it is in the direction of implementation of both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm accord, with a routinization of procedures that contributes to both predictability and confidence.

During the reporting period, all provisions of the document, including the right of onsite inspection were exercised. As of April 1, 1989, 18 inspections had been conducted since the Stockholm document came into effect (January 1, 1987). Inspections are beginning to be viewed as routine activities under the Stockholm regime and are an important aspect of building confidence in Europe.

Warsaw Pact countries forecast 17 notifiable military activities for 1989, of which one was a national exercise and six were combined Warsaw Pact activities. The Soviet Union forecast its participation in 12 of these activities—six to be conducted solely by Soviet forces, and six to be carried out in conjunction with other Warsaw Pact states. During this reporting period, Warsaw Pact states notified and conducted seven activities.

NATO countries originally forecast 11 activities for 1989; however, the U.S. military authorities were in the process of restructuring the Reforger series of exercises and cancelled "Reforger '89" as part of that program ("Reforger '90" will be in January 1990).

The U.S. will exercise forces in 4 of the remaining 10 activities. Of those, only "Caravan Guard '89" will be under the command and control of U.S. forces. During this reporting period, NATO states notified and conducted four exercises.

Neutral and nonaligned states forecast three exercises for 1989. During this reporting period, the Swiss notified and conducted two exercises. The NNA complied with their Stockholm commitments.

Two Warsaw Pact activities exceeded the observation threshold during this reporting period—both predominantly Soviet exercises in Hungary and the G.D.R. Two U.S. observers were sent to each of these exercises. Although Hungary and the G.D.R. acted as the official hosts for the exercises conducted in their respective countries, the Soviets had complete control over observation itineraries. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, in particular Hungary, proved to be much more forthright and open when asked questions about their forces participating in an exercise. The Soviet Union followed the "letter of the law" but rarely satisfied observer requests for additional information. Hungarian and G.D.R. officials provided actual unit designations while the Soviet Union did not. Some Western observers continue to feel that Eastern activities are not always as large as announced in notifications.

NATO member states invited observers to two exercises during this reporting period, one of which was in the Federal Republic of Germany and the other in Norway. Soviet observers participated in both observable exercises during this reporting period. Consistent with the openness requirements of the Stockholm document in terms of information provided, observation opportunities continued to include helicopter overflights and opportunities for direct contact with exercising troops.

For the NNA, one of the two Swiss exercises was observable. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. observed this activity.

Provisions in the Stockholm document for onsite inspection were exercised three times during NATO activities. The U.S.S.R. inspected a British home defense exercise; Poland, inspecting for the first time, inspected activities related to a predominately U.K. exercise in the Federal Republic of Germany; and the G.D.R. inspected an exercise in the Federal Republic. Only one NATO state conducted an inspection during this period. The U.S. inspected a Soviet exercise in the Baltic military district of the U.S.S.R. There were no instances during this reporting period of a state accusing another of violating the provisions of the Stockholm document.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union continues to carry out its obligations under the comprehensive confidence- and security-building measures of the Stockholm document which went into effect on January 1, 1987, and during this reporting period demonstrated increased familiarity with the CDE regime. This enabled them to make effective use of that regime, including in their observation and inspection activities.

The current reporting period encompassed the end of the 1988 exercise year and the beginning of that for 1989. The final three exercises of 1988 all took place in October 1988. They were notified by the Soviets in a timely manner via diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. One exercise was in the Soviet Union while the others were in Hungary and in the German Democratic Republic. The U.S. requested and was granted permission to inspect one of the exercises, held in the Baltic military district from October 10–16.

The Soviets made every effort to accommodate the requirements of the U.S. inspectors during the inspection. Indeed, Soviet support for the U.S. team was a marked improvement over previous exercises. The team found their Soviet hosts open and generally very cooperative.

Also in this reporting period, the Soviet Union provided a calendar of 12 notifiable military activities involving Soviet forces to be conducted in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe during 1989. Along with the calendar, the Soviet Union advised that it foresaw no exercises involving more than 40,000 troops in 1990. Prior notification of 5 of the 12 exercises has already been made, although the final two of the five were set to take place in April. The final 7 of the 12 exercises listed on the calendar are planned for the second half of the year.

Notifications of the five exercises were provided in a timely manner via diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and included at least the minimum information required by the Stockholm CDE document. The actual dates of four of the five exercises fell within the calendar dates, with the fifth beginning on the last day of the calendar period for starting the exercise.

Three of the five notified exercises for 1989 have taken or will take place on Soviet territory, the other two in the German Democratic Republic. The notification for the exercise scheduled for April in the Moscow military district stated that the exercise would involve over 17,000 Soviet troops and be accompanied by the required invitation to send observers. This invitation has been accepted by the U.S. and other Western CSCE signatories.

Romania. Romania has had no military maneuvers large enough to require notification since CDE notification requirements went into effect. There have been no voluntary notifications of military maneuvers small enough to fall below CDE notification thresholds.

Romanian observers attended one NATO activity, four Warsaw Pact activities and one Swiss activity.

Poland. The Polish Government continues to adhere to the letter of the Stockholm document. Polish authorities signaled their intention to inspect a non-notified activity in the Federal Republic of Germany from November 7–9. However, due to an error in preparation of coordinates for the inspection area, the team was not in viewing distance of the exercise. The Polish team requested, but the West German hosts turned down, a request to change the inspection area. This was consistent with the Stockholm document.

Hungary. Hungary has exhibited a cooperative attitude and an effort to meet both the letter and the spirit of its obligations in meeting its CSCE security requirements. The Hungarian Peoples' Army hosted observers from 18 participating states for the combined Soviet-Hungarian exercise on October 15–20, 1988. The Hungarian commander was more open than his Soviet counterpart, but U.S. observers felt that both countries lived up to their commitments under the Stockholm document. In November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a similar exercise, but at a level below that requiring observers, will take place in October 1989. In February, the Hungarian forces participated in an announced, but nonobservable, combined exercise with Soviet and Czech forces in Czechoslovakia.

German Democratic Republic. There was one exercise during the reporting period large enough for CDE notification procedures to be applicable, an unnamed exercise held October 17–23. Druzhba 1989, held March 15–22, included only 16,500 troops. The G.D.R. fully complied with CDE notification requirements. Observers have commented that their guides during exercises were responsive to their questions and requests.

The G.D.R. conducted an inspection in the Federal Republic of Germany in November. For the first time the request contained information about the objective of the inspection, to inspect the German logistics exercise "Sachsentross '88". The note also contained a request for an exercise briefing.

Czechoslovakia. During the reporting period, Czechoslovakia made proper notification of an exercise named "OHRE '89," which was conducted between February 27–March 3, 1989. According to the notification, exercise participants were solely from the Czechoslovak Peoples' Army. The announced number of participants and equipment was below that requiring invitation of observers. Another exercise, this one unnamed, was held in Czechoslovakia during the first week of February 1989. It included Soviet and Hungarian, as well as Czechoslovak, participants. Presumably this exercise did not meet the criteria for prior, official CDE notification since none was made. For apparently the first time, the fact that the exercise would take place was published in the local media several days prior to the event. In the past, mention of military exercises was made only after the fact or, at best, after the exercise had started. In the past the Czechoslovak Government has consistently met the minimum requirements mandated by the Stockholm CDE agreement.

Bulgaria. Bulgaria continued to comply with its Stockholm commitments. Notifications (one per year) were timely, via diplomatic notes. Units involved were as announced. Turkish observers were invited for last year's single big exercise, "Maritsa '88." The Turkish general staff declined to attend, however. Other annual military maneuvers have fallen below the strength required for mandatory notification. However, the Bulgarian Government on one occasion made a discretionary announcement of "Balkan '87," a command-control exercise involving Bulgarian, Soviet, and Romanian units. They did not announce the same exercise in 1988. Exercise announcement dates in Bulgaria apply only to combat units (i.e., tanks, bombers, and soldiers). Normally, communications and logistical support deploy to the field up to a week prior to the announced exercise date.

Chapter Three

Implementation of Basket II: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment

The overall record of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe in the implementation of Basket II remained mixed during the reporting period. Most of these regimes continue to pay at least lip service to the need for structural reform, and all of them continue to express interest in various forms of cooperative business arrangements with Western firms. Even in those countries, such as the Soviet Union, which have been most energetic in pursuing economic reform, implementation has been slow and uncertain and has resulted in few concrete improvements in the living standards of their populations.

The reform atmosphere has resulted in considerably improved Western access to factories, government offices, and other institutions in most of these countries. Romania remains the most prominent exception to this trend. Elsewhere in the region, foreign diplomats, academics, and business representatives have reported increased access to economic institutes, think tanks, industrial enterprises, ministries, cooperatives, and the like. Officials encountered on these visits seem far more willing than heretofore to discuss issues frankly and openly. Related to this has been a surge of interest in learning more about Western business and management techniques, particularly in the Soviet Union.

The improvement has been relative, however. In all cases, access to economic information and to commercial counterparts falls far short of standards prevailing in the West. Permanent office and housing accommodations for resident foreign business representatives remain scarce throughout the region. The traditional wide variations among these regimes, with respect to the quantity and quality of economic and commercial information available to foreigners, has also continued. Countertrade remains a customary business practice in all these regimes. While Romania has been particularly insistent, in the Soviet Union as well, most major deals now under discussion involve some type of countertrade.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe accepted important new obligations in the Vienna Concluding Document with respect to publishing statistical information, improving access for business representatives and tourists, moderating countertrade demands, and respecting the fundamental freedoms of scientists and of

environmental activists. U.S. authorities will continue to monitor their record in observing these obligations.

Soviet Union

General Assessment. Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions continued to show improvement. In late 1988 and early 1989, Soviet authorities extended to virtually all enterprises and organizations the right to trade freely, supporting this move with new regulations on registration, licensing, and customs. The new system was to go into effect April 1, 1989. While its implementation will be gradual, this trade liberalization should have positive impact over time. Access of foreigners to Soviet organizations and, to a lesser extent, commercial and scientific information continues to increase. In the media and official rhetoric, the Soviets have begun to pay increased attention to environmental concerns, but this has yet to translate into tangible results.

Governmental reorganization continued to create problems for business representatives and others, but the difficulties were less than those which arose during the previous 6-month period. In late 1988 and again in March 1989, reports of further reorganization circulated and, as of April 1, business representatives will be able to deal directly with Soviet firms, creating new short-term problems in establishing contacts despite long-term positive effects. Working conditions for resident business representatives did not change. Despite eased visa requirements, visiting and new-to-market firms have been adversely affected by the severe shortage of housing and office space. Growing foreign business interest in the Soviet market and burgeoning tourism have exacerbated this problem.

Business Operating Conditions. U.S. business representatives were generally able to obtain appointments with Soviet trade officials and had few complaints of interference by the Soviet Diplomatic Services Bureau (UPDK), customs, or the Ministry of Finance in their office operations. Firms are still required to wait for UPDK to identify replacement office workers. Access to Soviet end-users should improve as legal barriers fall, but for now it is often complicated. Small and mid-sized companies still have problems gaining access to Soviet officials as telexes and letters often go unanswered. U.S. firms generally reported an increase in the level of inquiries from Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTOs) over the previous year. It is expected that inquiries to U.S. firms will continue to increase in the next 6 months due to the improvement in overall relations. During the period, accredited firms and the U.S. Commercial Office in Moscow had numerous calls and visits from cooperatives requesting information and trade contacts with potential Western partners. Soviet access to the U.S. Commercial Office improved substantially.

At the end of the review period there were 30 U.S. firms, including the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, with accredited offices in Moscow. This represented an increase of two in the past 6 months. Soviet authorities were accommodating in meeting requests to open new representations. Finding office space and housing remains the most serious Soviet barrier to expanded foreign business presence.

American businesses continue to face high office space rental costs. High rents at the Sovincenter International Trade Complex continued to create serious difficulties for many small firms which have established nonaccredited offices in Sovincenter's residential wing. In the absence of other office options, these firms had to pay the high rents. Firms desiring to move from one location to another report that waiting lists are for up to 2 years. As in the past, most nonaccredited firms experienced problems in meeting requirements for office equipment, vehicles, and clerical support staff. Western managers of Soviet-American joint ventures report the same problems. In one case the Western manager has waited 5 months for approval to install an office copying machine.

Hotel and housing conditions for business representatives continued to worsen. Visiting business representatives frequently had difficulties obtaining hotel space in Moscow. During large trade exhibitions or visits by foreign dignitaries, it is virtually impossible to obtain a hotel room in the city. As a rule, housing remains in short supply and several accredited American business representatives are living in hotels waiting for apartments. A number of new hotel construction projects are underway and others are under negotiation. In 1–3 years, this may help to ease the Moscow hotel crunch.

Soviet visa issuance for business representatives continues to be good. Multiple-entry visas are issued for some nonaccredited and all accredited foreign business representatives. The Soviets have speeded up the visa process and simplified sponsorship procedures. There were no difficulties reported by American firms concerning visa issuance during this period.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Regularly published statistical information remains woefully inadequate and, in some cases, actually worsened in the past 6 months, notwithstanding reorganization and modernization at the State Statistical Committee (*Goskomstat*). Limited monthly economic performance data, a staple by which to measure Soviet macroeconomic performance, ceased publication in late 1988 and reportedly will not resume. Fuller monthly reports on economic developments of the type most countries in the East and West produce are still not available. Quarterly data is published, but during the past 6 months a large number of reporting categories were changed or dropped without explanation, obscuring the pace of economic development. No new, commercially useful information has appeared. *Goskomstat* is still trying to develop statistical services, on a paid basis, but its efforts have been very slow and, partly as a result, little foreign interest has developed. New handbooks with long-unpublished information appeared in late 1988, but in every case the press run was so small that only extremely lucky consumers, including foreign embassies and firms, have been able to purchase them before they become unavailable. Trade-related data is limited and published very tardily. Balance-of-payments information remains totally unavailable, though the Soviets have started to publish Western estimates on indebtedness and balance-of-payments. Some new demographic and health statistics were published, part of the policy of *glasnost*. However, major gaps in available information remain, and methodology is often undescribed.

Access to Soviet officials for discussion of current economic developments continued to improve. Foreign diplomats, academics, and even business representatives have reported increased access to economic institutes, think tanks, industrial enterprises, ministries, cooperatives, and the like. Soviet counterparts have become far more willing than heretofore to discuss issues frankly and openly. Related to this has been a surge of Soviet interest in learning more about Western business and management techniques. At least two Soviet institutes have established relationships with U.S. business schools.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Soviet officials have continued encouraging U.S. firms to consider cooperation arrangements of all types. Traditional trade continues, but the Soviet emphasis has been to solicit proposals from U.S. firms for industrial cooperation and joint venture arrangements as a way of generating more hard currency, gaining technology, expanding domestic supplies, and learning Western marketing and business techniques. By the end of March some 300

joint ventures had been signed with foreign firms and numerous other proposals are under consideration. Only a small number of these joint ventures had actually begun operations. Currently, about a dozen U.S.-Soviet joint ventures exist, of which four are actually in business. In December 1988, the Soviet authorities liberalized joint venture requirements, making foreign majority ownership and directorship possible. Problems associated with joint ventures include the lack of ruble convertibility which hampers repatriation of profit, Soviet failure to provide quality resource inputs in a timely manner to operating joint ventures, and lack of investment guarantees in Soviet law and practice.

Official Visits. The U.S. and Soviet Governments agreed at the April 1988 Joint Commercial Commission meeting to establish a range of working groups in various specific industrial sectors. In October, bilateral working groups in the fields of medical equipment and light industry held their second meetings in Moscow. The bilateral working group on construction held its second meeting in New York in December. The second legal seminar exchange on U.S. and Soviet commercial law took place in Washington and New York in January. The first Soviet commercial exhibition in the U.S. was opened in New York in December by Soviet Deputy Premier V.M. Kamentsev; U.S. Secretary of Commerce William Verity attended the opening.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Pressures increased for Western firms to link sales and purchases during the period as a result of declining hard currency revenues due to depressed prices of oil and other raw materials which make up a large share of Soviet exports. Most major deals now under discussion involve some type of countertrade. However, the lack of any central clearing mechanism makes countertrade an especially difficult process and most countertrade proposals founder because of the lack of available Soviet products marketable abroad.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises remained no different from those affecting other companies. The practicality of doing business in the U.S.S.R., however, severely limits the prospects for American small and medium-sized firms because of the long lead times, high transport and travel costs, and other costs associated with doing business in the U.S.S.R. In addition, Soviet dependency on countertrade and a somewhat fixed Soviet hard currency income stream essentially preclude most small businesses from effectively selling to the U.S.S.R.

In May 1988, the Soviet Government approved a new law which put cooperatives on a more solid legal footing and established the right to engage in foreign trade. Soviet cooperatives, of which there are now over 77,000, offer a potential area for trade with Western firms. Serious hurdles remain to be overcome in this area: continued legal constraints, lack of information, and ignorance of the West. But over the coming decade Western firms may find opportunities in the cooperative sector if it continues to receive Soviet Government backing. Decrees passed in December 1988 and February 1989 have restricted cooperative development somewhat, and rumors circulated in March that limitations on cooperative trading rights were being discussed.

The Soviet Union is a signatory to both the Montreal protocol of the Vienna convention on protecting the ozone layer and the convention on transboundary air pollution. Although the Soviet Government has indicated some resistance to U.S. proposals on accelerated reductions in the production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the U.S.S.R. has lived up to its obligations under the Montreal protocol. In March of this year, the Soviet Government announced its intention to place a freeze on the production of Freon 113. Also in the multilateral arena, Soviet experts have been eager participants in the activities of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.

Independent environmental groups have become much more active as Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* takes root. This trend has been especially apparent in the Baltic states, where environmental issues provided an early and permissible area for dissent from official government policies and a focus for resistance against overcentralized economic decisionmaking in Moscow. Soviet authorities have recognized the depth of public feeling on the environment and have generally tolerated and sometimes encouraged independent environmental activists, a recognition which led to the creation of a public, nongovernmental ecological fund in 1988.

Estonian activists have played an important role in setting the broader political agenda there. Estonian environmentalists have even established regular contacts with like-minded individuals in Finland and the other Baltic states. Despite the lesson of Chernobyl, however, where the U.S.S.R. was severely embarrassed by its failure to keep the West informed, the Soviet Government is still reluctant to provide timely and accurate information on environmental accidents in its border areas and has yet to publish, systematically, data on the true environmental situation throughout the U.S.S.R. for domestic or international consumption.

Romania

General Assessment. Romania's overall performance under Basket II did not improve during the reporting period. While calling for greatly increased technology transfer, the Romanian Government continued to neglect existing scientific exchange mechanisms. The government's foreign trade policies remained based on strategies for rapid retirement of the country's foreign debt, drastic restrictions on hard-currency imports, and insistence that, wherever possible, Western sales to Romania be paid by counterpurchase of Romanian goods. The severe restriction of imports also caused declines in productivity in many sectors that are starved for imported inputs. Continued exports of agricultural products have also imposed severe shortages of basic foodstuffs on the Romanian people. An aggressive export-expansion program continued to be hampered by internal secrecy controls and by reorganization of trade ministries and institutions. Business facilitation suffered in favor of maximizing hard-currency intake even from marginal sources. Suspension of Romania's most-favored-nation status went into effect in July 1988. Romania has adjusted its export product mix somewhat to compensate. Even so, Romania's 1988 trade surplus with the U.S. was 8.5% less than in 1987.

The government continues its policies of restricting access by business representatives and others to all but those with approval to have contact with foreigners. Access to plants and production lines is very restricted, with permission for visits frequently denied without explanation. Submission of written requests 3–4 weeks in advance may facilitate visits of foreigners to production facilities.

U.S. business representatives have had adequate access to directors of FTOs and their staffs, but a new directive reportedly prohibits FTO directors from seeing foreign business representatives without 24-hour prior approval by the ministry to which the FTOs report. Additionally, frequent personnel changes at ministries, institutions, and FTOs connected with foreign trade as well as the December 1988 reorganization of the FTOs make it difficult

to pinpoint and establish relations with the key figures for trade negotiations.

U.S. Government officials and business representatives have access to some Romanian officials, but the waiting period for appointments can be long, and some relevant officials are unavailable. Appointment requests are often only answered if put in writing.

Business Operating Conditions. The cost of maintaining business offices in Romania is high. Rents charged by official Romanian agencies are comparable to market rates in major world commercial centers. Authorities continue to take as much as 8 months or longer to process Western firms' applications to open business offices. Commercial office space in one of the several downtown hotels in Bucharest is commonly offered to Western firms. Firms may also rent space on premises owned by the Romanian Government agency Argus. Romanian employees of foreign firms must be hired through Argus, and Argus has claimed the authority to change the personnel of foreign firms without the consent of the firms involved. Argus has recently used this authority to remove a long-term employee of an American firm, resulting in the firm's decision to close its Bucharest office.

Acceptable hotel accommodations are available in Bucharest for transient business representatives at rates matching top-class accommodations in world commercial centers. Resident business representatives are referred to the national tourist office to locate housing. The search for adequate housing is difficult and time consuming. Prices for residential space are comparable to those in West European capitals, though utilities, furnishings, and facilities generally fall far below those standards. Rental charges have remained steady in the reporting period, except for the effects of exchange rate changes, but utility prices have risen markedly. The extremely high cost of telecommunications services is also an impediment to the development of commercial relations.

Other than prohibitions on travel in certain restricted areas, there are no restrictions on business travel, and business representatives do not report unusual difficulty in obtaining visas.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Romanian statistical data are very poor and are noteworthy for their unreliability and their omission of basic information common elsewhere. While some information is made public each February for the preceding year, organized data on the performance of the domestic economy are published only once a year, generally 12–14 months after the close of the year covered. Data often are not comparable from year to year, and indices are neither reliable nor adequately defined. Even the usually sparse data provided have been pared to one-third the previous amount in the last two editions of the statistical annual. Much useful information has been deleted. Production declines are admitted only in the face of overwhelming evidence of difficulties.

Except in the context of debt or loan negotiations, Romania is reluctant to provide even basic financial information to foreign banks, governments, and international organizations. This reluctance, together with the unreliability of Romanian statistics, makes it difficult to track even the most basic trends in Romania's economy. Limited demographic data is included in the statistical annual. Published public health statistics are sparse and unreliable.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The Romanian Government officially promotes the concept of joint ventures and production collaboration and claims to be interested in cooperation with American firms in third-country markets. In fact, the law concerning joint venture operations in Romania, concluded in 1971 and once considered one of the most forward-thinking in Eastern Europe, has now become an example of rigidity by comparison with those of its CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] neighbors. U.S.-Romanian collaboration in third-country markets is virtually nonexistent.

Official Visits. Romanian Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade Nicolae Andrei visited the U.S. in November 1988 in connection with the U.S.-Romanian Economic Council meeting in New York. Following the meeting he traveled to Washington for consultations with the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Romania employs a strict system of countertrade aimed at reducing its foreign debt. There is no sign of this policy changing, even though the foreign debt is expected to be paid off in 1989. Romanian purchases of Western goods without countertrade have continued to decline significantly. Romanian enterprises now require almost all Western firms seeking to sell goods in Romania to take 100% in counterpurchases of Romanian-made goods, insisting on inclusion of less-desirable products from the machine building and machine tools industry. They even occasionally seek counterpurchases in excess of the original purchase price. In those few cases where U.S. firms buying Romanian goods have sought to pay through "barter" arrangements of their own products, Romanian organizations have refused, insisting on hard currency payment.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Romania trades regularly with small and medium-sized U.S. firms. Such companies are often represented in Bucharest by agency firms, which helps reduce the cost of establishing representation. Agency firms are also better able to deal with Romanian pressures for counterpurchase.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The Governments of the U.S. and Romania signed an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation in 1979, providing for exchange visits by scientists, joint scientific projects, and exchange of information. The volume of activity under this agreement has been small. Arrangements for exchange of visits and information in some fields under the agreement have never been implemented, and in one field they were terminated for lack of activity.

In addition to minimal activity under the scientific and technological cooperation agreement, the U.S. and Romania maintain informal, ad hoc scientific contacts. For instance, seismologists in the U.S. and Romania have maintained contact and a program of information sharing over the last 10 years. Nonetheless, the same factors negatively influencing the Romanian business climate also inhibit commercial cooperation in science and technology. Most Romanian scientists invited independently to international conferences do not receive permission from the government to attend. Often they are also not permitted to send papers to the conferences.

Although Romania is not very active in international environmental cooperation, it attends some multilateral meetings and is among the signatories to a Danube River antipollution convention. Romania appears to be increasing its awareness of environmental concerns but these remain of secondary importance. Romania has not signed the Montreal protocol on protection of the ozone layer (the country produces no chlorofluorocarbons). Independent environmental groups do not exist.

Poland

General Assessment. During the past 6 months, economic relations between Poland and Western countries have continued to improve. Economic mixed commissions between Poland and most Western countries, including the U.S., have resumed regular meetings. A session of the Polish-American Economic Council—representing business communities of the two countries—was held in Washington in early October 1988. Poland has actively pursued investment protection agreements with Western governments. Such agreements have now been signed with Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and Austria. In an effort to increase Western investment in Poland through joint ventures, the government adopted revised legislation, which went into effect on January 1, 1989. Reductions in maximum tax rates and a provision permitting 100% foreign ownership are the major improvements over the 1986 legislation. According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, roughly 70 new joint venture proposals were submitted for approval during the first quarter of 1989.

As important as the new legislation is, even more important is an improved attitude toward promoting investment activity. The Polish authorities recently have shown a willingness to entertain all reasonable investment proposals.

Poland's economic troubles—unchecked inflation, industrial unrest, and nagging consumer shortages—were among the principal factors underlying the efforts to seek accommodation at the roundtable talks between the authorities on the one hand and the political opposition led by Solidarity on the other. A comprehensive timetable of economic reform measures—the highly touted second stage of economic reform—ran aground in 1988 following two rounds of labor unrest.

The Rakowski government took over in October 1988, pledging to inject new life into the reform process. The new government prepared a 2-year economic consolidation plan aimed at stemming inflation and increasing market supplies. It energetically pursued a program of economic reform legislation, including a key law on economic activity. That legislation was aimed at simplifying registration procedures for launching private companies, dropping limits on private sector employment, lowering tax rates, and opening up equal access by the private sector to credit and production supplies. Parliament also revised the 1986 foreign investment law to make investment in Poland more attractive. The government proceeded with a long-planned reform of the banking system, creating nine new regional banks intended to compete with one another on a commercial basis. Most recently, the government introduced a new foreign exchange law authorizing private citizens to trade in hard currency at a market exchange rate and expanding the use of bank auctions for Polish enterprises to distribute foreign exchange reserves to the highest bidder. A new policy on interest rates, meant to encourage savings, has sharply increased those rates since the first of the year. Interest rates, however, generally remain below the rate of inflation.

But these initiatives will require time to take hold. Of more immediate concern, the authorities have been unable to stem the momentum of a classic wage-price spiral. Official statistics confirm that wages (up by 119% through January 1989) have gone up much faster than prices over the past year. Fueled by wage demands, inflation reached an 85% annual clip at the end of January. The central bank has recently adopted a more stringent credit policy, and higher returns on savings seem to be reversing a longstanding aversion to holding zlotys. But the authorities have made little progress toward the goal of more efficient use of labor, energy, and investment. They maintain a number of central controls, such as direct allocation of resources and subsidization of priority industries, which frustrate the operation of market forces. Many prices are still set by administrative fiat and remain below market levels.

Following the failure of the price reform operation attempted in early 1988, price subsidies to consumer goods and services have continued to rise; they are projected to exceed four trillion zlotys in 1989 ($7 billion at the official exchange rate), equal to 23% of total budget expenditures. Subsidies for milk alone promise to cost the government a trillion zlotys this year (equaling the projected budget deficit).

Shortages continue to plague the economy, fueling consumer and worker discontent. The growth of the parallel market, including dollar stores dealing in all sorts of scarce commodities, reflects distortions and obvious inequities between those who have access to hard currency and those who do not. The government began the year by derationing retail sales of gasoline and coal, leaving meat as the only item still subject to rationing. It has identified agriculture, housing construction, and environmental protection as priority tasks. But the building industry's performance remains poor, and the chronic and acute shortage of housing shows no signs of improving. Growing public attention has also been directed toward serious environmental problems, among the worst in Central Europe, and the government is devoting some resources to controlling air pollution in the most grievously affected regions.

Poland has taken steps to regularize its debt situation with both commercial bank and official creditors. But it has not concluded bilateral agreements with official creditors for the 1986–88 period. Trade surpluses fall substantially short of the amount needed to service Poland's hard currency debt. Polish authorities continue to discuss with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the outlines of a prospective adjustment program. The World Bank has developed specific projects which could be implemented if an IMF program were agreed.

The roundtable discussions appear to reflect a common perception, shared by the opposition and the authorities, that political reform is a necessary component in any real solution to Poland's long-term economic problems. Solidarity's proposals for economic reform are similar in many areas to the government's. However, Solidarity emphasizes the need to eradicate the *nomenklatura* system and reduce party and state control of the economy.

As a trade union, Solidarity also emphasizes social objectives. During the roundtable talks, it demanded that wages be indexed to inflation as a basic condition for reaching any agreement on economic matters. The government negotiators agreed in principle, in spite of fears that indexation may make it more difficult to rein in inflation. More importantly, the prospect of a broader agreement on restructuring the political system and legalizing Solidarity offers hope of political reconciliation and broader participation, which remain the prerequisites for successful economic reform in Poland.

Business Operating Conditions. Access to Polish business contacts and commercial officials remains relatively easy, with both private U.S. business representatives and U.S. Government officials able to arrange meetings directly with their counterparts, without brokering by protocol or foreign relations departments of the Polish Government or the organization visited. Factory visits can be difficult to arrange, depending on the sensitivity of the installation.

There has continued to be a rise in the number of American firms with representation offices in Poland. The total number has risen from 16 to 23 over the past year. Significantly, three new after-sales service offices were opened, indicating an increase in sales and long-term business strategies by these American firms.

U.S. owners continue to operate *Polonia* businesses with varying degrees of success, depending on their rates of in-

come taxation. The overall number of firms is about 750, with slightly more than 10% owned by U.S. citizens. The total output of these firms amounted to 494 billion zlotys in 1988 ($866 million at the official rate).

Hotel accommodations for visiting business representatives are usually available, although at rates five times higher than for Polish citizens. Permanent housing is generally available but expensive. There are no restrictions on business travel within Poland, and business visas are not difficult to obtain. Air service to and from Poland is adequate.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The Government of Poland publishes regular economic statistics. Most of the disaggregated data are not current and do not contain enough detail to permit thorough economic analysis or adequate market research.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. In concert with efforts to implement decentralizing foreign trade reforms, the Polish Government has attempted to improve conditions facing both domestic and foreign private firms. Western business appears encouraged by the direction of policy, although there is a visible degree of confusion arising from a sustained period in which the major Polish trading companies have been undergoing reorganizations of both management and scope of activity. The future of commercial cooperation will be determined by the extent to which legislated reforms are implemented over the next few years and the extent to which that economic growth creates opportunity for foreign investment. Poland continues to seek foreign investment. Licensing arrangements remain possible, as is joint production in and for third markets, in goods and especially in services.

Official Visits. Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Kaczurba visited Washington in February. A number of additional visits are planned for mid-1989, the purpose of which is to encourage U.S. investment by conveying new policies to U.S. business and government.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The Polish Government officially discourages countertrade, though several U.S. firms have engaged in countertrade at the behest of individual foreign trade organizations. The frequency and nature of these countertrade arrangements vary and generally are possible only in products of which Poland possesses an oversupply. A special license is needed for all countertrade transactions.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. These businesses have not experienced any particular problems during the reporting period, with the exception of certain firms operating under the *Polonia* law. Despite these obstacles, many *Polonia* firms continue to prosper, and their existence enjoys official backing when their operations help fulfill Polish Government economic aims.

Poland is a signatory to the 1979 convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. The Polish Government declined to sign the 1985 protocol on sulphur dioxide, but it did sign and is in the process of ratifying the 1988 protocol on nitrous oxides. Polish authorities have not signed the 1985 Vienna convention for the protection of the ozone layer but have declared their intention to accede to both it and the 1987 Montreal protocol. Environment Ministry officials expect the formal process of accession to be completed by summer 1989.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. Bilateral contacts in the scientific and environmental fields continued to expand and develop on a broad front. Within the framework of the September 1987 U.S.-Polish agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, 12 Polish scientists visited the U.S. for exploratory talks with American colleagues in various scientific and engineering disciplines. These visits are expected to produce collaborative research proposals which will compete for financial support from the Maria Sklodowska-Curie Joint Fund II. The structure and mechanics of the joint fund were finalized during a meeting of U.S. and Polish experts in Washington, in advance of the second meeting of the science and technology joint commission scheduled for April 1989. Several joint projects in fundamental science were also finalized under a separate memorandum of understanding between the National Science Foundation and the Polish Academy of Sciences. Another nine joint projects in the health sciences were agreed upon within the framework of a longstanding cooperative program between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Polish Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.

Cooperation in the field of environmental protection was highlighted by a visit to Poland by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—the first official visit by an EPA Administrator to an East European country on bilateral business. EPA undertook to loan to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources hardware for an automated air monitoring facility, data from which will support joint research in environmental science. Ecology was also the focus of a joint symposium in Washington cosponsored by the National Academy of Sciences and its Polish counterpart; the published reports from this conference and its October 1987 predecessor will characterize the state-of-the-art in Polish and American ecological research. Future cooperation between the two Academies was the focus of a March 1989 visit to Warsaw and Krakow by the president of the National Academy of Sciences, the first such visit in a decade.

Several nongovernment environmental groups function in Poland on a national scale. Their activism tends to vary inversely with their size. Probably the most influential, the Polish Ecology Club (PKE), numbers about 4,000 members nationally. In recent months, the Government of Poland has undertaken an extensive and highly visible dialogue with independent environmental groups and activists. Indeed, the ecology component of the March 1989 roundtable process has endorsed many points originally enunciated by PKE and other private environmental organizations. Implementation of these new environmental policies remains problematic; nevertheless, ecological issues have never before received as thorough an airing and as positive a response from official circles. This is surely related to the fact that in its October 1988 statement of goals, the Rakowski government listed environmental protection as one of its three principal priorities (along with food and housing).

Hungary

General Assessment. In 1968, long before Gorbachev's introduction of *perestroika*, Hungary launched a set of reforms to improve economic performance and development. Notwithstanding periodic setbacks, this process has been evolving in Hungary for almost 20 years and has helped Hungary achieve a level of economic decentralization, private initiative, market orientation, and social pluralism which today serve as models for other centrally planned economies.

Significant reforms in 1988 included a new law on corporate association, which permits joint-stock and limited liability companies and sets up new operating rules for both foreign and domestic firms. Private companies can now employ up to 500 people, and 100% foreign ownership of domestic firms is permitted. Hungary also established the first personal and value

added tax systems in Eastern Europe and took the first steps toward a reform of the wage and price systems. The country has the CMEA's only operating stock and bond markets.

At the start of 1989, the government liberalized 40% of imports and plans to continue its development of a modern banking sector, build an employment benefits system, and cut back on government consumer and production subsidies. Various advisory committees are discussing additional ways to lift restrictions inhibiting investment and market forces.

With an eye toward promoting trade and investment, Hungary has also expanded its political ties with Israel and South Korea. With World Bank assistance, Hungary hopes to bring its production patterns up to world market levels as well as improve management techniques.

Despite Hungary's renewed reform efforts, economic results in 1988, like those of the previous 2 years, remain disappointing. GDP [gross domestic product]—65% of which still passes through the central budget—stagnated, and the $370 million government deficit was double the projection in Hungary's standby arrangement with the IMF. Inflation, officially 15.9%, is considered by many to be much higher, and the reduction of subsidies and resulting price hikes have become a serious political issue. In 1988 real wages dropped by 8% and consumption by 3%. Government statistics predict a further erosion in the standard of living this year, while a full fifth of the population lives below the official poverty line. Profitability of state firms remains a particularly elusive goal. Although estimates put the number of enterprises operating in the red as high as 300 and loss-making cooperative farms at over 100, only a handful have been forced into bankruptcy. Subsidies to the others remain high.

Concern is growing about unemployment, which may reach 100,000 (up from the current officially reported 15,000) if the government seriously pushes its restructuring program. In addition, Hungary's $17.3 billion gross hard currency debt is a constraint which will grow as medium- and long-term debt matures. In short, the sum of all the reform and austerity-oriented activities has not yet added up to dramatic results. Hungary's external accounts are one bright spot, as the convertible currency current account deficit declined from $847 million in 1987 to $591 million last year under pressure from the IMF. The value of convertible currency exports was up 20%, thanks in large part to better world prices for Hungary's traditional exports.

Business Operating Conditions. Hungary continued to make significant strides with improvements in local business operating conditions. To attract greater foreign investment and expand commercial relations with Western countries, joint venture laws were further liberalized to provide foreign investment protection, guaranteed repatriation of profits and the right of up to 100% foreign ownership. Hungary's new law on corporate association, implemented on January 1, greatly expanded private business activities and investment possibilities by allowing for the formation of private stock companies and raising the ceiling on private employment of workers. In keeping with the improved business climate, joint venture formations continued to grow at a rapid pace. The number of joint ventures in Hungary grew to more than 250 as registration requirements have been simplified. U.S. company presence in Hungary grew to more than 35 joint ventures and representational offices combined. The number of U.S. business representatives living and working in Hungary has also continued to grow. Hungary's newly established relations with South Korea and expanding commercial ties with Taiwan and Israel have also contributed to a higher level of business activities in general.

Deluxe and first-class hotel accommodations for business travelers and tourists are quite good and competitively priced despite recent increases. Most first-class hotels offer business services, including typing, translations, fax, and telex. The availability of medium-level, medium-priced accommodations continues to improve with the opening of new privately owned and operated pensions. Office space available to Western firms will increase significantly as construction is completed on Budapest's Third International Trade Center later this year and as other construction projects move forward. Office rental prices, however, are extremely expensive by local standards.

No restrictions are placed on Western business travel to Hungary, and business visas can be obtained without difficulty at the Budapest airport and at highway border crossings. Resident business representatives, however, continue to be hampered by the need to work through a Hungarian Government "facilitative" office, which remains highly bureaucratic and ineffective. Locating suitable housing and acquiring telephone service, problems which confront the Hungarian population in general, are major sources of complaints among Western business representatives. Hungarian business practices and reliance on traditional suppliers have also been a source of serious complaints among U.S. business representatives.

Although not attributable to the Hungarian Government, the opening of a new American International School in Budapest and a new American club facility have served to improve significantly the general living conditions for Western business representatives and their families in Hungary.

Official Visits. Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead visited Hungary in October 1988. In November, Congressman Dante Fascell of the House Foreign Affairs Committee led a congressional delegation to Hungary, as did Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the House, in March 1989.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The exchange of publications in respective science and technology activities between U.S. Government departments and institutes and counterpart Hungarian organizations is satisfactory. These exchanges have been carried out officially, as well as informally, between government agencies and through the U.S. Embassy's science attache.

Domestic dissemination of science and technology information has expanded substantially. On a monthly basis under a 1985 license with *Scientific American*, Hungary publishes *Tudomany* (*Science*), which is essentially a Hungarian language reprint of articles from the American publication. The publication is of high quality, with a circulation of about 30,000. *Tudomany's* publisher also has a joint venture with Computer World Communications of the U.S. to publish *Computer Technology*, a monthly in 20,000 copies, as well as three other newsletter-type publications in English and Hungarian.

The exchange program between several U.S. Government agencies (National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Geological Survey, National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration) and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) and its various institutes is relatively active. The MTA maintains close working relations with the National Science Foundation, NAS, and various universities in the U.S. In October 1988 the NAS and the MTA evaluated their bilateral exchange programs over a 10-year period and agreed, in principal, to double the number of exchanges, pending the availability of funds. NAS President Frank Press visited Hungary in March 1989 and renewed the memorandum of understanding between

the two academies. The Hungarian Government has indicated a strong desire to expand exchanges in all areas of science and technology. Proposed bilateral exchanges in environmental matters are now under review. Hungarian authorities recently announced they are prepared to sign the Montreal agreement on protection of the ozone layer.

In 1989, Hungary expects to host more than 100 international meetings and conferences on a broad spectrum of scientific topics. The John Von Neumann Society for Computing Sciences hosts or supports several international conferences each year. Indigenously manufactured and imported computers have been displayed at these conferences as well as at Budapest's annual international fall and spring fairs. U.S. electronic equipment, including computers, has also been featured at these events.

German Democratic Republic

General Assessment. There has been no significant change in the past 6 months in the G.D.R.'s performance in implementing provisions of Basket II.

Business Operating Conditions. There has been no change in American business representatives' access to G.D.R. trade officials and enterprise managers during the past 6 months. The G.D.R. often requires that its citizens obtain prior approval for contacts with Western business representatives, and the requirement that foreign businesses deal through G.D.R. foreign trade service organizations also limits access to managers at the enterprise level.

Operating conditions for establishing business offices in the eastern part of Berlin remain unchanged. Four U.S. companies have offices there; two are staffed by East Germans, one by a West German national, and one by a Swiss national. Western firms wishing to establish an office in East Berlin are required to rent space either in the International Trade Center, which has strict access control, or in a building which is used solely by the firm. Recently U.S. and other Western businesses have begun to complain about the cost of such business space. Costs have risen steeply in the past 2 years and now stand at nearly $45 per square meter.

Restrictions on travel and visas for foreign business representatives do not appear to have caused problems during the reporting period. Persons in possession of G.D.R. hotel vouchers are generally issued visas upon arrival at designated entry points. In addition, visas for day visits to East Berlin are obtainable at designated Berlin sector-sector crossing points with little delay. Western business representatives residing or maintaining offices in the G.D.R. and East Berlin are often issued multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year. Nonresident business representatives generally receive single-entry visas unless multiple-entry visas have been requested on their behalf by an East German trading partner.

As is the case for virtually all visitors to the G.D.R., nonresident foreign business representatives are required to exchange approximately the equivalent of 25 marks ($13.75) per day into East German currency for the duration of their visits. Of this sum, any unspent G.D.R. marks cannot be converted back into Western currency upon departure but must be either forfeited or deposited in a special account for use upon the visitor's return.

Visiting business representatives must normally stay in expensive hotel accommodations which require payment in convertible currencies. In cities without such hotels, accommodations are less expensive, and payment may be made with G.D.R. marks. Subject to these conditions, however, travel is otherwise virtually unrestricted. No U.S. business representatives have complained to the U.S. Embassy about unavailability of hotel accommodations.

Resident business representatives are allowed to rent, but not buy, housing. Available housing is usually expensive and standards vary, although some is quite good. All housing services must be obtained through a state-operated agency which determines the rent as well as the location of housing for foreigners.

G.D.R. customs regulations restrict the importation of printed material with the word "German" in the text or in the address. This has caused problems in the past when business literature containing this word in certain contexts arrived and could not be distributed, but recently the government has interpreted this regulation more liberally.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The type, quality, and timeliness of economic and commercial information released by G.D.R. is considered unsatisfactory by Western businesses. The main source of such economic data is the annual statistical yearbook published by the G.D.R. state central administration for statistics. The yearbook is not published on a timely basis but appears about 10 months after year's end. The small portion of the report devoted to foreign trade usually lumps export and import figures together in one number. Thus the user normally knows only the total amount of trade between two countries, not how much the G.D.R. purchased or how much it sold. Furthermore, Western business representatives and economists often question the reliability of the figures given.

The G.D.R. Foreign Trade Bank's (*Deutsche Aussenhandelsbank*) annual report offers only highly aggregated information on the hard currency value of East German imports and exports and provides no specifics on foreign debt. In general, it does not serve the needs of banks and firms seeking to evaluate potential business relationships. Moreover, the G.D.R. does not provide information on total balance of payments, aggregate net and gross foreign debt, projections of international financial flows and statements of sources and uses of funds for the banking sector.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Joint ventures in the sense of joint ownership of business undertakings within the G.D.R. with foreign firms are not permitted under local law. Although the G.D.R. has entered into a few cooperative production agreements with Western firms, it has shown less interest in developing these cooperative ventures than most other East European countries.

The G.D.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany reached agreement in August 1988 on simplified procedures for West Germans to transfer to East Germans and East Germans to access their own hard currency assets in the West. Under the terms of this agreement, East Germans can routinely convert the money into so-called Forum checks for use in the state-run Intershops. To date, this procedure has run smoothly.

Official Visits. Although not solely a bilateral trade-related visit, Deputy Secretary Whitehead's meeting October 11 with General Secretary Honecker and politburo member Axen had considerable trade content. An official mayoral delegation from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, explored trade expansion possibilities December 16–21, and a congressional delegation led by House Ways and Means Chairman Rostenkowski addressed trade during a March 29–30 visit.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Trade with the G.D.R. often involves countertrade arrangements. Cooperation agreements for production within the G.D.R. are also often coupled with countertrade or "buy-back" features. Aside from opposing countertrade as a matter of principle, most U.S. firms are also inhibited from such arrangements by difficulties in obtaining the quantity and quality of goods desired, limitations on what the

G.D.R. can or is willing to supply and the unmarketability of some East German products offered.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. In general, small and medium-sized enterprises do not encounter problems different from those faced by larger enterprises. There has been no new legislation affecting such firms participation in trade and industry.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. Due to the German Democratic Republic's use of lignite as its primary source of energy (80%), the G.D.R. is the largest producer of sulphur dioxide in Europe. The authorities have taken few significant steps to improve air quality, nor does there seem to be much hope for a change in the problem of air pollution given the G.D.R.'s overriding concentration on economic growth. It seems unlikely that the G.D.R. will satisfy its Helsinki commitment to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 30% by 1990.

A number of environmental groups have sprung up in the G.D.R. Some, such as *Arche* and the environmental library at the Zion Church in East Berlin, exist under the umbrella of the Research Center Wittenberg, a Church-associated organization. Others, oriented more toward citizens' action, exist under the aegis of the *Kulturbund*. The *Kulturbund*-connected groups enjoy government approval for the most part since they do not take a confrontational approach. The more independent, more critical church-associated groups, however, have existed largely outside the government's good graces. In this reporting period, however, government representatives did meet with members of *Arche*.

Czechoslovakia

General Assessment. Czechoslovak cooperation with other CSCE signatories in the implementation of Basket II remains focused overwhelmingly on the Soviet Union and other member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. For the last several years, about 80% of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade has been conducted with socialist countries. The Soviet Union alone accounts for 45% of Czechoslovak trade. The West's share of Czechoslovakia's trade remains at a relatively stable 15%, although the Czechoslovak Government has repeatedly expressed a desire to increase the amount and proportion. In 1988, it initialed a basic trade agreement with the European Community (EC), and the Czechoslovak ambassador to Belgium has also been accredited to the EC.

The long-term complex program for scientific and technological development up to the year 2000 and various bilateral science and technology agreements with CMEA states will likely occupy a considerable portion of Czechoslovakia's applied science resources for the foreseeable future. Czechoslovakia has reached modest agreements with Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany (as well as with Poland) on environmental cooperation and has stated an interest in membership in Eureka, the joint European research program.

At the CSCE review conference in Vienna, Czechoslovakia proposed convening an economic forum in Prague to be attended by all Helsinki Final Act signatories, but this proposal was not adopted. The Czechoslovak Government has also included economic cooperation as a subject to be covered within the framework of its proposed European "zone of confidence."

The eighth 5-year plan (1986–90) calls for an acceleration of economic growth and foresees a restructuring of the Czechoslovak economy away from industries dependent on high energy and raw material use and toward research and development and more technologically advanced products.

Despite a generally recognized need to modernize its industrial plant and equipment with Western technology, Czechoslovakia continues to take a very conservative approach to foreign borrowing. There are some signs that the country is considering more use of foreign credits to modernize its plants and infrastructure, but the officials involved in decisionmaking in this area have indicated no change in policy.

U.S.-Czechoslovak bilateral trade improved in 1988. Trade totaled roughly $151 million, up 15% from 1987. U.S. exports were up 17%, and imports were up about 11%. The U.S. and Czechoslovakia conduct a significant amount of trade through U.S. subsidiaries in Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and other Western countries. The lack of MFN tariff status, absence of Eximbank [Export-Import Bank] credits and U.S. export controls continue to concern Czechoslovak officials.

Business Operating Conditions. Contacts between foreign business representatives and their counterparts from the U.S. are regulated by central authorities. Although economic reforms underway may liberalize conditions, foreign business representatives have in the past reported difficulty in developing knowledgeable contacts and locating accurate information about investment plans, hard currency spending priorities, and economic performance. The number of American business offices has not changed during the period. Pan American Airways, which resumed service to Prague in 1986, is working to expand its presence. U.S. firms with representation in Prague appear to have adequate space. There are no resident American business representatives in Czechoslovakia. Foreign business representatives in Prague appear to have suitable housing obtained through official channels or arranged privately.

Due to the shortage of tourist and visitor facilities in Prague and other major Czechoslovak cities, foreign business representatives report difficulty obtaining hotel accommodations. Visas for foreign business representatives are generally not a problem and are rarely denied. The only exceptions usually involve persons born in Czechoslovakia whom the authorities regard as dual nationals. Some foreign business representatives complain that they cannot obtain multiple-entry visas and must apply for a re-entry visa each time they depart from Czechoslovakia.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Foreign business representatives regard the range and timeliness of economic and commercial information available in Czechoslovakia as inadequate. Monthly statistical reports in the official press provide little useful information, and information on foreign trade is insufficient for market research purposes. Publication of balance-of-payments data is restricted. Demographic and public health statistics are available on a sporadic basis. Many foreign observers believe the data published by the Czechoslovak authorities are unreliable.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. At the beginning of 1987, Czechoslovak authorities announced plans to "restructure" the domestic economy so as to allow greater decentralization and independence for individual enterprises. In the past foreign trade had to be conducted through one of a number of FTOs, each of which enjoyed a monopoly over both imports and exports for particular product lines. In addition, a number of foreign trade representation firms handle local representation for Western companies. In connection with the new restructuring policy, authorities announced plans to modify the foreign trade sector. The Czechoslovaks are implementing legislation which would considerably reduce the monopoly position of FTOs and extend the possibility of direct trading rights to enterprises. It still remains unclear how successful implementation will be.

In 1988, a mandated 30% reduction in government workers caused a substantial reorganization of government ministries and departments, including substantial early retirements but few lay-offs of employees.

In mid-1985, the Czechoslovak Government made a decision in principle to permit formation of joint venture corporations with Western companies. Twelve joint venture agreements have been signed, including one with a Danish medical equipment firm which is a subsidiary of an American company. A new and more comprehensive joint-venture law was enacted at the end of 1988, and it came into effect in 1989. It guarantees repatriation of profits from production of items for the export market. Czechoslovak officials have indicated convertibility of local currency for hard currency will not be permitted for joint ventures that produce only for the domestic market. The new law guarantees repatriation of salaries. Joint ventures will not be required to fulfill set goals of 5-year plans. It will be possible for the foreign partner to own the majority of the company, possibly as high as 99%, but this must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. In addition, new tax legislation provides a lower rate of profits tax on joint ventures than for domestic concerns (40% rather than 50%). It also authorizes the Minister of Finance to grant a 2-year exemption from the profits tax, with smaller exemptions for an undefined period thereafter.

In its efforts to modernize and accelerate economic development, Czechoslovakia expects to increase purchases of Western technology via licenses. A fairly large number of license production agreements exists, including agreements with U.S. firms for refining oil, manufacturing color television tubes, and producing chemical products. At least one U.S. drug manufacturer has a coproduction arrangement in the country, and a few U.S. construction-engineering firms have contracts with Czechoslovak firms for the supply of generator turbines and other heavy machinery.

Official Visits. Several technical-level economic and trade meetings took place during the previous reporting period. Sessions of the government-to-government business facilitation working group met in October 1988 and were set to meet again in April 1989. These meetings are held in tandem with a similar working group on humanitarian affairs. Another round of these working group meetings is scheduled for the late fall of 1989.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Czechoslovakia appears to have no formal legislation covering countertrade arrangements, but the demand for countertrade on Czechoslovak trade partners is consistent and widespread. Countertrade demands commonly run about 25%–40% of the value of the original sale, but demands for 100% or more are common. U.S. and other Western firms report that their main problems with countertrade concern product quality and availability and a common requirement that countertrade goods be sourced within the same FTO. It is not unusual for Czechoslovak authorities to insist upon countertrade and then fail to provide the agreed-upon items.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. Czechoslovakia and the U.S. signed a bilateral exchanges agreement in April 1986 that covers the fields of culture, education, science, and technology. The science and technology provisions of the agreement provide for implementation through agency-to-agency contacts between the two countries. Such exchanges have worked well in some areas, but not in others. The National Academy of Sciences has an exchange program with the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, as does the National Science Foundation. Bilateral science and technology cooperation usually takes place under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Government, particularly the Czechoslovak Academy of Science. Private contacts are limited.

Czechoslovakia has signed and ratified the convention on transboundary air pollution but not the Vienna convention or the Montreal protocol. It has announced intentions to sign these documents this year. It is too early to judge implementation efforts. Prime Minister Adamec recently admitted that Czechoslovakia was behind in its efforts to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide. He noted that at one plant desulphurization was 17 months behind schedule. However, he insisted that Czechoslovakia would meet its international commitment. During the period Prime Minister Adamec proposed a meeting of prime ministers of neighboring countries to consider environmental problems. A meeting at expert level was convened in March and there will be a meeting at the ministerial level later this year. In theory, this will be in preparation for the prime ministerial-level meeting.

Independent ecology groups exist in Czechoslovakia. Often composed of human rights activists and young people, they do not generally possess the necessary technical expertise to do much more than identify problems. However, on occasion local experts involved in environmental issues have established contact with and unofficially provided information to these groups. One independently prepared technical document that described Czechoslovakia's environmental problems in detail was published in Bratislava in 1988. It evoked a defensive reaction from the authorities and was suppressed, but U.S. authorities are unaware of any legal prosecution following its publication.

Bulgaria

General Assessment. Little substantive progress was made during the reporting period in regard to transforming Bulgaria's economy to reflect and respond better to economic realities, despite numerous decrees on economic restructuring. Although party leaders have reiterated that the party should withdraw from active participation in managing details of the economy, they have made clear their intent that the party retain overall control and in many cases the local party apparatus remained heavily involved in economic planning and decisionmaking.

Bulgaria continued to seek Western technology and actively pursued its goal of full membership in GATT. Bulgaria has also begun negotiating a trade agreement with the EC. Reforms of wholesale prices progressed, according to Bulgarian officials, but data on those prices were not publicly available. Increases in the retail prices of a small number of consumer goods in the fall of 1988 led to a sharp public reaction. The first newspaper article admitting the existence of inflation in the country appeared in March 1989.

Business Operating Conditions. Conditions for Western business representatives remained difficult, although they generally enjoyed ready access to authorized business contacts and trade officials. Although access did not substantially improve during the reporting period, local officials appeared more able and willing to initiate direct contacts with foreign business representatives and trade officials, without channeling all requests through Sofia. One additional British businessman set up operations during the last 6 months, bringing the total of British companies with resident representatives to five. Twenty Japanese firms reportedly maintain offices in Sofia. There are no resident American business representatives.

Visiting business representatives reported no restrictions on business travel or problems in acquiring hotel accommodations. There were occasional complaints about delays in the issuance of visas to business visitors, however. Housing accommodations for long-term residents

were inadequate by Western standards, as was the supply of consumer goods and services. A measure adopted in November 1988 allowed foreign residents to exchange currency at a more favorable rate for use in consumer purchases, although hotel fees and airline tickets still have to be paid for at the "premium" rate of exchange adopted in January 1988.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Access to business information remained limited during the reporting period. Although Bulgaria regularly published economic performance data and foreign trade figures, information was reported selectively and often in insufficient detail for meaningful economic analysis. For example, percentages were often given in lieu of raw data, and bases for comparisons were carefully selected to enhance the appearance of current figures. Government pledges to provide more and better information on the economy remain largely unfulfilled. While foreign estimates place Bulgaria's gross foreign debt somewhere between $6.5 and $7.5 billion, the government has not published any official statistics on the subject. Much economic information still inhabits the realm of "official secrets," although articles in the official press during March 1989 commented critically on the lack of statistical data.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The Bulgarian Government actively encourages Western firms to establish joint venture projects in Bulgaria, which now claims to have the most liberal joint venture law in Eastern Europe. Licensing agreements remain popular. An Austrian firm has reportedly entered a joint venture agreement to construct a hotel complex in Burgas.

Regulations were issued in 1987 authorizing the creation of free-enterprise zones. Initial steps had been taken to establish such zones in the Danubian port towns of Vidin and Ruse, but the one joint venture in Ruse involving an Austrian firm has been the first and only agreement reported reached. Although similar free enterprise zones are reportedly to be established in Burgas, Varna, and Plovdiv, no measures were taken during the reporting period for their establishment.

Official Visits. Bulgaria received and prominently publicized a steady stream of official visitors and delegations in the trade and economic fields. Major visits by West German President von Weizsaecker, French President Mitterrand, and others resulted in economic agreements regarding joint ventures, foreign credits, the training of management cadres, and the avoidance of "double taxation." There were several exchanges of experts between Bulgaria and the U.S. during the reporting period in connection with bilateral programs in agriculture and science.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Pressure for countertrade continued as the Bulgarian Government sought to acquire new technologies with minimal hard currency expenditure. The Bulgarians reportedly had little to offer by way of countertrade, although Western business representatives sometimes accepted less marketable merchandise as a means of establishing a niche in the Bulgarian market.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. The Bulgarian Government officially recognizes the potentially valuable contributions of small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly in the service sector and in the production and merchandising of consumer goods. However, restrictions on ownership of the means of production and on the direct employment of others continued to inhibit commercial initiatives by private producers. Although some private restaurants have been established, most are family-run enterprises and the prices they charge are still dictated by the state. Local officials expressed a desire to encourage the production of goods and services, and a measure adopted in January 1989 allowed the hiring of up to 10 workers, with a minimum wage set by the state. Problems in securing supplies and harassment by local officials seem to have inhibited significant development in this sphere, however.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The Bulgarian scientific establishment, a highly bureaucratized system, continues to place the strategic and economic needs of the state above the nonpolitical advancement of scientific inquiry. Contacts between Bulgarian scientists and their counterparts abroad are carefully controlled. International cooperative efforts in science and technology, and in particular with the U.S. and other Western countries, have expanded somewhat in recent years as a result of government emphasis on integrating science and technology advances into the national economy.

Through joint research projects with Western counterparts, a number of Bulgarian scientists have made significant contributions in their fields. Exchange agreements between the Bulgarian Academy of Science and, inter alia, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and U.S. Department of Agriculture were in force and fully subscribed.

The concept of scientific or academic freedom, as understood in the West, is far from being a reality in Bulgaria. The controlling bodies of science and technology institutions are staffed chiefly by party officials who emphasize national prestige and state security concerns. Researchers who enjoy world-class reputations or receive funding from international organizations comprise a privileged class of scientists, while less-exalted colleagues scramble for funding or permission to travel. Political motives also intrude into funding allocations; large sums are expended on showcase high-tech projects of questionable practical value, while many laboratories struggle with outdated equipment.

The Bulgarian Government signed and ratified the convention on long-range transboundary air pollution and its subsequent protocols. It is not a party to the Montreal protocol. Bulgaria paid increasing attention to environmental concerns during the reporting period, but few concrete results were seen. In March 1989, managers at factories in Burgas described stringent pollution control measures adopted during the planning stages of their enterprises and reported purchases of pollution control equipment from both East and West European countries. There are no independent environmental groups active in Bulgaria. One formed in Ruse in early 1988 was crushed by the authorities.

Chapter Four

Implementation of Basket III: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Basket III contains specific measures to foster human contacts, improve access to information, and promote cultural and educational exchanges. Basket III and Principle Seven of Basket I, strengthened by provisions of the Madrid and Vienna Concluding Documents, constitute the principal human rights provisions of the Helsinki process.

HUMAN CONTACTS

In the Final Act, participating states commit themselves to facilitate family reunification and meetings, marriage between citizens of different states, and expansion of contacts and travel, especially in the areas of tourism, business, sports, and among young people.

In addition, the Madrid Concluding Document contains a number of provisions that strengthen and extend the human contacts commitments in the Final Act. The participating states have pledged: to deal favorably with applications for family meetings, reunification, and marriage; to decide upon marriage and family reunification applications within 6 months; to ensure that rights of applicants for family reunification are not prejudiced; to provide necessary forms and information to applicants for emigration; to reduce emigration fees; to inform emigration applicants of decisions expeditiously; to assure access to diplomatic missions; and to facilitate contacts among representatives of religious faiths.

The CSCE states agreed in Vienna to decide on emigrant visa applications in family reunification and binational marriage cases within 3 months, to decide within 3 working days on applications relating to visits to seriously ill or dying family members, and to permit family members to travel together and to visit more distant relatives. They also agreed to strict limits on travel restrictions based on national security grounds and to provide persons whose applications for foreign travel are denied with written notification, including the grounds for the refusal.

General Assessment

To some extent, the Helsinki process has led to freer travel policies in the East, but much remains to be done to achieve CSCE goals. In general, Eastern countries maintain a policy of limiting and controlling their citizens' right to depart abroad. It should be noted that the U.S.S.R. and other Warsaw Pact countries have ratified the UN Charter and other international documents on human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which the right to leave one's country and return thereto is articulated. The right of any person to leave any country, including his own, is also spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This provision was incorporated into the Helsinki Final Act by reference, since all participating states committed themselves (in Principle Seven) to "act in conformity with the Universal Declaration." However, in practice, the Soviet Union significantly restricts the rights of its citizens in this regard. Practices in the countries of Eastern Europe vary considerably.

Soviet Union. In general, Soviet performance in permitting travel abroad and the return of its citizens to the Soviet Union improved during the reporting period. As noted below, U.S. visitor visa issuance was up—a trend reported across the board by those countries issuing the largest number of visas to Soviet citizens—as were applications for permanent residence outside the Soviet Union.

While waits of 2–3 months for passports are common, the number of refusals on secrecy or "poor relative" grounds declined, although refusals on these grounds continued. Public discussion of proposed legislation on entry and exit controls—including speculation on the abolition of the requirement for a notarized "invitation" from the Soviet citizen's host abroad—also continued. Although it is not known when the new law will be enacted nor its provisions, senior Soviet officials claim it will bring the Soviet Union fully into compliance with all international agreements, including its CSCE commitments in this area.

Romania. Romania's performance in the field of emigration and human contacts was poor during this reporting period. While there was some increase in exit permission granted for temporary family visits, the process of applying for emigration permission remained difficult and arbitrary. Officially, Romania opposes emigration although it does allow some departures under the rubric of family reunification. The Romanian Government made no noticeable progress toward resolving many long-term emigration cases. Merely applying for emigration permission can result in loss of social benefits such as jobs and housing. Family members of Romanians who have emigrated legally or illegally often report they are harassed because they have family living abroad. Vital documents required for the application process are generally available and remain valid, although some must be renewed at considerable expense. Refusals are given either orally or in writing, and no explanation for the refusal is provided by the passport authorities. The only recourse for a refused applicant is to reapply. Romanian law places a time limit of 3 years on refusals for national security reasons. It appears, however, that the law is erratically enforced and some individuals must wait more than 3 years. Travel regulations and emigration procedures are not readily available to the public.

Poland. The Polish Government has instituted another major liberalization of its passport issuance policy which gives its citizens almost unfettered freedom of travel. As of January 1, 1989, Polish citizens, if they so choose, can obtain passports valid for unlimited travel to both socialist and nonsocialist countries which are good for up to 10 years and which they can keep in their possession between journeys. This marks a substantial reduction in official oversight and control of international travel. At the same time, the application process has been greatly simplified. Polish citizens no longer need present notarized letters of invitation from relatives or acquaintances abroad, a process that is both expensive and fraud-prone. Applicants may now alternatively present a personal statement affirming that they have adequate funds to finance international travel, and they receive their passports based on that assurance.

Hungary. Effective January 1, 1988, the Hungarian Government introduced new passport regulations which did away with most previous restrictions on visits

abroad by its citizens. Hungarian passports are now valid for 5 years for travel to any country for visits of up to 90 days. The permitted stay can be extended either by request before departure or later, upon application to the nearest Hungarian Embassy or Consulate. Staying abroad beyond the permitted period is a civil offense and can be punished by withdrawal of all passport rights for up to 5 years.

The Hungarian Government retains the right to refuse an application for a passport, but such cases have been rare. For the majority of the population, therefore, the new regulations have meant a major relaxation of constraints on contacts abroad. Travel is constrained only by the difficulty of obtaining convertible currency. Official government statistics show a fourfold increase in travel by Hungarians to the West since the new passport law came into effect.

German Democratic Republic. An increase in this reporting period in incidents of shooting at would-be escapees has focused new attention on the G.D.R.'s poor record of following through on its CSCE commitment to allow persons to leave as well as return to their country of origin. General Secretary Honecker has stated on several occasions that the number of individuals allowed to travel will at least equal 1988's record figure of 1,400,000. All the same, the G.D.R. continues to restrict travel and emigration opportunities for its residents and some have been killed or injured during this reporting period while trying to flee.

In December 1988, the G.D.R. published a new law on short-term Western visits and permanent emigration which more clearly defined the categories of persons eligible to submit applications and broadened the circumstances under which applications may be made. According to the law, officials are required to accept applications, reach decisions within fixed time periods, and provide a clear legal statement for rejections. On July 1, 1989, the right to appeal these decisions to a court is to be introduced. The new law appears to codify substantially the more liberal practices of the past 3 years, but the grounds for refusal listed include some clauses reserving for the authorities considerable discretionary power.

The new travel law does not ensure that actions by family members do not adversely affect the travel rights of applicants, particularly when family members have previously emigrated illegally. The law also does not establish strictly warranted time limits on refusals for national security reasons, as called for in the Vienna Concluding Document, and individuals who have served in the army generally have a difficult time receiving permission to travel for up to 3 years afterwards.

Czechoslovakia. The ability of Czechoslovak citizens to travel abroad is subject to controls which, though relaxed over the past year, still do not permit all Czechoslovak citizens the ability to exercise their rights under the Vienna Concluding Document. Czechoslovak authorities are aware of the need to amend their legislation and practices to come into conformity with obligations undertaken in Vienna. It is not yet clear how far-reaching a reform will actually be implemented, since the review of existing legislation and practices was only scheduled to be completed in mid-March.

Bulgaria. Freedom of travel from Bulgaria, particularly to Western destinations, remains a privilege reserved for a few, not a right. The revisions of the passport law, first discussed in early 1988, have yet to be enacted, although the issue will reportedly be dealt with by the next National Assembly session. Passport applications are often refused repeatedly, with no reason given. Those who do travel abroad but do not return at the appointed time are subject under the criminal code to imprisonment, a fine, or enforced domicile.

Regulations regarding travel are not generally published or widely available. Bulgarian citizens cannot apply for exit documents to travel abroad unless they submit to their district office of the People's Militia an authenticated affidavit of support, prepared by a sponsor abroad. Bulgarian regulations require five separate authentications of such a document before it is accepted as legitimate. Otherwise, a Bulgarian citizen must have $200 worth of foreign currency in a bank account (which different regulations prohibit him using directly), in order to apply for a passport for foreign travel.

There are no administrative or judicial remedies when the right of travel has been violated. Increasing numbers of Bulgarians have turned to the U.S. Embassy for assistance and are added to the divided families list, gaining the benefit thereby of official Embassy representation over their refused exit requests. No time limits are specified on refusals for national security reasons, although there is apparently a "regulation" declaring that no Bulgarian male who has registered for military service (usually done at age 16) can travel outside the country until 2–5 years following completion of that service. Despite repeated requests, the U.S. Embassy has been unable to ascertain which ministry promulgated the regulation or obtain a copy of it in writing.

Routinely, acts or omissions by family members adversely affect the right of applicants for foreign travel. When one family member has remained in the U.S. and obtained refugee status, for example, there is a 3–5 year "penalty period" before relatives can visit and/or join him.

Family Visits

Soviet Union. Soviet practice in the area of family meetings improved steadily in the period of this report. From October 1, 1988, through March 31, 1989, the U.S. Embassy issued 12,239 visitor's visas for private visitors to the U.S. (this figure includes visas issued to a very small percentage of third-country nationals temporarily residing in the U.S.S.R.). A small but increasing number of Soviet citizens applied as private visitors and were issued U.S. visitor visas for the purpose of carrying out business negotiations with U.S. firms or taking part in various academic or cultural exchanges. During the past 6 months, the Consulate General in Leningrad issued nonimmigrant visas to 2,934 Soviet citizens (including a small number of third-country nationals).

Soviet citizens are still required by their government to obtain notarized invitations from relatives or friends, guaranteeing all expenses incurred outside the Soviet Union. Trends noted in previous reports have continued: more private business and academic travel is being allowed, and entire families are more frequently permitted to travel abroad together. In a rather high percentage of cases, families who received invitations to emigrate 10 years ago (a fact apparently recorded by Soviet authorities) are now being allowed to visit U.S. relatives to "check out U.S. life" to decide first-hand whether they still wish to apply for emigration or stay in the U.S.S.R. Almost 50% of total private visitors are Jewish. The percentage of private visitors who are Communist Party members (including a few elected officials) was higher than during the previous years of restrictive Soviet exit policy.

During the reporting period the U.S. Embassy had no need to make routine interventions on behalf of Soviet citizens wishing to visit relatives in the U.S. On only one occasion was a prospective visitor case raised by a high-ranking embassy official at the Foreign Ministry. One month later, the subject of the representation, having received a Soviet exit visa as the U.S. urged, applied for and received a U.S. visitor visa.

Romania. Exit permission granted by Romanian authorities for the purpose of short-term family meetings increased

somewhat during this reporting period. During this time, the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest issued roughly 3,100 nonimmigrant tourist visas to Romanian citizens. This is significantly more than in the comparable period in 1987–88. Difficulties in obtaining exit permits for temporary visits still persist, however. Opportunities to travel abroad for most Romanians are strictly limited. Passport issuance procedures are arbitrary, unpredictable, and expensive.

Only those persons approved by party-controlled "workers committees" are allowed tourist passports. Those who receive passports often do so only after months or years of waiting. Applicants report that bribery often plays a large role in the issuance procedure. Rarely are entire families issued passports at the same time for a visit abroad. Usually at least one member of the immediate family must stay behind. In cases of serious illness or death of a family member in the U.S., the Embassy has requested, and occasionally received, expeditious consideration.

Americans generally encounter few problems in obtaining visas to visit relatives in Romania, unless they themselves are former Romanians who left the country illegally or are considered "undesirable" by the Romanian Government for other reasons. Most Americans arrive at Romanian frontiers without visas and receive entry permission on the spot. The U.S. Embassy estimates that approximately 500 Americans visited Romania during the reporting period. Since nearly all Americans are permitted to enter Romania, intervention is not generally necessary. The Embassy is not usually advised when a U.S. citizen has been refused entry. The Embassy has, however, received information after the fact that Americans were temporarily detained and ultimately refused entry, although they had valid Romanian visas. In isolated instances, Americans have experienced unpleasant interrogations by police either regarding their relationship to Romanian citizens or for other, unrelated reasons.

Poland. For Polish visitors to the U.S., the U.S. Embassy can process a nonimmigrant visa application within 3 hours—even more rapidly in urgent cases—unless waivers of ineligibility or clearance are required. Such clearances normally require 10–15 days for processing. The average duration of host country exit formalities for tourist travel is up to 2 weeks. The estimated average total cost is the equivalent of $30.

The number of exit permits issued for visits to family members in the U.S. during the reporting period is estimated at more than 42,000. The number of visas issued to Poles by the U.S. Embassy and constituent posts at Krakow and Poznan for visits to family members was approximately 60,000 from October 1, 1987, to September 30, 1988.

For more than 2 years now, the U.S. Embassy has not interceded on behalf of Polish citizens applying for nonimmigrant visas who have problems obtaining passports. Indeed, by all indications, since the previous liberalization of passport issuance was announced in the spring of 1987, the vast majority of Polish citizens applying for passports have been able to obtain them with little or no difficulty.

The U.S. Embassy estimates the number of tourist visas and other nonimmigrant visas issued to Americans desiring to visit Poland at 58,000. The estimated average duration of the visa application process for Americans visiting Poland is 2 weeks, most of which is really mail turnaround. American visitors to Poland are required to exchange $15 per day at the official rate of exchange. If they are visiting relatives in Poland, only half that amount must be exchanged.

There are no restrictions placed on most American citizens regarding travel within Poland, so there consequently is little necessity for U.S. authorities to facilitate travel within the country. U.S. diplomats are, however, required to file travel notifications for travel within Poland. This system was implemented in May 1986 in response to similar restrictions imposed by the U.S. on travel by Polish diplomats within the U.S.

Hungary. The U.S. Embassy issued 4,068 visas for family visits to the U.S. during the reporting period. Visas are seldom denied to Americans for family visits to Hungary. The Foreign Ministry never supplies reasons for the one or two such refusals annually of which the U.S. Embassy is aware but will consider the Embassy's request for review, at times with positive results. Favorable reconsideration is often granted for demonstrable humanitarian concerns such as the illness of a close relative. The most difficult cases involve people especially prominent in the 1956 uprising or those who on previous visits were convicted of violations of Hungarian law, often related to customs matters.

German Democratic Republic. In 1988, a record number of East Germans, including some 1.4 million individuals under pension age, traveled to the Federal Republic. The more relaxed travel restrictions also continued to apply to travel to the U.S. During this reporting period the U.S. Embassy issued 1,386 visas for family visits. Of these 683 were issued to nonpensioners. In the same period a year ago, the Embassy issued 1,152 visas for family visits, including 674 to individuals below pension age. In all of 1988, the Embassy issued 3,879 visas for family visits, including 2,231 visas to individuals under pension age.

Under G.D.R. regulations in effect through December 31, 1988, private travel to noncommunist countries was not allowed until citizens reached retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men). On a case-by-case basis, the government also permitted persons below retirement age to travel to the West, chiefly to the Federal Republic of Germany, on urgent family matters, narrowly defined as births, deaths, marriages, and significant birthdays and anniversaries for first-degree relatives (spouses, parents, children) and siblings. For the last 3 years, however, the government substantially eased these restrictions and the authorities increasingly made exceptions to their own rules.

In December of last year, the G.D.R. published a new law on short-term Western visits which came into effect January 1. Under this law, the categories of persons eligible to submit applications and the circumstances under which applications may be made are somewhat broader and more clearly defined. East Germans may now apply to visit uncles, aunts, parents-in-law, grandchildren, nieces and nephews, cousins, and brothers- and sisters-in-law, in addition to first-degree relatives, on a wide variety of occasions. The authorities are required to reach decisions within 1 month and provide a clear legal statement for rejections. Decisions on emergency travel must be made within 3 days. Additional amendments enacted in mid-March broadened the categories of individuals who may make private visits to the West in an attempt to respond to popular criticism that the new law was proving more restrictive than the practice of the past several years.

Emigrants from the G.D.R. generally must wait 5 years before they can return for family visits, although individuals who marry foreigners and depart on regular passports may return at any time. Certain prominent individuals allowed to visit the West for extended periods but who choose to retain their citizenship apparently may also travel to the G.D.R. at any time.

Czechoslovakia. Travel of Czechoslovak citizens, especially to the West, continues to be restricted, but opportunities for foreign travel have expanded recently. This improvement is connected with a certain liberalization of the country's for-

eign exchange controls. The number of visas issued by the U.S. Embassy in Prague for visits to family members in the U.S. was 2,576 for the reporting period. This represents an increase of 42% over the same period a year ago. It used to be the case that the majority of Czechoslovak citizens allowed to travel to the U.S. to visit relatives were retired and elderly. However, during this reporting period the Embassy saw a significant increase in visa applications from working-age persons, many of whom were either single or traveling as a family unit. Generally, Czechoslovak authorities resolve applications for necessary exit permits within a month as specified by the Vienna Concluding Document.

Most U.S. citizens obtain visas to visit Czechoslovakia without difficulty, often in a single day. However, many U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak origin continue to be refused visas with no explanation given, sometimes after having received several visas in the past. In addition to continuing expressions of concern about this arbitrariness, the U.S. Embassy has made representations to the host government on behalf of 13 such citizens during this reporting period.

Bulgaria. Although Petur Vulkanov, Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Consular Department, declared in an interview in January 1989 that Bulgaria's visa system "is among the world's most liberal," experience has not borne out this assertion. Applications for passports must be either approved or denied within a 45-day period. Most cases which are refused and are subsequently added to the divided families list of the U.S. Embassy take anywhere from 2–6 months to resolve. The U.S. Embassy issued 642 tourist visas to Bulgarians during the reporting period, a 42% increase over the same period last year. The great majority of tourist visas were issued for family visits. The U.S. Embassy cannot reliably estimate the number of Bulgarians refused passports for temporary visits to the U.S. notwithstanding the presence of close relatives there.

For Americans visiting Bulgaria, a frequent problem continues to be the Bulgarian requirement—often not made clear to visa applicants—that a special "visitation" (rather than "tourist") visa be obtained to stay with a relative or friend instead of in a hotel room paid for in hard currency. In order to obtain such a "visitation" visa, the applicant must have an affidavit of support from the family member or friend in Bulgaria, certified by the municipal People's Council.

Divided Family Cases

	Nuclear Families		Non-Nuclear Families	
	Cases	Individuals	Cases	Individuals
Soviet Union	21	66	4	16
Romania	138	182	1,342	3,061
Poland	0	0	3	12
Hungary	0	0	0	0
G.D.R.	0	0	13	45
Czechoslovakia	0	0	1	4
Bulgaria	7	19	18	31

Family Reunification

There have been significant improvements in Soviet performance on family reunification issues during the reporting period. Some of the states in Eastern Europe are more restrictive or arbitrary than the Soviet Union—such as Romania, the G.D.R., and Czechoslovakia—while others raise fewer obstacles to allowing their citizens to emigrate to join family members abroad.

The U.S. Government regularly intercedes with Eastern governments on behalf of relatives of U.S. citizens who have been refused permission to emigrate to the U.S. to join their families. The accompanying table shows the number of such cases being monitored officially by the U.S. Government as of March 31, 1989.

Soviet Union. The relative liberalization of emigration for family reunification has continued for the period October 1, 1988, through March 31, 1989. The U.S. Government representation list now numbers fewer than 30 families, down from more than 50 at the beginning of the reporting period. A large majority of Soviets who apply still receive exit permission on their first application. Many of those now on the representation list have been listed there for years. They are increasingly a hard core of cases of individuals or family members who had access to information the Soviet Government still considers secret. In some cases, as many as 20 years have elapsed since the individual's access to secret information. The Soviet Government has shown no inclination to budge on most of these cases, although it has been very responsive on cases in most other categories.

For example, the humanitarian affairs administration of the Foreign Ministry has declared that any Soviet national who also has American nationality can depart the U.S.S.R. at will. If the dual-national has relatives abroad, he may apply to go to those relatives. If he has no relatives abroad, he may apply to renounce his Soviet citizenship and then depart the country on his American passport. This announcement was made early in 1989, and it has not turned out to work quite so smoothly as first hoped. The U.S. Embassy is currently investigating a case where the renunciation of citizenship according to these terms has not been accepted by the local branch of the office of visas and registration. Other cases have been accepted, however, and it is possible that regional administrations do not always get the word immediately on new procedures.

During the reporting period 263 Soviet nationals received U.S. immigrant visas to join first-degree relatives for permanent U.S. residence. An additional 2,401 persons were processed for entry into the U.S. as refugees or parolees. Also during the reporting period, another 4,601 refugees and parolees were interviewed by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and granted permission to enter the U.S. as either refugees or parolees. An INS officer was in Moscow during the month of October, for 10 days in December, and on a permanent basis beginning on January 12, 1989. A second INS adjudicating officer arrived April 2 to help cope with the mounting caseload. As of the end of the reporting period, there were more than 22,400 persons who had submitted applications for refugee status awaiting INS interviews. Applications continue to come in at the rate of more than 4,000 per month. More than 60% of applicants are Armenian, many of whom are current or former residents of Baku and other areas of Azerbaydzhan, where there have been outbreaks of violence between Armenians and Azerbaydzhanis.

Romania. The Romanian Government has made little progress in meeting the provisions of the Vienna Concluding Document regarding pending family reunification cases. Cases are virtually never re-

solved within 3 months; some have been in limbo for years. The Romanian Government continues officially to oppose emigration and reiterates this policy publicly and frequently. A number of departures are allowed under the rubric of family reunification, but the approvals for such cases lag far behind emigration requests. The government has continued to let a relatively large number of ethnic Germans emigrate. During this reporting period 4,151 people departed Romania for the Federal Republic of Germany, as opposed to 5,732 people during the last reporting period. Jewish emigration to Israel is greater than in the last reporting period, with 813 departing as compared to 518.

Total immigration to the U.S. is up from the previous reporting period. However, levels were unusually low in the previous period, just after the Romanian renunciation of MFN. The number of preference-based visas issued, all of which were for family reunification, rose to 296 from 209 in the previous reporting period. Thirteen humanitarian parole cases, also for family reunification, were processed. The number of people documented to join a family member in either refugee or asylum status in the U.S. fell to 299 from 360 in the previous reporting period. The number of persons issued refugee documentation was 666, of which approximately 220 are estimated to be family reunification. The total documentation for U.S. immigration purposes during the period was 1,274, of which approximately 828 were for family reunification. During the last reporting period immigration totaled 992, of which 577 were family reunification cases.

In general, difficulties still exist for obtaining exit permits for temporary visits. The Romanian Government has taken a much harder line of late with the relatives of those who have left the country illegally. Applications made by people whose relatives, however distant, have departed Romania illegally are routinely denied. The same often holds true for those who have relatives in "sensitive" positions, i.e., the army, security apparatus, or government. Romanian law specifies that persons who have worked with state secrets will not be granted exit permission until 3 years after they have ceased working with sensitive material. In practice, this time limit is erratically applied and some applicants must wait much longer before receiving emigration approval.

Exact figures for the number of persons who have been unsuccessful in applying for permission to emigrate are difficult to obtain. The U.S. Embassy currently knows of 2,113 persons qualified to enter the U.S. who have to date been unsuccessful in obtaining exit permission. This includes 1,202 persons remaining on the refugee list who have been waiting at least 6 years for exit permission and 911 persons awaiting family reunification. The Embassy makes monthly representations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of all qualified applicants still waiting passport approval. These interventions generally receive no response from Romanian officials. While the Romanian Government continues to delay resolution of many cases in which the Embassy has shown interest, they issue emigration passports for people who have no hope of ever qualifying for U.S. immigration. The Embassy is aware of nearly 500 cases of people holding approvals for departure to the U.S. who are not qualified to immigrate. As a result of these passport approvals, people are routinely deprived of jobs, housing, and social benefits in Romania, even though no other country will accept them as immigrants.

The U.S. Embassy has four adoption cases pending since 1987 in which parents were permitted to select a child, but actual adoption has been held in abeyance. Romania announced that no more adoptions by foreigners would be considered after January 1, 1988. One of the four American cases has been refused by the Romanian People's Council, but the case is under appeal. The other three are also presumably still under consideration.

Poland. In a further consequence of the Polish Government's 2-year liberalization of passport policy, nearly all of the individuals on the divided families list maintained by the U.S. Embassy and presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a quarterly basis have either been issued passports, been promised passports, or have abandoned their intention to emigrate. The Embassy's nuclear divided families list currently stands empty; that is, all the cases that involved the spouse, parent, or minor child of an American citizen or resident alien have been resolved, and the individuals have either received passports or decided not to emigrate. However, six cases are still outstanding on the non-nuclear divided families list, though two of the individuals recently reported that they had in fact been issued passports. All the cases may be resolved in the near future.

Hungary. As part of new passport regulations, the Hungarian Government expanded the categories of persons whom a Hungarian may apply to join through emigration. These now include brothers, sisters, and grandparents (as well as spouses, children, and parents). The U.S. Embassy in Budapest processed 48 applications by local nationals for immigrant visas for family reunification during the reporting period, including applicants processed to join refugees. There were no cases of refusals of emigration permission for family reunification.

German Democratic Republic. During 1987, 12,706 East Germans were granted exit visas to immigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany—less than in 1986. In 1988, however, 30,127 East Germans emigrated legally, and in the first quarter of 1989 at least 12,000 individuals were permitted to go to the West. Reasons for leaving vary—some do so for family reunification, others for economic and political motives. As far as immigration to the U.S. is concerned, of the six cases on the family reunification list at the beginning of the reporting period, four families were permitted to leave the G.D.R. to join relatives in the U.S. At the end of the reporting period, there are seven families (19 people) now on the list. Two cases have been refused exit permits without reasons given.

Only a fraction of those desiring to leave the G.D.R. for the Federal Republic have been allowed to do so. While there are no fully reliable figures, Western sources estimate that as many as several hundred thousand individuals may have submitted applications under the old system. It is impossible to estimate how many of these have already submitted new applications under the new travel and emigration law which came into effect in January.

That law more clearly defined the categories of individuals who may apply for family reunification and created a new category of emigration for humanitarian reasons. The authorities are required to accept applications, reach decisions within 3 months on most cases (6 months on the special humanitarian cases), and provide a clear legal explanation for rejections. Citizens will also have access to judicial review of negative decisions after July 1.

The experiences of exit visa applicants, especially for the Federal Republic, vary. While some East Germans have been able to lead normal lives after submitting an exit visa application, others have been subjected to reprisals of varying degrees of severity. Applicants have lost their jobs or have had to take menial work. In the past, G.D.R. authorities have visited the homes of exit applicants to try to intimidate them into withdrawing their applications. Their children may face discrimination and harassment in school. Successful applicants must usually renounce their G.D.R. citizenship and accept a stateless passport, but East German citizens can readily obtain a West German passport once they reach the West.

A few G.D.R. citizens apply for immigration to the U.S. though they intend to remain in the Federal Republic or West Berlin. It is, therefore, difficult to know the exact number of persons allowed to leave the G.D.R. for family reunification in the U.S.

The Embassy makes representations to the G.D.R. by periodically presenting a list of cases of direct interest to U.S. citizens. The list submitted in this reporting period included six cases of families wishing to go to the U.S. for family reunification.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on family reunification is generally poor. The Czechoslovak Government does not regard married sons and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens as needing reunification since, in its view, the basic family unit is with them in Czechoslovakia. The record on spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens is relatively good, although these persons face the same bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles encountered by others who wish to emigrate.

The divided families list includes one case that involves four persons. In addition, seven families totaling 17 individuals are known to be awaiting permission to join non-U.S. citizen family members in the U.S.

Czechoslovak policy discourages emigration of members of the workforce. Adult sons and daughters, married sons and daughters, or siblings of U.S. citizens frequently experience great difficulty in obtaining exit documents and often must wait many years before receiving exit permission. Decisions on exit documentation often seem arbitrary and as dependent on where the application is made as on the merits of the case. The U.S. Embassy has 189 active immigrant visa cases and has received no word from most of those concerned, presumably because of the difficulty in obtaining exit documentation, since the time they were notified of their petition approval. Families of refugees can expect waits of at least 3 years, which is an improvement over the situation in the past, when a 5-year wait was the norm. In the past, some beneficiaries have had to renounce Czechoslovak citizenship in order to receive exit documentation.

Assembling the documents needed to apply for emigration usually takes a minimum of 6 weeks. This includes obtaining statements of "no objection" from local authorities, without which an application is incomplete and unacceptable. Processing of an emigration application takes from 6 weeks to 6 months from the date the completed application is submitted, although the average time is 3 months. If the application is refused, it is possible to file an appeal within 15 days. If it is refused a second time, the applicant must wait 3 months before submitting a new application. In some cases, people are told it is useless to reapply, although according to Czechoslovak law they have the right to do so. An emigrating Czechoslovak's largest expense is often the education payment levied, in theory to reimburse the government for university and postgraduate education. Some applicants have had to pay the Czechoslovak crown equivalent of $1,000, approximately 6 months' wages for the average immigrant.

During this period, the U.S. Embassy in Prague received 43 new immigrant visa applications (14 more than during the same 6 months a year ago). The Embassy issued 40 Czechoslovak citizen immigrant visas to family members of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens during this period, an increase of 12 cases. Ten relatives of refugees were processed.

Bulgaria. A number of family reunification cases remain pending on the U.S. Embassy's divided family list, but regular monthly meetings with the Bulgarian Consular Department and a generally cooperative attitude there have resulted in gradual but steady progress. The Embassy issued 15 immigrant visas and four refugee visas to Bulgarians for family reunification purposes during the reporting period. The Embassy cannot estimate reliably how many additional Bulgarians with close relatives in the U.S. may have wanted to emigrate but were unable to obtain permission. Most other NATO embassies reported no problems with regard to this issue, with the exception of the Turkish Embassy, for which significant family reunification problems remain.

Binational Marriages

States participating in the CSCE process have pledged to consider favorably applications for entry or exit permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen of another participating state. In the Madrid Concluding Document, the participating states committed themselves to deal favorably with binational marriage applications and to decide on applications normally within 6 months. There is a mixed record of implementation of these commitments by the Soviet Union and the East European countries. The following chart indicates the number of cases the U.S. Government was monitoring as of March 31, 1989.

Soviet Union	4
Romania	52
Poland	0
Hungary	0
G.D.R.	12
Czechoslovakia	0
Bulgaria	1

Soviet Union. Soviet authorities have continued to issue exit permission to Soviets with fiance(e)s in the West. During this period the U.S. Embassy issued approximately 20 fiance(e) visas to allow Soviets to go to the U.S. to marry American citizens. Approximately 30 immigration petitions were approved for Soviet spouses of American citizens. The Embassy issued 60 immigrant visas to Soviet spouses of American citizens. There has been a general improvement in the resolution of many cases of family reunification, but there are still some divided spouse cases on the U.S. Government representation list that remain unresolved after more than a year. Frequently, these cases involve refusals due to alleged knowledge of state secrets. The number of divided spouse/fiance(e) cases on the representation list was reduced from six to four during this 6-month period.

Romania. The Romanian Government's record of expeditious handling of marriage cases has not been good. The U.S. Embassy currently has records on 52 pending cases. The average wait for approval is 2 years. One case has been pending for 4 years, while some are resolved in 9–12 months. The Embassy is not aware of any marriage case that was ever resolved within 3 months of the initial application. During this reporting period the U.S. Embassy received notification of the approval of 34 binational marriages, 23 to U.S. citizens, 2 to U.S. residents and 9 to persons of whom the Embassy has no record. Final passport approval is a process that always lasts longer than 6 months. Embassy intervention is received without response or any noticeable change in the speed of resolution.

Poland. American citizens can more easily marry Poles in the U.S. than in Poland. The U.S. does not issue documentation that an American citizen is free to marry, and Polish courts usually require such certification in order to recognize a marriage. If the American involved has never previously been married, the process takes from 4–8 weeks; for divorced Americans, it can take up to 1 year. In addition, as the Polish Government does not recog-

nize divorces granted abroad involving Polish nationals, a divorce promulgated in the U.S. must be officially recognized in a Polish court, a process which also takes up to 1 year.

Hungary. Hungarian performance continued to be good during the reporting period. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest received or approved petitions for 33 binational marriage immigrant visas. These included immigrant visas to Hungarian spouses, to American citizens, and to spouses of legal residents of the U.S. None were refused exit permits or delayed for more than 6 months. There has been no need for U.S. interventions in this reporting period.

German Democratic Republic. Under the new travel and immigration law, applications for binational marriage cases are to be settled within 3 months of a completed application. Previously, the authorities were required to reach a decision within 6 months. The G.D.R. does not consider an application to have been made until all required documents have been presented, and assembly of documentation in requisite formats can cause significant delay. Once the documents are accepted, permission to marry and emigrate is generally granted, provided the couple marries in the G.D.R. The U.S. Embassy has currently eight binational marriage cases pending, all of which were reported to the Embassy after October 1988.

Czechoslovakia. Although the processing of the marriage applications takes 3 months, the Czechoslovak record on binational marriages is generally good. The Czechoslovak Government requires that marriages take place in Czechoslovakia. In the past there have been cases of U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak birth being refused an entrance visa and the Czechoslovak fiance(e) being refused an exit visa for the purpose of marriage. During this reporting period, the U.S. Embassy issued 28 immigrant visas to the spouses of U.S. citizens. An additional seven applications for marriage which occurred were being processed during this period.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government's record on this issue has been positive. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued 9 visas during the reporting period for the purpose of binational marriage. Two cases on the Embassy's list have been resolved; another remains, pending documentation of Bulgarian charges of "marriage fraud." Other NATO embassies reported a great upsurge in the number of binational marriages. One case which has required U.S. intervention involves problems with Bulgarian bureaucratic regulations. Bulgarian law does not recognize marriage to a foreigner either in Bulgaria or abroad without prior permission. A couple which married without such permission is now attempting to obtain it. The local People's Council is demanding a copy of the marriage certificate notarized by the Bulgarian Consul in the country in which the marriage took place. The Consul will not notarize the document because to do so would imply endorsement of the marriage.

Travel for Personal and Professional Reasons

Although the Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate travel for personal or professional reasons, in fact the Soviet Union and most other East European states impose restrictions on travel by their own citizens. While they generally encourage visitors from the West, those who attempt to see dissidents or who bring in religious or literary materials are subject to harassment.

Soviet Union. In addition to the 15,173 U.S. visas issued by the U.S. Embassy and Consulate General for private travel, the Embassy issued 6,641 visas to Soviet citizens for official business (including diplomatic and official visas and government-sponsored academic and cultural exchanges and business trips). Private travel continued to outpace government-sponsored trips. During the reporting period a significantly larger number of nonnuclear relatives applied to visit Soviet employees of the U.S.S.R. Embassy and Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Some applications were submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but an increasing number of individuals in this category applied in person at the Embassy as private visitors. During this period the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to be taking itself out of the tour business. The Soviet Government tourist agency "Intourist" and the youth tourism agency "Sputnik" began to submit applications for Soviet tour groups directly to the Embassy without the cover of a diplomatic note, a further indication that Soviet policy on travel abroad has relaxed considerably.

The U.S. Embassy has no way of estimating how many Soviet foreign travel passports were issued from October 1, 1988, to March 31, 1989. But judging from the growing demand for U.S. visas, Soviet passport issuance is up significantly. Applicants still report that they must wait for 2–3 months to receive their passports. However, passports are routinely issued with a 5-year validity. Exit visas to specific countries are still required (valid for 6 months and relatively easily extended), but the number of trips abroad allowed each year as well as the length of stay permitted abroad are no longer specified. Soviet citizens making family visits appear to be allowed to reside abroad as private guests for up to one year. More and more Soviet citizens, surprisingly not just retirees but working people as well, are making multiple trips to the U.S. each year. It is becoming increasingly common for visitors to finance their travel (airline tickets paid for in rubles) by purchasing Western electrical and home entertainment appliances in the U.S. and selling them in secondhand shops at home for prices much higher than the cost of round-trip airfare.

It would be difficult to give an estimate of the number of Soviets refused exit permission in any period. The Soviet Government continues to bar travel to many who have had access to any kind of information the government considers secret, and often to their family members as well, even many years after the last period of access to such information. Other grounds for denial seem to have been substantially relaxed, however, as evidenced by the long lines of applicants for all kinds of visas outside the U.S. Embassy.

The Soviet Embassy in Washington and the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco levy a $15–$20 "processing" or "expediting" fee for visas issued to American citizens. As a reciprocal measure, the U.S. Embassy levies a $20 charge in rubles for both private and official visitor's visas. Periodic Embassy representations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to abolish visa fees have not met with a positive response. Soviet citizens must pay 200 rubles (over $300 at official exchange rates) for a foreign travel passport.

As a general matter, the Soviet Government encourages tourism to the U.S.S.R. by Westerners as a source of hard currency and potential ideological benefit. Relatively less expensive rates are offered to large groups, which are less troublesome to program and easier to control than individual tourists, who pay premium rates for comparative liberty. Soviet authorities continue to prefer tourists who concentrate on the sights and who meet with "official" Soviet citizens by arrangement through their Soviet hosts, although there has been a dramatic rise in "private visitor" tourism, arranged by invitation of Soviet relatives.

The U.S. Embassy in Moscow has no means of estimating the total number of tourists and other visitor visas issued to Americans by Soviet Embassies and Consulates in the U.S. and abroad. Intourist officials have told the Embassy that U.S. tourism to the U.S.S.R. should exceed

100,000 in both 1988 and 1989. The popularity of the Soviet Union as a travel destination continues to grow, the result of increased press coverage of liberalizing trends in the U.S.S.R. Additional direct flights between the U.S. and the Soviet Union should further increase the number of American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, although the current Soviet hotel space shortage will limit any increase in the number of group tours during 1989.

Travel within the Soviet Union by American tourists and other foreigners continues to be closely restricted by Western standards. Large portions of the country are closed entirely to foreigners. Virtually all tourists must plan their itineraries and pay for transportation, accommodations, and even meals in hard currency in advance of travel. As a result, Soviet authorities have no currency conversion requirements for tourists, but rubles may not be imported or exported from the Soviet Union by tourists. Once a tourist has arrived in the Soviet Union, changing a previously arranged itinerary becomes practically impossible. Even in the case of illness or accident, changing previously arranged plans is a long, difficult, and often impossible task. As a result of hotel space shortages, tourists are often limited to a 3-day stay in Moscow, with the remainder of their tour spent in other Soviet cities.

Further barriers to normal tourism are imposed by overly restrictive customs regulations. Most problems seem to occur upon departure, resulting from incomplete or inaccurate execution of the Soviet customs declaration by the American tourist. This almost always results in confiscation of the items in question, and claims procedures are cumbersome and often ineffective. The U.S. Embassy intervenes with Soviet customs and tourist officials when difficulties experienced by Americans come to its attention. However, the Embassy has no means of knowing how many customs abuses or confiscations are not brought to its attention. In the case of Americans who lose their Soviet customs declaration, a letter of explanation from the Embassy often smooths the path for the American's departure. The official Soviet tourist agency, Intourist, which actively solicits Western tourist business, often takes little or no responsibility for assisting its customers when they fall into difficulty.

Romania. The Romanian Government continues to be extremely slow to issue tourist passports for any reason. A 3-day issuance as provided for in the Vienna Concluding Document for emergency travel is almost unheard of. In isolated cases, U.S. Embassy intervention has quickened the process for emergency passport issuance somewhat, but in the majority of cases an emergency tourist passport simply is not a possibility. The U.S. Embassy issued roughly 3,100 tourist visas in this reporting period. A total of 240 official visas was issued, along with 10 fiance(e) visas. Tourist visa issuance continues the upward trend of the past two reporting periods. The Embassy estimates that approximately 500 Americans have visited Romania during the past 6 months (exact figures not available). The average wait for a U.S. visa is 1–5 days. Tourist visas are usually issued the same day. Visas that involve actual or suspected membership in the Communist Party (about 30% of all nonimmigrant visas issued) may involve a delay of 5 working days so that waivers can be obtained as required by law.

The cost of U.S. visas for Romanian citizens remains $18 for a single-entry visa and $47 for multiple entries, which is purportedly the same amount charged to Americans by Romanian authorities. Many Americans report, however, higher amounts charged by Romanian authorities for visa issuance. In addition, they are often asked to pay $20–$40 for additional telex messages to "expedite" the issuance. The fee for visas issued at the airport upon arrival is higher. There seems to be no standard rate, but some tourists have reported that they were charged over $30 for a single-entry visa. Applications for Romanian tourist passports may take several months to process and are frequently denied. Romanians must pay the equivalent of $7 to apply, $43 for the passport, and varying amounts for an exit visa.

Americans and other foreigners are required at the port of entry to exchange $10 for every day to be spent in Romania. Persons who leave before completing their expected time in the country are only occasionally refunded a corresponding amount. The $10 conversion can be waived for visitors of Romanian origin and in some cases for those visiting close relatives. In recent months, however, the Embassy has received complaints from increasing numbers of Romanian-born Americans who say that they were forced to change dollars before being allowed to enter Romania, despite a stated policy to the contrary.

There are no restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens, other than travel to or near military installations. However, no foreigner is allowed to stay in the home of a Romanian unless the person is a first-degree relative. Problems with customs authorities both on entry and departure from Romania require regular intervention by the U.S. Embassy. Goods being brought in to family members are frequently confiscated, as is, on occasion, valuable jewelry as well. People taking out family belongings often have them seized at the border and declared part of the "national patrimony," thus making their export illegal. People not only lose their belongings but are not allowed to leave Romania until a sizable fine in hard currency has been paid.

Poland. The Polish Government actively promotes tourism from the U.S., as this is a source of hard currency for the Polish economy. American tourists in Poland during the reporting period generally experienced no difficulties with local authorities, other than problems involving customs or currency regulations.

Hungary. Hungarian travel continued to increase dramatically during this reporting period, due to the new passport regulations. In calendar year 1988, Hungarians made more than 11 million trips abroad.

The U.S. Embassy in Budapest issued 8,913 nonimmigrant visas to Hungarians during the reporting period. Seventy percent of Hungarian applicants (noncommunist affiliation waiver cases) received visas in 1–2 days. The 30% for whom waivers of ineligibility or clearances from Washington were required received visas within 2 weeks. U.S. nonimmigrant visa fees for Hungarians (based on reciprocity) are $10 for single entry, $20 for double entry, and $40 for multiple entry.

Processing time for a Hungarian passport is currently 2–4 weeks. The passport costs 500 forints (approximately $10) and is valid for travel to all countries for trips of 90 days and can be extended.

Hungary has reciprocal waiver of visas arrangements with six nations which are not members of the Warsaw Pact: Sweden, Austria, Finland, Malta, Nicaragua, and Tunisia (only for diplomats). The Hungarian Government issued approximately 125,000 tourist and other nonimmigrant visas to Americans in the period from April 1, 1988, through March 31, 1989. Hungary has no currency conversion requirement for U.S. visitors, but applicants may have to produce proof of sufficient funds to cover their planned stay and departure, particularly when extensions of stay are requested. Recently, when submitting requests for extensions of stay, foreigners have been asked to exchange the equivalent of $10 per day for the period, but this requirement is often waved for those staying with relatives or able to show other continuing availability of resources.

The Hungarian Consulate in New York generally issues visas to nonofficial visitors within 24–48 hours. Visas are available at the Budapest airport and at some land

borders. The U.S. Embassy is aware of one or two refusals annually to Hungarian-Americans. Official U.S. Government visitors are generally covered by the 7-day reciprocal agreement.

German Democratic Republic. In spite of a more liberal travel policy, many G.D.R. citizens are still unable to travel abroad, especially to Western countries. Only pensioners can with relative ease obtain permission to travel to the West. Otherwise, exit formalities for G.D.R. citizens who can travel to the West usually take 4–10 weeks. The total cost of a G.D.R. passport and visa is about $6.

Under G.D.R. law, travelers to the West may exchange only a very limited amount of marks for Western currencies at the official rate. Travelers to the Federal Republic may exchange only 15 marks (about $8). Until the summer of 1987 the maximum had been 70 marks (about $38). No export or import of G.D.R. currency is permitted. These severe currency exchange restrictions also have the effect of diminishing travel. G.D.R. citizens traveling to the West are almost totally dependent on the largesse of friends and relatives and certain small West German subsidies. Many pensioners, who technically may travel, decline to do so because they are embarrassed to be dependent on Western friends and relatives.

For travel to the U.S., nonpensioners may exchange 70 marks and pensioners 30 marks. Currency exchange restrictions are somewhat more relaxed when travel is undertaken within socialist countries. However, G.D.R. citizens still complain that the amount of money they are allowed to exchange for such travel only barely meets the cost of accommodations and meals.

Conversely, the relatively high currency exchange required of Westerners diminishes travel and tourism to the G.D.R. and East Berlin. Westerners can, however, generally obtain visas to visit the G.D.R. without difficulty other than a long wait. Exceptions are those who have emigrated recently from the G.D.R. or who wish to visit East German relatives who have filed exit applications.

The processing of G.D.R. tourist and business visa applications takes about 6 weeks if the application is made in the U.S. and less time if made in the Federal Republic or West Berlin. If a traveler is in Berlin and purchases a voucher showing pre-paid reservations in G.D.R. hotels, a visa can be obtained the same day. Day visas limited to East Berlin can be obtained by Westerners (except West Berliners, for whom somewhat more cumbersome procedures still exist) within an hour at specified Berlin sector-sector crossing points. The G.D.R. has continued its policy, initiated a year ago, of permitting West Berliners to stay overnight in East Berlin. Previously, there was a curfew time by which West Berliners had to be out of the eastern part of the city.

G.D.R. single-entry tourist or business visas cost 15 marks (about $8); multiple-entry visas, 40 marks (about $22). A day visa for East Berlin costs 5 marks (about $3). In addition, the official G.D.R. travel agency which processes visa applications in the U.S. charges those over 16 years of age a handling fee of $22 (or for express handling $30) per person. The G.D.R. requires those between 14–60 to purchase 25 marks (about $14) in East German currency per day. Those under 14 are exempt from such currency conversion requirements. This money cannot be reconverted or taken out of the G.D.R.

U.S. visitors can travel freely in the G.D.R. except for areas adjacent to military installations. Permission must also be obtained for travel within 5 kilometers of the G.D.R. border, except when entering or leaving the country.

Travel and tourism in the G.D.R. is not without risk. It is common G.D.R. practice to demand high bail from foreign travelers arrested in the G.D.R. and impose more severe prison sentences on them than those imposed on East German citizens. G.D.R. police also are thought often to enforce speed limits on foreign travelers more rigorously than on their own citizens. Traffic fines normally must be paid on the spot in hard currency.

The U.S. Embassy issued 1,386 tourist visas and 1,031 other nonimmigrant visas to G.D.R. passport holders during this reporting period. In the same period a year ago, the Embassy issued 1,152 visitor and 690 other visas.

U.S. tourist visas are issued within 1 working day, except for cases which require waivers of ineligibility. The latter usually take 3 working days and include those applicants who are members of communist organizations. Those wishing to travel to the U.S. for business reasons who are not ineligible generally wait 5 working days for a visa. A U.S. tourist visa costs $6 for a single entry, $12 for two entries.

Czechoslovakia. In theory, Czechoslovak citizens may buy hard currency from the state bank to finance travel to the West once every 3 years. In practice, while some Czechoslovaks are able to travel to the West every year, others are granted exit documentation once in a lifetime or never. In addition to applying for passports and exit permission, which are required even for travel to countries in the East, persons desiring to visit "nonsocialist" countries must submit an application for a hard currency allocation in January of the year in which they wish to travel. Regulations promulgated in January 1988 enable Czechoslovaks to receive hard currency from friends or relatives abroad for foreign travel. In such cases, the traveler need not apply for a hard currency allocation from the government. This new regulation has enabled many more Czechoslovaks to travel to the West than had previously been the case. Czechoslovaks applying to travel also need permission from their employers and a police certificate.

Exit formalities for travelers normally take about 6 weeks. The standard fee is 400 crowns (about $75) though additional fees are sometimes required. The Czechoslovak authorities are able to expedite the process in cases of emergency. The U.S. Embassy is aware of two cases in which exit permission was granted within 2 days due to family emergencies.

The U.S. Embassy in Prague issued 3,694 tourist visas during this period. Total nonimmigrant visa issuance was 4,696, an increase of over 40% for the same period last year.

Tourism to Czechoslovakia in general is encouraged, although former Czechoslovak citizens frequently experience difficulties in obtaining entry visas. Most U.S. applicants receive visas on a same-day basis, for a fee of $14. Since January 1989, Czechoslovakia has been issuing tourist visas at four border points for a $30 fee. This may increase the number of American and other Western tourists visiting the country.

Tourists are not restricted in their travel around the country, although certain localities, for example those around military establishments, are officially off-limits. If a tourist loses his travel and identity documentation, he usually has to wait 3–5 days before he receives exit permission. Efforts by the U.S. Embassy to shorten this waiting period have met with very limited success. Currency exchange regulations are strictly enforced, and the Embassy frequently receives telephone calls during peak travel months from American tourists who failed to exchange enough money (currently approximately $16 a day) or allowed their visas to lapse and found that Czechoslovak hotels were not allowed to house them.

The Czechoslovak borders are closely patrolled by border guards armed with automatic weapons, who in the past have shot persons attempting to leave the country illegally. There are no available estimates on the number of persons killed or wounded while trying to escape, although Austrian and West German residents living in the border area have reported hearing

gunshots on the Czechoslovak side of border. There are no public government statistics on the number of persons serving prison sentences for attempting to leave Czechoslovakia without official permission.

Bulgaria. In addition to the tourist visas mentioned above, the U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued 568 other nonimmigrant visas to Bulgarians during the reporting period, an increase of 25% over the same period last year. Other Western embassies also reported significant increases in the number of Bulgarians allowed to travel abroad. A notable development during the reporting period was the issuance of passports and exit visas by the Bulgarian authorities to entire families (parents and children) for tourist travel to the U.S. While the Embassy cannot determine the average time required for a Bulgarian to obtain travel documentation, Bulgarian law calls for decisions to be made on passport applications within 45 days. A Bulgarian passport authorizing travel to one country for up to 1 year costs about $40; a passport authorizing travel for 5 years costs about $60, and an additional $10 for travel to more than one country. U.S. tourist visas cost Bulgarians $14 or 28 leva.

Conversations with Americans who have visited Bulgaria suggest that waits of up to 1 month for visas are frequent, and accounts are common of friends or relatives who have been refused Bulgarian visas, or the length of whose visa processing time made travel impossible. Bulgarian tourist visas cost $14 but many American visitors probably paid less, passing through Bulgaria on lower-cost transit visas. The Embassy cannot reliably estimate how many Americans receive tourist visas to visit Bulgaria, although there continue to be a number of complaints about the delay or refusal of such visas. There is no currency conversion requirement for U.S. visitors to Bulgaria, nor any restrictions on travel within the country other than the area along the border permanently restricted to all foreigners, diplomats as well as tourists.

Religious Contacts

In signing the Madrid Concluding Document, the 35 CSCE states agreed to implement further provisions of the Final Act so that religious faiths and their representatives can "develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information." In Vienna these commitments were reinforced to include guarantees for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship, for religious education in the language of choice, and for the distribution of religious materials.

Soviet Union. The authorities regularly grant Soviet entry visas to religious representatives of various faiths, although individuals wishing to meet with unregistered church groups have been denied visas. It is more difficult for individual representatives of various faiths inside the Soviet Union to receive exit visas to visit churches in the West. One of the major obstacles is a Soviet stipulation that individuals cannot visit the West on the basis of an invitation from an organization; invitations must come from individuals.

Romania. Officially recognized leaders of Romanian churches are generally allowed to travel to the West to meet with their coreligionists or attend conferences. Most foreign religious activists are allowed to enter Romania without difficulty to meet with church leaders and attend church services. Some foreign visitors preach in Romanian churches. However, the government actively discourages such activity. The ability of religious visitors to Romania to exchange information is severely hampered by strict Romanian border controls. It is extremely difficult to bring religious materials into Romania, and many visitors report that Bibles—even single copies for personal use—and other religious materials continue to be seized by border authorities. Romanian censorship of international mail also applies to correspondence between church groups in Romania and the West.

Poland. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw frequently issues visas to members of the clergy, Catholic as well as non-Catholic. Most Polish members of the clergy have no difficulty in obtaining passports for travel abroad. In fact, some are able to do so with considerably shorter notice than other travelers. Many representatives of U.S. religious denominations travel to Poland regularly without difficulty. In some instances, the government allows missionaries to live and work in Poland and to build meeting halls there.

Hungary. Hungary has a good record in this field. There are substantial contacts, and travel is considerable in both directions.

German Democratic Republic. Western clergy were permitted to attend an ecumenical conference during the current reporting period, and some G.D.R. religious leaders were allowed to attend similar lay conventions and religious meetings in the West. For the first time, young members of the Church of the Latter-day Saints were permitted to leave the G.D.R. to go on mission in this reporting period. Tolerance only extends, however, to events strictly religious in nature and does not affect the fringe groups tied to the Lutheran Church. There were no incidents in this reporting period of individuals refused permission to acquire, receive, or carry with them religious publications or objects.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on facilitating travel by religious officials to and from Czechoslovakia is spotty. During the reporting period Cardinal Tomasek received a number of high-level church visitors from abroad, including Cardinal Law of Boston. Generally, when a proposed visit takes place between a recognized institution in Czechoslovakia and its counterpart abroad, visas are issued. However, the government has not invited Pope John Paul II to visit Czechoslovakia despite Cardinal Tomasek's request that an official invitation be issued and the existence of petitions supporting such a visit signed by thousands of Czech and Slovak Catholics. Similarly, Catholic priests and other religious leaders who manifest too much independence are frequently denied permission to travel outside Czechoslovakia. Unofficial or unsanctioned travel by religious groups, or the importation of religious literature and similar activities, has been severely punished in the past.

Bulgaria. During the reporting period there have been no reports of measures taken to hamper contacts between Bulgarian religious figures and those from abroad who openly declare their intentions.

INFORMATION

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate wider and freer dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and exchange of information with other countries and to improve the working conditions of journalists. In the Madrid Concluding Document, participating states committed themselves to encourage the sale and distribution of printed matter from other states, decide journalists' visa applications without undue delay, grant permanent correspondents and their families multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year, provide more extensive travel opportunities for journalists, increase possibilities for foreign journalists to establish contact with sources, and allow journalists to carry with them reference materials and personal notes. In Vienna, they agreed to allow individuals and organizations to obtain, possess, reproduce, and distribute information of all kinds; to permit direct and normal reception of foreign radio broadcasts; and to

decide on the visa applications and accreditation of local and foreign journalists within 2 months and to ensure that they are free to maintain public and private contacts.

Dissemination of Information

Soviet Union. The Soviet Government views the dissemination of information as a tool to shape public attitudes in support of current policies. As such, the dissemination of information in the Soviet Union today—through the mass media and by individuals, institutions, and organizations—continues to be conducted according to guidelines and regulations established by the government and emanating from the party. Despite the genuine changes resulting from reform, the Soviet Government continues to act to ensure that the dissemination of information ultimately "serves socialism."

The government also takes actions, at various levels of the bureaucracy, to impede the uninhibited access of Soviet citizens to news and information from abroad and to constrain on occasion the legitimate reportorial activities of foreign journalists resident in Moscow. Thus, even as areas have expanded enormously within which the Soviet press and other mass media can exercise editorial decisionmaking independent of other authority, the party—or the government as an agent for the party—remains the linchpin in the process. In both the mass media and in allowing public access to information, taboos and "old thinking" remain. Criticism in the media of basic policies established by the current party leadership is indirect and must often be deduced, as in the past, from evidence of nuance, innuendo, and omission. Despite the slow growth of new technologies, there is no sign of any large-scale retreat from familiar controls on the possession, reproduction, and distribution of information at a level below state-sanctioned organs.

The ability of individuals, organizations, and institutions to obtain, possess, reproduce, and distribute information is circumscribed by Soviet law, regulations, and practice. Access to the technology of reproduction—copying machines, for example—is controlled and all such machines are, in theory, registered. Clearly, however, the coming of the personal computer and other new forms of reproduction and distribution suggest that the future effectiveness of such controls may be in doubt. In one sign of changing times, a U.S. company has recently opened an American-style "fast print" shop in central Moscow, although payment for its services must be made in hard currency. The fledgling cooperative movement had begun to make inroads into the state monopoly on the reproduction and distribution of information to the extent that senior party officials have, in late 1988 and early 1989, spoken out against such undertakings under the guise of protecting the public from "pornography" and other antisocial printings. Indeed, in December, a government decree forbade cooperatives from engaging in publishing and film production.

In the current atmosphere of openness, the national print media and television carry broader discussions of issues considered in the past to be beyond public debate. The most dramatic and important example during the past 6 months has been the attention accorded by the mass media to election campaigns for the Congress of People's Deputies, and in particular, at least in the case of television, to the Moscow contest involving former Politburo member Boris Yeltsin. In the mass media, overt censorship appears to be little used at present although the mechanism for state censorship remains in place. Under *perestroika*, cooperative television projects undertaken with foreign, usually Western, television companies continue to be broadcast. During the past 6 months, the state broadcast committee has undertaken two broadcasts in cooperation with the television service of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and additional projects with USIA are scheduled.

Although agreements to begin or to increase the public sale of American news publications such as *Time* magazine and the *International Herald-Tribune* were reported in late 1988, newsstand checks by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in January and February 1989 failed to find any evidence of meaningful public availability of these or other American publications. Copies of American communist publications are also rarely found in Moscow. Soviet citizens also report to the Embassy that Western news publications appear to be no more available than they were in the past. In late March, *Izvestiya* published a letter from a Leningrad resident complaining that it was impossible to find Western publications in kiosks despite assertions to the contrary.

U.S. authorities are not aware of any effort by the Soviet Government to encourage the public sale and distribution of printed matter from other states. Soviet law restricts the kinds of materials which can be imported into and distributed within the Soviet Union and bans entry of materials judged to be "anti-Soviet" or to be "slanderous" to the Soviet system. Under *glasnost*, the restrictions themselves have narrowed but not disappeared. A Soviet official recently noted that customs officials would continue to confiscate literature in Russian published in Western Europe by certain emigre groups, such as those connected with the National Workers' Union, because of the group's anti-Soviet stance. Beyond material legally proscribed, the availability of foreign printed matter in the Soviet Union, at present, tends to be more a function of the inconvertibility of Soviet currency than of government edict or policy. In September 1988, the State Committee for Book Publishing, in joint partnership with the American Book Publishers Association, opened a permanent display of American books in Moscow, where Soviet citizens and organizations with convertible currency can place orders for U.S. books.

Soviet citizens and foreign visitors have been subjected to restrictions on the quantity of religious materials they may import into the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, there appear to be no legal restrictions on the ability of Soviet citizens to receive subscriptions to foreign publications which do not violate Soviet law. Such subscriptions are, however, precluded in effect since few Soviet citizens have access to foreign currency. Some foreign publications, including the Russian-language cultural magazines of the U.S. and other Western countries, are included in the annual central list of periodicals to which Soviets may subscribe. In March, however, some Western embassies, including that of the U.S., were informed that this practice would halt as of January 1, 1990, unless publishers could ensure the delivery of sufficient copies to satisfy public demand without limitation. On the other hand, embassies were invited to increase the number of such magazines made available in the U.S.S.R. for newsstand sale.

The absence of convertible currency continues to limit to a relative few the number of American and other Western films shown commercially and on television in the Soviet Union. In October 1988, the Soviet State Film Organization (*Goskino*) cooperated with the Disney Film Studio to sponsor the first major festival of Disney films in three cities of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Motion Picture Association of America signed two important agreements with *Goskino* in September 1988 to provide for better copyright protection for U.S. film properties and to allow agreements to be reached in connection with increased distribution of American films here. To date, this latter agreement has not produced any visible results.

Soviet radio jamming directed against Western radio broadcasting to Soviet audiences apparently came to an end in late 1988, when jamming aimed at the broadcasts of Radio Liberty was halted.

Romania. The Romanian Government seeks total control over dissemination of information in Romania. All media are rigidly controlled and used primarily as vehicles for government and party propaganda. Foreign and even local news items are carefully selected. As a result, domestic media reports are widely ignored or treated with extreme skepticism. An active and imaginative "rumor mill" seeks to fill in much of the news gap. Foreign radio broadcasts are not jammed and are a major source of both foreign and domestic news. Romanian libraries carefully control access to information, especially to historical source materials.

In this reporting period, there were no Western periodicals or publications sold to the general public in Romania, although a variety of technical journals and other Western publications, in limited quantities, are available to selected government and party officials, academicians, and scientific researchers. The national press agency (AGERPRES) does not receive the four major Western news services, AP [Associated Press], UPI [United Press International], AFP [Agence France Presse], or Reuters. The Romanian press relies heavily on material from socialist news agencies such as Tass and New China, as well as on reprinting articles from Western publications.

During the reporting period, Romanian press treatment of the U.S. and the West continued to be highly critical. The focus of this negative reporting continues to be on social problems facing the West. Articles appear almost daily in the Romanian press highlighting such Western problems as the homeless, unemployment, and drug abuse. However, as a matter of policy, the Romanian media only use articles taken from Western sources to criticize the West. As a result, these negative articles, taken from *Time*, *Le Monde*, or *The New York Times*, are generally accurate. No articles of "disinformation" appeared during the reporting period.

There are no American or other Western books or periodicals sold at Romanian newsstands, even in those hotels used primarily by foreigners. Although efforts to limit Romanian citizens' access were apparent during the reporting period, some continued to gain access to Western publications through foreign embassy information centers and libraries. American books, usually out-of-date scientific or technical works, are sometimes available in secondhand bookstores. Few Romanians have subscriptions to Western periodicals, usually individually purchased during foreign travel. The Romanian government does not grant permits for its citizens to use foreign exchange for Western periodical subscriptions.

During the reporting period Romanian television increased its broadcast schedule from 2 hours per night to 3 hours. There was some initial optimism that this new schedule would allow for more informational and entertainment programs. However, this was not the case. Hard currency shortages continue to limit Romanian television's schedule to domestically produced documentaries and variety shows, almost all of which extol the virtues of President Ceausescu and the government. For those Romanians living near the borders, Hungarian, Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, and Soviet television continues to be the favored option. American movies, which were almost totally absent from television in the last reporting period, are now shown about once every 3–4 weeks. At cinemas, American movies are rarely seen. Romanian movie houses concentrate on historical and patriotic films, as well as a sprinkling of films from Soviet and other East European countries.

Poland. Now as open as during the Solidarity period of 1980–81, the Polish media remain the least shackled in the Warsaw Pact. The press follows the approved government line on international issues but remains a forum for lively debate on domestic issues. The broad range of views found in the Polish press reflects an equally wide diversity of philosophical positions maintained by individual publications. Such publications as the independent Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the Warsaw daily *Zycie Warszawy*, the hardline party weekly *Rzeczywistosc*, the liberal party weekly *Polityka*, and nonaligned *Res Publica* can all be expected to present contending views on economic reform, ideology, and cadre policy; the extent of dialogue with various spheres of society; cultural issues; the role of the church; and the role of the intellectual in society. The press also freely discusses social and family problems, alienated youth, inadequacies in public health services, environmental issues, and many other subjects highlighting current concerns in Poland.

The process begun in February 1989 with the roundtable talks between the government and the opposition has accelerated the process of open discussion. Anticipating agreements to legalize the banned Solidarity trade union and other organizations which arose in 1980, journalists positioned themselves in an attempt to have a second professional union approved, to see more journals legalized and to guarantee and widen the process of liberalization in news dissemination. The discussion now includes subjects until recently considered not worth raising such as the eventual transformation of Polish radio and television into something approximating the BBC; a free market for paper and newsprint to enable publishers of all persuasions equal opportunity to produce journals; and an end to pre-publication censorship.

On international issues, and specifically those involving East-West relations, a handful of well-known journalists frequently treat individual subjects, such as arms negotiations, by focusing on the facts and eschewing overtly propagandistic lines. Well-known officials and journalists participate in press and media discussions on public issues. Many journalists who during martial law were dismissed after "verification" of political orthodoxy or who resigned in protest are now active again in a variety of smaller circulation but widely read publications.

The underground press continues to thrive, producing publications varying from shop-floor leaflets to relatively high-quality editions of books not published officially. The underground also produces videotapes on a variety of subjects.

Satellite television has come to Poland. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw estimates that 3,000 authorizations have been issued for satellite dishes. Satellite television is such an accepted part of life that the General Staff daily newspaper, *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, publishes program listings at the beginning of each month. In March 1987, Polish TV began 10 hours a day of live retransmissions of Soviet television broadcasts received by satellite from the U.S.S.R.

Changes in the political situation within the U.S.S.R. have paralleled Poland's inclination for more open and lively debate. *Glasnost* in the Soviet Union has encouraged open discussion in Poland of what has come to be referred to as the numerous "blank spots" in Polish history, especially with respect to relations with the Soviet Union. Many heretofore taboo episodes in bilateral relations are now being debated within newspapers, on the airwaves, and in journals. A government spokesman, for example, has now stated publicly that circumstantial evidence indicates Soviet security forces were responsible for the Katyn massacre, a statement unimaginable a year ago.

More orthodox party and government officials seem to be losing in their attempt to retain tight control over what they consider the most influential print and electronic media. Party journals regularly include the views and commentary of independent and opposition figures. Statements by Lech Walesa and his most prominent advisers are carried almost daily. Polish television, probably the organ most closely associated with the party, carries the views of party members, the independent statements of farmers and workers, and

the statements of Mr. Walesa. While the goal may be to compete on their own terms in more open journalistic atmosphere, Polish television and party journals have also had to become livelier and more responsive to the increasingly diverse views of their readers or viewers.

Poland has always been a country where the editors-in-chief of individual publications have been able to wield significant influence. Formal censorship still exists in Poland but interventions have become less frequent. Many articles are self-censored before they reach official eyes. Controversial articles which do appear are often the result of prolonged bargaining between the editor and the censors. Because of this quasidecentralized feature of the Polish media, government officials often have to be satisfied with an absence of criticism or a replay of other Eastern critical media commentary rather than enthusiastic backing.

Within the imposed and perceived parameters of official press policy, the Polish audience is exposed both to ideas and to means of handling controversial issues which would receive little or no public exposure in most other East European countries. The weekly press conferences of government spokesman Jerzy Urban with foreign journalists provided detailed information on domestic and foreign policy issues and were given extensive coverage in the official Polish media. These meetings were opened to the press office representing Lech Walesa and many sessions became public dialogues between the government spokesman and his opposition counterparts. The government daily *Rzeczpospolita* carried a virtually verbatim transcript of each of these conferences, including the pointed questions which were frequently at least as informative for the Polish readers as the official responses. The official press frequently publishes the results of public opinion polls which reflect widely shared views unpopular with the government and, quite often, articles appearing in the underground press spark lively debates in the official press as well.

More and more Western dailies and periodicals are available in outlets frequented by tourists such as hotel kiosks and international reading rooms. Personal and institutional subscriptions are possible but are severely limited by the unavailability of hard currency. Several hundred copies of *National Geographic* and *Scientific American* are reportedly received each month. Thirty-five thousand copies per issue of the USIA quarterly, *Ameryka*, have been distributed in Poland since September 1988 through Polish distribution channels and directly by the U.S. Embassy. All copies are regularly sold out.

Few American periodicals or books are presently sold at newsstands, although some U.S. news weeklies are found in public reading rooms. The U.S. Embassy distributes 500 copies of *Newsweek* magazine in Poland to selected recipients through commercial arrangements with *Newsweek*. The Embassy also distributes a much smaller number of copies of *Time* magazine. Both publications, as well as copies of *USA Today*, are imported directly into Poland for use by various Polish Government offices but are not available for sale. *Newsweek* has received permission for newsstand sales of the periodical beginning this year. Books published in the U.S. can occasionally also be found in Polish used bookstores as can old copies of American pictorial magazines. Public and university library purchases of new books and periodicals from the U.S. are severely limited by lack of hard currency. U.S. authorities have no reports of the removal of books from library shelves during the current reporting period. Thus, American books and periodicals already in library collections, principally university libraries, remain available to users.

Control of hard-currency expenditures outside of Poland makes it difficult for an individual to subscribe to American periodicals. Many Poles receive subscriptions paid for abroad which usually arrive through the Polish mails. Public sale of books and periodicals from the U.S.S.R. and other communist countries is widespread. Major outlets also have periodicals published by West European communist parties such as *White Star* of the U.K. Prices are comparable to or even cheaper than those for Polish publications. The Polish authorities facilitate private subscriptions to periodicals from communist countries by permitting subscribers to order them through the Polish central subscriptions office.

During a recent week, 20 American feature films were playing in Warsaw's more than 40 theaters. Polish television has noticeably increased the number of American feature films and has expressed an interest in having even more. Film Polski, the feature film production arm of Polish television, has also coproduced films with European and American partners. Television series and programs from other Western nations are regularly broadcast. The lack of hard currency rather than ideology seems to be the major impediment to the appearance of more Western programs on Polish television. To complement its agreement with the American Cable News Network, Polish television has signed a commercial agreement with ABC [American Broadcasting Company] and with Italian television and envisions other arrangements in the future to bring more TV imports to Poland.

Routine monitoring indicates that there is no jamming of either short-wave or medium-wave Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts. Radio Free Europe reception has also noticeably improved.

Hungary. The availability of information during the past 6 months has remained good. It is estimated that over 100,000 Hungarian homes receive Western satellite television broadcasts through satellite dish/cable systems. A recent article on foreign broadcasting claims that a third of Hungarians are exposed to foreign television broadcasting of some type. With official concurrence, this process of equipping homes with satellite dishes is progressing rapidly—especially on the community level where it can be done inexpensively. Hungarian publications carry program schedules for the satellite channels.

Hungarian television broadcasts interviews with prominent Americans on prime time television. These are either conducted in the U.S., in which case USIA/TV often makes available studio time and facilitates transmission to Hungary, or they are conducted in Hungary during visits by Americans. A recent example of the former was a 15-minute interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, and of the latter an equally long interview with Congressman Dante Fascell. In the course of one recent month, the U.S. Ambassador to Hungary was interviewed by Hungarian radio and television as well as by the government newspaper.

Leading magazines and newspapers continue to be available at hotels and major kiosks, and subscriptions are available to Hungarian individuals as well as institutions. In addition, new publications are proliferating.

The library of the U.S. Embassy in Budapest receives the *International Herald Tribune*, the Sunday *New York Times*, *USA Today*, and a full range of magazines, but these are read mostly by younger people. The Embassy deals with over 1,000 readers every month and the post's table-of-contents service continues to be popular and well-used. The Embassy also supports translation and publication of American books, ranging from scientific essays to classic works on international relations. The Embassy also provided a grant to permit Hungary's two leading publishers to attend—for the first time—the American Publishers Association national convention.

The overall attitude toward the U.S. as reflected in the media has been generally positive during this period and legal reforms planned in Hungary have resulted in

favorable coverage of the U.S. constitution and protection of human rights. Personal relations with media representatives remain remarkably cordial. Hungarians listen to or watch Western radio or television unimpeded. As a rule Hungary does not jam Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, or other Western broadcasts. The U.S. Embassy was not aware of any jamming during the reporting period. Coverage of the U.S. presidential election was professional and straightforward.

Access to foreign and particularly Western films is virtually unhindered. While there were 146 showings of Soviet films in Budapest theaters during the reporting period, there were also 1,154 showings of American films and 635 of Hungarian films. There was a similar trend on government-owned television where 85 American films were shown as compared with 53 Soviet films.

German Democratic Republic. The East German Government attempts to control most information available within its territory. All media have as a prime responsibility the inculcation of values and beliefs favorable to the government and to the economic and social system it has established. A subsidiary goal is to present countries with differing political, social, and economic structures, including the U.S. but especially the Federal Republic of Germany, as unsuccessful in meeting the basic needs of their citizenry. Strict censorship is practiced, and dissenting views appear only rarely and then usually on topics not central to ideology or government policies. Nevertheless, the parameters for presenting dissenting views remain narrow and, since the state owns virtually all printing and reproduction equipment, it effectively has a great deal of control over the type and quality of information distributed by individuals, institutions, and organizations. There have been numerous instances of official censorship of church newspapers in this reporting period, although this practice apparently has tapered off since January.

In the aftermath of the Honecker visit to Bonn in 1987, a new law has facilitated private import of certain types of specialized West German publications. Though literature "directed against the preservation of peace or containing other agitation, contravening the interests of the socialist state or its citizens," or having pornographic content remains banned, and the import permission does not cover publications with political content, in this reporting period the government has continued to take a relatively liberal attitude regarding these potentially restrictive clauses.

Print media are effectively controlled. In general, only publications listed in the G.D.R.'s postal publication register may be imported. Materials not so listed are regularly confiscated at border and sector-sector crossings, although the practice appears to have become somewhat less frequent with the passage in late 1987 of the new law governing such imports. The U.S. Embassy has been able to distribute to official and unofficial contacts a variety of printed materials, including the USIA-produced magazines *Dialogue, English Teaching Forum* and *Problems of Communism*, as well as the Embassy-produced weekly "Wireless File." To the Embassy's knowledge these publications usually reach their recipients, whether mailed or delivered by hand.

U.S. magazines and newspapers, other than those published by the American Communist Party, are not freely available to the general public. Libraries and official institutes do receive U.S. magazines, scholarly journals, and daily papers. Circulation of these publications, even within those university sections or institutions permitted to subscribe to them, is restricted. Small numbers of the *International Herald Tribune* and other Western papers are also sold upon request for hard currency to foreigners in a few hotels catering to Western visitors.

Some 9–12 American films are shown yearly in the G.D.R., most of them familiar, popular features, usually a season or two out of date. "The Image Maker," "Romancing the Stone," and "Children of a Lesser God" are popular titles from this reporting period. Further, East German television also broadcasts American films on a regular basis.

Importation of reading material from the Soviet Union has become more restrictive in this reporting period. In November of last year the G.D.R. permanently barred the Soviet magazine, *Sputnik*, purportedly for regularly distorting Soviet history and the history of the Soviet and German communist parties. In February 1989, it banned an issue of a German-language Soviet newspaper, *Neue Zeit*, which contained an interview with Polish activist Lech Walesa.

No broadcasts are jammed in the G.D.R. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do not broadcast in German, but VOA's English-language broadcasts can be received in the G.D.R.

Czechoslovakia. The poor performance of the Czechoslovak Government concerning the dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information continued throughout the reporting period. Although information originating from socialist countries is prominently published and broadcast, information from or about the U.S. and Western Europe is restricted by the Czechoslovak Government and hard to obtain.

Objective information about the U.S. is scarce. No American publications are sold openly in Czechoslovakia except for a few copies of the U.S. Communist Party newspaper, *Daily World*, which are seen on newsstands irregularly. During this reporting period (and for the first time in recent memory) a few copies of several day-old *International Herald Tribunes* were reported to have been irregularly available at a few hotels which cater almost exclusively to Westerners. Only rarely and haphazardly are a few, nonpolitical Western publications sold in Czechoslovakia.

While the Czechoslovak state library spends some $10,000 annually on American books, these are mainly of a technical nature and are available only to selected institutions and individuals. Some American books and periodicals are available on a restricted basis in technical and university libraries. English departments at the major Czechoslovak universities maintain collections of American literature, but these contain many gaps, particularly in recent American fiction and criticism. Moreover, departmental libraries are generally open only to faculty members and students majoring in English.

A 1983 Czechoslovak Government directive that changed the terms of payment for periodical subscriptions from "nonsocialist countries" from Czechoslovak crowns to U.S. dollars or other convertible currency is still in force. Since hard currency payment by individuals and institutions is a real burden, the long-term result of the directive probably is a substantial reduction in the number and variety of foreign publications purchased from the West. Other people who have some access to convertible currency or are offered subscriptions by friends or relatives in the West sometimes do not pursue these options, because they believe too few magazines will actually reach them or their receipt will arouse suspicion.

During the reporting period, the Government of Czechoslovakia did not interfere directly with the operation of the American Embassy library in Prague, which makes nearly 4,000 American books and approximately 115 current U.S. periodicals in the English language accessible to the public daily. However, access to the library is discouraged by the widespread fear among Czechoslovak citizens that they will have difficulties should they visit the library. The Embassy continues to hear reports of official discouragement of library visits.

The press and culture section of the U.S. Embassy distributes over 150 subscriptions of American periodicals (about

100 titles) to Czechoslovak citizens and institutions under its periodical presentation program, but the Embassy continues to receive complaints that periodicals are actually received only sporadically.

American films make up a sizable percentage of all films shown commercially and are better represented than films from other Western countries. Among the American films screened in Prague during the reporting period were "Hannah and Her Sisters," "Pale Rider," "The Last Emperor," "Mission," "Starman," "Jagged Edge," "Out of Africa," "Jaws," "The Purple Rose of Cairo," "Sweet Dreams," "On Golden Pond," "Ghostbusters," "Platoon," "Beverly Hills Cop," and "Flashdance." Most U.S. films are at least several years old and contain nothing that could be considered offensive to socialism or to the Czechoslovak Government. American films rarely appear on Czechoslovak television.

During the reporting period, jamming of Radio Free Europe broadcasts in Czechoslovakia ceased. The Voice of America is also not jammed. Both VOA and Radio Free Europe have large audiences.

Access to information via direct satellite reception is increasing, but satellite dishes are still not common due to general local unavailability and the need for significant amounts of convertible currency to obtain them from the West.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian media remains tightly controlled by the Communist Party. Almost all journalists are members of the party or of the Fatherland Front organization. There is prompt and open official reporting on accidents, crime, prostitution, and similar social subjects of concern to the authorities. Criticism of officials or the goals of the communist regime remains within strict parameters. Those who overstep the boundaries are reprimanded at the least and often lost their jobs. Stefan Prodev, the editor of the newspaper *Narodna Kultura*, was removed from his position in November 1988 for interpreting Bulgaria's brand of *glasnost* too liberally. Television journalist Kevork Kevorkian was reprimanded following an interview with a Soviet surgeon in December 1988 and briefly removed from the program *Vsyaka Nedelya*

Domestic information (particularly economic and demographic statistics) remains strictly controlled, although a law legally defining "state secrets" is reportedly in the offing. Information from abroad is not widely available, reproduction facilities are officially controlled, and the distribution of information (i.e., leaflets or protests) may be punishable as the propagation of "antistate propaganda." U.S. newspapers and magazines are not sold in Bulgaria, although carefully selected articles from the Western press, generally critical of the West, are sometimes translated for publication in Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Individual Bulgarian citizens are actively discouraged from subscribing to Western periodicals. However, certain Bulgarian institutions like the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and the Committee for Culture have institutional subscriptions to Western newspapers and news magazines for their senior officials.

During the current review period, Bulgarian television frequently showed carefully selected Western programs. Western films, particularly from the U.S., were shown regularly in Bulgarian cinemas. Such films included "Crocodile Dundee," "Wallstreet," and "Broadcast News." The National Film Archive continued to screen an American film every Monday and Friday, as well as other films; it is open to the public. "The Postman Always Rings Twice" was recently aired on television. Western plays, usually critical of Western values, are performed in Bulgarian theaters, and Western popular and other music is regularly heard on Bulgarian radio. The government has not jammed Voice of America's Bulgarian service or the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] for a number of years. It ceased jamming Radio Free Europe at the end of December 1988. Jamming of Turkish radio broadcasts, however, continues.

Working Condition of Journalists

Soviet Union. In the main, the performance of the Soviet Government in connection with working conditions for foreign journalists has improved in the period under review. During the emergency generated by the massive earthquake in Armenia in early December 1988, journalists were allowed to travel to and within the earthquake region freely without following standard travel and "sponsor" procedures. For some weeks immediately following the disaster, journalists were allowed visa-free entry to the region. Other notable examples of the cooperative approach extended to foreign journalists during the past 6 months include the issuance of a visa to Andrew Nagorski of *Newsweek* magazine, who had been expelled from the Soviet Union in 1982; allowing journalists from *U.S. News & World Report* access to previously closed military bases and defense production facilities; permitting the installation of direct microwave transmission equipment from the central Moscow offices of U.S. television networks to the Ministry of Communications transmission tower, thus bypassing Soviet television studios; and facilitating the coverage of the March 26 national elections by the foreign press corps. In addition, several long-standing press requests for office space and new housing were satisfied early in 1989, thus eliminating, for the present, administrative problems which had been impeding expansion of some U.S. press bureaus in Moscow.

U.S. authorities have no information about the number of visas granted by the Soviet Government but are unaware of any recent cases where American journalists have not received visas for entry into the Soviet Union. They know of several instances where Soviet visas have been granted, but not for all of the destinations requested by the visiting U.S. journalist on their visa application form. While Soviet journalists temporarily visiting the U.S. are not normally subject to any travel restrictions, U.S. journalists visiting the Soviet Union are limited to 115 cities with Intourist accommodations. U.S. journalists have also complained about the difficulty of finding an acceptable Soviet sponsor for their visits. The Novosti press agency, for example, requires a $500 registration fee and $140 per day to arrange a program in Moscow and payment of hotels, meals, and services for a Novosti guide for travel outside of Moscow. U.S. sponsors make no such demands on visiting Soviet journalists.

The Embassy has not received any complaints from American journalists regarding bringing in their own technicians and equipment or carrying reference material for professional purposes. There have been no American journalists expelled from the Soviet Union since 1986.

A large team of *Time* magazine reporters and photographers spent several weeks in the Soviet Union during February-March preparing a recently published special issue devoted to developments there. During the past 6 months, a correspondent for the *Sacramento Bee* was permanently accredited.

There are 24 American news organizations which operate permanently staffed resident bureaus in Moscow. In addition, there are other American journalists who are accredited in the Soviet Union but who do not reside there. Not all U.S. press bureaus are staffed by Americans. For example, the Moscow bureau chiefs of the *Wall Street Journal* and *The Washington Post* are non-Americans while the bureau chief of the *Toronto Star* and two Reuters press agency reporters are American. In total, 35–40 Americans are employed by resident foreign press bureaus in Moscow. All resident permanently accredited Ameri-

can journalists and their accompanying family members have multiple-entry visas valid for at least 1 year.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs press administration, the parent administrative and sponsoring body for foreign journalists resident in the Soviet Union, conducts an extensive program of organized travel for foreign journalists. In addition, the Ministry facilitates arrangements for the professional travel of individual journalists within the Soviet Union. In most cases these procedures appear to have worked well and to the satisfaction of the American press corps in Moscow. Travel restrictions for U.S. journalists do present a continuing problem. U.S. journalists should be allowed to travel to all open areas of the Soviet Union regardless of whether the city has Intourist accommodations or is experiencing civil disorder. Soviet journalists resident in the U.S. may travel to over 80% of the territory of the U.S. without difficulty. Moreover, the U.S. closed-area restrictions do not apply to visiting Soviet journalists.

U.S. officials know of no cases during recent months when the access of foreign journalists to sources has been obstructed by organs of the Soviet Government. On the contrary, government officials are becoming more and more accessible to foreign journalists, in both private meetings and more formal occasions. Access to private citizens appears to be open and unrestricted. During the balloting in connection with the Soviet elections on March 25, foreign correspondents were able to conduct informal "exit polling" with voters at voting stations and to hold an impromptu press conference with Chairman Gorbachev after he cast his ballot.

During the review period, 168 U.S. visas were granted to Soviet journalists. One visa request was denied for travel to cover the U.S.-Soviet summit in New York in December. One decision on a Soviet journalist was delayed. This action was taken pending completion of an informal agreement permitting *Newsweek* correspondent Andrew Nagorski, who had been expelled from the Soviet Union in 1982, to enter the U.S.S.R. while the Soviet journalist, who had been expelled from the U.S. in reprisal, was allowed to return.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains a large and active press center for all journalists, domestic and foreign, accredited in the Soviet Union. In addition, there are other smaller press centers operated by other elements of the Soviet Government, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Press centers are established routinely for all major events.

Romania. Romania openly seeks to manipulate and control journalists. A lecture from Romania's national press agency, AGERPRES, on the need for more objective reporting is standard procedure for the few foreign journalists who receive journalist visas. During the reporting period, it continued to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to arrange interviews with Romanian Government officials. All interviews must be arranged through AGERPRES, while AGERPRES contends that "distorted reporting" has made it more and more difficult for them to secure appointments. As a result, journalists rarely get appointments even with ample advance notice. Most Western journalists continue to rely heavily on diplomatic and Western business contacts as well as Romanian emigrees for their information.

The Romanian Government provides opportunities for journalists to travel under controlled conditions, usually only to government-approved destinations and with official escorts. Foreign journalists may (and frequently do) travel unescorted by rental car or public transportation. However, they are under constant surveillance by Romanian militia and secret police.

The Romanian authorities vigorously discourage all but officially approved contact by their citizens with Western journalists. By law, citizens must report contacts and the substance of any conversation with any foreigner. The enforcement of this law continued during the reporting period. As a result, unofficial contacts with Romanian citizens remain difficult. Stringers hired by American and Western news agencies must have Romanian Government approval and are subject to dismissal by the government. There are no permanently accredited American journalists resident in Romania. Approximately 10 American journalists, including three nonresident American journalists accredited to Bucharest, visit Romania each year.

Some foreign journalists occasionally receive journalist visas for travel in controlled circumstances. During the last 12 months or so, however, no American journalist has been able to secure a visa for Romania outside the country despite continuing efforts by the U.S. Embassy. Individuals applying for journalist visas find that the Romanian authorities simply delay a decision on the visa application until after the journalists' projected travel dates. As a result, journalists wishing to visit Romania have no choice but to seek a visa at a Romanian border point. It appears that all journalists who have applied for visas at the border have been allowed to enter. However, since only tourist visas are available at the border, journalists who come to Romania are subject to detention and expulsion if they attempt to take pictures or talk to Romanian citizens, activities which government authorities maintain are "incompatible with the status of their tourist visas." Since the majority of journalists travel on tourist visas, they do not attempt to bring their equipment or reference materials with them.

During this reporting period an American journalist was detained by the police for questioning for several hours after he attempted to meet with a Romanian dissident. His notes were confiscated, and he was told to leave the country. In reply to Embassy protests about the journalist's treatment, government officials said the reporter had only a tourist visa and had no right to conduct an interview.

No Romanian journalists traveled to the U.S. during the reporting period.

American and other national press centers are permitted for certain events such as high-level visits. There is a Romanian foreign press club, although events there are very rare.

Poland. Resident and visiting American journalists rarely report difficulty in gaining access to Polish sources for reasons other than those normally encountered in the West. Journalists continue to rank Poland high on the list of East European countries in terms of general access, second only to Hungary. The official government spokesman conducts weekly press conferences for foreign correspondents which are well attended and often include newsworthy announcements and considerable give-and-take. The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also holds periodic press conferences.

Three full-time Warsaw-based American journalists were accredited during the reporting period. Visa issuance has become noticeably faster and regularized with the Foreign Ministry press office now claiming that Polish embassies can issue visas without requesting guidance from Warsaw. Recent experience indicates that visas can be issued within 5 days. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw estimates that upwards of 50 visas for journalists were issued during the reporting period. The Embassy knows of no visa refusals for American journalists.

There are 16 U.S. journalists and two television producers permanently accredited in Poland. They and their families have multiple-entry visas which must be renewed every year. There are no travel restrictions in Poland for either resident or visiting foreign journalists. Visiting radio and television journalists may bring their own equipment and crews. Permanent broadcast representatives may import their

own equipment and may have one permanent producer from the home bureau, but they must hire permanent crew locally. They appear to encounter no problem with importing reference material for professional use. No American journalists have been expelled from Poland during the reporting period.

The U.S. Embassy estimates that the number of U.S. visas issued to Polish journalists would not exceed 30 for short-term journalists working for periodicals and Polish radio and television. No such visas were refused during the reporting period.

Hungary. American journalists often visit Hungary and usually have no difficulty obtaining visas. Hungary does sometimes deny visas to journalists whose activities are viewed by the regime as hostile. As a sign of change, perhaps, a Radio Free Europe correspondent has just been accredited and has visited Hungary to cover the recent session of parliament. Foreign journalists have access to the press center of the Hungarian Journalists' Association, as well as to the official foreign press center, Pressinform. Reports of its cooperation and efficiency have been generally favorable, and it is open to national as well as foreign journalists by appointment. The director of Pressinform has visited the U.S.

Radio and television journalists can bring their own technicians and equipment into Hungary after notifying either a Hungarian Embassy or the Foreign Ministry. The equipment must be registered with customs upon both entering and leaving the country. Journalists may also bring with them reference materials for professional or personal use. The government imposes few difficulties on foreign journalists, who seem able to establish and maintain personal contacts and communications with both official and nonofficial sources. There are no areas closed to travel in Hungary.

German Democratic Republic. Though foreign journalists are generally treated correctly and courteously by East German officials, their ability to report on events in the G.D.R. is complicated—and often hindered—by regulations. Though visas and accreditations are generally received in a timely fashion, the G.D.R. will not accredit journalists resident in West Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany. East German officials appear to be responding quickly to short-notice requests by U.S. television crews to film inside the country, granting permission for equipment to be imported and for third-country nationals working for U.S. companies to be given visas quickly.

Visiting journalists who wish to interview East Germans are often required to follow a program organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accompanied on their interviews by a G.D.R. "interpreter" and issued visas only for the period of time covered by this organized program.

There are two representatives of American news organizations accredited to the G.D.R.: a representative of the communist *Daily Worker* and an AP correspondent (an Austrian citizen). Both have multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year. Family members receive the same type of visa. Since most U.S. journalists not permanently accredited to the G.D.R. do not notify the U.S. Embassy, it is difficult to know how many were granted G.D.R. visas in the reporting period. U.S. officials are not aware of any visa refusals to American journalists during this reporting period. All such accreditations and visas appear to have been issued within 2 months of the date of application. Several West German members of the press were refused entry to the G.D.R. during the Leipzig trade fair in March on the grounds of alleged visa irregularities. No American journalists were expelled in this reporting period.

Members of the press accredited to the G.D.R. are free to travel anywhere in the country after they advise the Foreign Ministry in writing 24 hours before travel commences. Journalists interpret this rule to mean that notification must be given—and they stress that it is not a request for permission—only when they are working on a story, not if they are traveling for personal reasons. The East German authorities generally respect this practice.

Press contacts of the U.S. Embassy report that source confidentiality and access to contacts cannot be assumed. Initial appointments with officials and public figures must be requested through the Foreign Ministry. Once contacts are established, access to them often depends on who they are and their own sense of how risky it is to have a relationship with a foreign journalist. Cultural personalities, professionals not working directly for the state, and church employees are not restricted in the same way and are usually approached directly by journalists. Many G.D.R. citizens, however, consider contact with foreign journalists disadvantageous and try to avoid it.

Authorization for radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment into the G.D.R. has generally been granted. The authorities insist that foreign journalists, like other foreigners, are subject to restrictions on the printed material they can bring into the G.D.R. In fact, however, journalists generally have had no trouble in bringing in needed material.

There were requests for U.S. visas by East German journalists in this reporting period. No visits were refused, and no decisions were delayed.

Official press conferences and similar official press events are usually open to foreign journalists. Occasionally Western journalists are not given notification of press events, although they are not refused permission to enter if they do find out and attend.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government's generally poor and inefficient handling of Western journalists in Czechoslovakia has continued. The most serious recent incident occurred in January 1989, in conjunction with coverage of events associated with the 20th anniversary of the self-immolation of Jan Palach, a student, in protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion. The car of the accredited VOA correspondent was vandalized just off Wenceslaus Square in central Prague. The incident was protested.

The press department of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been generally reluctant to release information regarding the number of visas granted to American newsmen for either short-term or long-term accreditation. The U.S. Embassy estimates that during the reporting period a total of about 24 visas were granted to American journalists. To the knowledge of the Embassy, no American journalist's application for a visa was refused during the reporting period. The U.S. Embassy believes that most accreditations and visas are issued within 2 months of the date of application. Multiple-entry visas are not granted even to accredited journalists.

Prior to the reporting period, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs press department reported that nine American journalists had 1-year renewable accreditation for work in the country. The American news organizations they represented included the AP, UPI, Time-Life, *The Washington Post*, *Detroit Free Press*, *The New York Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, ABC News, and VOA. CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System] and ABC TV correspondents and the ABC Warsaw bureau chief have permanent nonresident accreditation. In general, the Czechoslovak Government has been reluctant to grant permanent accreditation to American television representatives, although there have been increasing numbers of U.S. television correspondents visiting Czechoslovakia.

During the prior reporting period, Ministry press department sources reported a total of 71 journalists from Western countries, and Japan had similar accreditation. No American journalists were expelled during the reporting period.

There are no travel restrictions for accredited journalists except in security areas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs press department organizes several journalistic tours every year. Journalists are often subjected to surveillance during visits to Czechoslovakia and have experienced physical harassment, in some cases, while covering unauthorized demonstrations. However, during the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy received no reports of attempts to interfere with the establishment and maintenance of individual local contacts.

Access to government officials and "newsworthy" data is usually restricted. Official press conferences and other similar official press events are open to foreign journalists. However, lack of advance information about such events decreases their usefulness for nonresident Western journalists.

The Czechoslovak Government permits radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment but encourages use of locally supplied technical personnel and equipment. Journalists are permitted to carry professional reference materials with them but these are often scrutinized by border guards and customs officials on entering and leaving Czechoslovakia.

Two U.S. visas were granted to Czechoslovak journalists during the reporting period. Both were granted to representatives of the Czechoslovak News Agency (one as a regularly assigned correspondent and one for the Gorbachev UN visit in December). No such visa requests were refused, nor were decisions delayed.

Bulgaria. Working conditions continued to show improvement, though occasionally journalists complain about the level of government appointments arranged for them. Journalists are encouraged to accept the services of an escort-interpreter to accompany them. They are discouraged from seeking appointments on their own. All appointments are to be made through the Sofia Press Agency. Theoretically, all areas of Bulgaria are open to journalists, but Western journalists are discouraged from visiting ethnic Turkish areas, except in tours organized by Sofia Press. Journalists are informed in advance of new areas closed for security reasons.

Ten American journalists are permanently accredited to Bulgaria, though none currently resides in Sofia. They work out of Warsaw, Belgrade, Rome, and Vienna. The U.S. Embassy knows of no journalists who were refused a visa to enter Bulgaria, though in the past there have been complaints of long delays in processing visa requests. Radio and television journalists are allowed to bring their own technicians, crews, and equipment when covering events in Bulgaria and have access to local crews and facilities as needed. Journalists are permitted to carry reference materials. Sofia Press charges a fee to nonaccredited journalists for making appointments with officials and others. The average cost is $200 for 3 days. The Foreign Ministry runs a press center for foreign journalists in a Sofia hotel, the Park Moskva, and arranges occasional press conferences. No American journalists have been expelled in the past 10 years. Visiting French journalists suffered no official harassment when they interviewed various human rights activists in January 1989, although they were subsequently attacked in the official press. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued four visas to Bulgarian journalists accredited to the U.S. during the reporting period.

COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELDS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION

This section of Basket III commits the signatories to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges between educational institutions, increase international scientific cooperation, and encourage the study of foreign languages.

General Considerations

Exchanges are an integral aspect of relations among the CSCE states. The examples listed in this section are only a partial accounting of the exchanges and the state of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and East European countries. The highlights are indicative, however, of the scope of exchanges and cooperative ventures—both publicly sponsored and strictly private in nature—initiated or in progress during the reporting period.

The following table shows the number of lectures and researchers exchanged during the reporting period under the Fulbright and International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) programs with the Soviet Union and East European countries.

Fulbright and IREX Programs

Fulbright	From U.S	To U.S.
Bulgaria	5	2
Czechoslovakia	5	8
G.D.R.	1	4
Hungary	12	7
Poland	1	0
Romania	1	2
Soviet Union	11	15
IREX	From U.S.	To U.S.
Bulgaria	1	4
Czechoslovakia	1	2
G.D.R.	6	10
Hungary	0	1
Poland	3	5
Romania	–	–
Soviet Union	28	42

Soviet Union. Since the November 21, 1985, signing of the new general exchange agreement in Geneva, there has been a steady increase in the level of cultural and academic exchanges. Negotiations for a second 3-year implementing accord were begun in Washington in March and continued in Moscow in May 1988. The implementing accord, covering calendar years 1989, 1990, and 1991, was signed June 1, 1988, in Moscow by USIA Director Charles Z. Wick and Soviet Minister of Culture Vasily Zakharov and witnessed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev during their Moscow summit. The new 3-year implementing accord took effect January 1, 1989, and continues through the life of the general exchanges agreement, i.e., through the end of 1991.

The first half of the 6-year (1986–91) U.S.-Soviet general exchanges agreement saw an overall enhancement of bilateral cultural and academic exchanges. As a reflection of this upswing in relations, the second implementing accord called for modest increases in most specific areas of bilateral exchanges and the introduction of some new types of exchanges.

Although overall cooperation was good during the period, there was also evidence that the expansion of bilateral exchanges is weighing heavily on the Soviet infrastructure. As a result, a steady deterioration in the administrative aspect of conducting these bilateral exchanges continued during this period.

On the other hand, there was also evidence that the Soviets are willing to explore new and creative ideas for improving the management of bilateral exchanges. For example, during this period, bilateral discussions were held about the possibility of opening a joint exchanges

office in Moscow, which would function under both the American Embassy cultural section and the Soviet State Committee on Public Education. In addition, the U.S. sponsored a trip to the U.S. by the chairman of the State Committee, two of his aides, and nine rectors of Soviet universities. This provided further opportunities to impress upon the Soviet side the need for improvements in the administering of bilateral exchanges, especially now that new exchange programs are being launched.

Significant American cultural presentations in the U.S.S.R. during this period included performances in Moscow, Tbilisi, and Leningrad of the American musical "Sophisticated Ladies" by an American cast supported by Soviet set designers (October 1988); performances by country-western singer Roy Clark in Moscow and Leningrad (November 1988); a major photography exhibit by *National Geographic* magazine (January 1989); a Robert Rauschenberg exhibit (February 1989); and an exhibit of the works of artist Mikhail Chemiakin. This last exhibit was particularly noteworthy since Chemiakin was expelled from the Soviet Union 18 years ago, obtained U.S. citizenship, and was invited back by the Union of Artists, which hosted his exhibit. The widespread critical and public acclaim accompanying this event speaks volumes for the changing climate for the creative arts in the U.S.S.R. under *glasnost*.

In addition, during this period the Smithsonian Institution and the Soviet Ministry of Culture opened exploratory talks on implementing a Soviet proposal for a joint U.S.-Soviet exhibit on the intellectual and artistic achievements of both societies. The exhibit, if it comes about, would be the largest of its kind between the two countries. It is proposed for several years from now.

Also during this period, the first Russian translation appeared of an American book following an agreement signed by USIA and a Soviet publishing house. "The Education of Henry Adams" was printed in 50,000 copies and will, according to the terms of the contract, be made available in Soviet bookstores for Soviet currency to Soviet citizens. Further agreements call for translation, printing, and distribution of other American books, including "The Federalist Papers," Henry Wouk's "The Caine Mutiny," Daniel Boorstin's "The Americans," and a series of children's books. Still other bilateral agreements call for the exchange of approximately two traveling book exhibits per year from each country.

This period saw a continuation of decentralization of the official administration of cultural and educational affairs in the Soviet Government, resulting in more authority in this area devolving to the constituent republics. It remains to be seen how this trend will further develop or what impact it will have on the central government's treatment of regional and ethnic cultures. The Soviet Government continues to attempt to walk a fine line between encouraging interest in regional cultures and languages and discouraging nascent nationalism.

Bilateral academic exchange has also steadily increased through this period. In academic year 1988–89, approximately 545 Soviets and 500 Americans are expected to participate in two-way exchange programs, either official or private.

As noted above, however, some administrative problems have accompanied the expansion of these exchanges. Specifically, following the reorganization of three former Soviet official agencies responsible for education into a single State Committee for Public Education, resources and personnel dedicated to exchanges with the U.S. have actually been reduced.

Unable to keep up with rapidly expanding exchange activity, the State Committee has sometimes failed to meet notification deadlines to both scholars and institutions, encountered problems with timely issuance of visas and generally not been able to devote attention to many administrative details of bilateral exchanges.

In spite of this, some innovative new academic exchange programs have been initiated. During the Moscow summit, President Reagan proposed—and General Secretary Gorbachev accepted—an exchange of high school students that will, when fully implemented, allow up to 1,500 U.S. students annually to attend schools in the U.S.S.R. and a similar number of Soviet secondary school students to attend high schools in the U.S. An agreement on this exchange program was signed in Moscow October 1, 1988, by USIA Director Charles Z. Wick and Soviet State Committee for Public Education Chairman Gennadiy Yagodin. The first Soviet participants in this exchange spent 4 weeks at American high schools in January 1989, while American participants (also numbering about 350) came to the U.S.S.R. in March 1989. This program is the first large-scale exchange of high school-level students between the two countries.

In another new approach, during this period 56 Soviet undergraduate students began attending classes at some 25 universities and colleges in the northeast and midwest in an exchange program partially funded by the U.S. Government. These students are scheduled to remain in the U.S. for a full academic year. In the second year of the program (academic year 1989–90), a second group of Soviets will travel to the U.S. and a like number of American undergraduates will study for 1 year in Soviet universities.

A recent Soviet decision to allow Soviet institutions of higher education to accept hard currency has led to a dramatic expansion of Russian language programs for American students. The American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR) has led the way, initiating Russian language programs at such nontraditional institutes as the Moscow Energy Institute and the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys. ACTR has also begun a program at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad. For its part, the Council on International Educational Exchange, which has a longstanding program in Leningrad, has concluded an agreement with Novosibirsk State University to set up a language program there. In addition, the Associated Colleges of the Midwest have begun a language program for students of its consortium at Kuban State University. Given the Soviet need for hard currency and the growing interest in Russian language study in the U.S., such programs are likely to expand in 1989.

Romania. For the 1988–89 academic year, only three American Fulbright lecturers are in Romania, the lowest level since the beginning of the program. Although Romanian officials approved six lectureships, notification came so late (after the start of the school year) that two of the American lecturers were forced to withdraw to accept other employment. A third U.S. lecturer was asked to leave by the authorities when she was found to be in possession of personal materials relating to the Mormon religion, which is illegal in Romania.

The number of Romanian professors who have taken up Fulbright lectureships in the U.S. has gradually declined, from 10 in 1982–83 to one in 1987–88. This year, 1988–89, there are two Romanian lecturers in the U.S. This drastic decline is somewhat offset by a sharp increase in Romanian research grantees, from none in 1987–88 to an estimated 11 in 1988–89. However, this is still far below the numbers of 10 years ago when as many as 40–45 Romanians traveled to the U.S. each year. The principal reason given for this decline is that the teaching load and rules governing extended absences do not allow sufficient time for most professors to undertake lengthy teaching/research projects abroad. The bilateral program of cultural exchange expired in January 1989. However, Romanian officials have given assurances that they will honor the agreement through the entire 1988–89 academic year. A U.S. proposal to extend the program of exchanges

for 2 years by diplomatic note is being studied by the Romanians.

Visits, exhibits, film showings, book fairs, magazine exchanges, and performing arts exchanges all come under the cultural exchange agreement or the agreement which originally established the American and Romanian libraries in the two countries. Film showings are a regular feature of the program of the American library in Bucharest, and various exhibitions have been held at the library in the past 6 months. Since implementation of the law limiting contacts with foreigners in 1986, some Romanians report they have been told they should not come to the American library. During the past several months, visitors have reported increased instances of police harassment. These incidents typically occur out of sight of the library and include demands for identification and an explanation for the visit.

A medium-sized exhibit of American lithographs was shown at the Constanta Museum of Art during November and December 1988. It was the first major exhibit accepted in a Romanian museum since the cancellation of "Filmmaking in America" by the Romanians in October 1987. Decisions on other exhibits offered to the Council for Culture have been pending for several months. Two small circulating exhibits are ending their itineraries with no replacements having been accepted as yet. Other programs have included visits by specialists in the presidential elections, photography, theater, film, U.S. history, and international relations. Most other Western countries continue to report shrinkage of cultural exchange programs, with some longstanding activities eliminated. Financial restrictions typically are cited by Romanian authorities as the reason. Romanian priorities appear to discourage academic exchange in nontechnical areas.

Romanian compliance with the Helsinki Final Act's provisions on translation, publication, and dissemination of written works from other states is spotty. A limited number of American books is published each year, usually literary works. Romanian publishers cite lack of hard currency to purchase rights as a major obstacle to publishing American books, and the U.S. Embassy now has a program to help them obtain copyright clearances. As a result, the number of American works scheduled for publication in the future has increased significantly.

As noted above, only a limited number of American books and films are available in Romania. Foreign exchanges shortages and rigid ideological controls make it unlikely that this situation will change dramatically. Romanian television, which had requested and received U.S. tapes on cultural and scientific subjects in the past, has ceased using such material.

Historically, Romania's culture has been enriched by an impressive variety of minorities and their traditions. The same variety exists today. Romania enjoys a sizable ethnic Hungarian population, a significant ethnic German population (now dwindling through emigration), the traditions of a Jewish culture and remnants of Bulgarian, Turkish, Czech, Serbian, and even Tartar groups, as well as a large Gypsy population. From a postwar high point, when a special autonomous area was created for the Hungarian minority, special government efforts aimed at maintaining the cultural integrity of these groups have shrunk to the point that the present government's policy now seems to be one of cultural assimilation. Opportunities to study technical and general subjects at the university level in Hungarian or German have shrunk drastically in recent years. When history is treated in books or on television, the historical contributions of the minority groups continue to be given little or no mention.

There are no open-access libraries (other than small neighborhood libraries) in Romania, except those associated with diplomatic missions. Foreigners other than official grantees usually are not allowed to use library or archival facilities.

Poland. There is no official bilateral cultural agreement between the U.S. and Poland. Official talks on the subject of cultural, educational, and informational exchange begun in Washington December 14–15, 1987, have continued at the working level in Warsaw throughout the reporting period. The opportunities for expanding cultural exchanges have increased, as is evidenced by the Polish acceptance of USIA's offer of major exhibits on American theater, craft, and painting, which have occurred or will take place during the period 1988–90. Polish cultural offerings traveling to the U.S. continue at about the same pace as in recent years, and privately sponsored American musicians, artists, and exhibits continue to find themselves welcome in Poland as long as they are willing to perform or exhibit for Polish nonconvertible currency. The lack of hard currency continues to be the basic limiting factor in the number and quality of American presentations in Poland.

Both government-to-government and private academic exchange continue. The Government of Poland is, indeed, even working with the U.S. Embassy on selecting international visitor grantees, as in the case of a group of publishers, and all but one of the official invitations issued during this reporting period have been honored. All travel has been quite open.

Polish publishers continue to publish translations of American and other Western authors, although much of what is currently appearing in print results from contracts signed several years ago. In the future, fewer American titles may appear unless some means can be found to assist in the hard currency purchase of publication rights. Custom duties do not play a role in the shortage of Western books, magazines, films, and other sources of information. Lack of hard currency does.

In the cultural field, the policy of the Polish authorities toward Poland's minorities can be described as benign neglect, with the exception of Poland's Jewish minority. The research center on Jewish history and culture at Jagiellonian University in Krakow is operating with the support of the authorities and is quite active. The program is developing and can be expected to expand. The center sponsors conferences, bibliographic, and archival work and is engaged in a three-way exchange program with the University of Connecticut and Hebrew University of Tel Aviv. Other small national minorities, i.e., Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Tatars, etc., maintain their cultural identity mainly by virtue of their own efforts.

IREX scholars have experienced only limited problems. Their visas and permission to utilize archives have been slow in coming, but do eventually come.

Hungary. The number of educational exchanges between the U.S. and Hungary increased dramatically in 1987, and the trend continues upward. In particular, the Soros Foundation funded the travel to the U.S. of 162 young Hungarians to spend 6 weeks studying English and American history and culture. Approximately 150 traveled in the summer of 1988. The Fulbright program continues to expand. The cultural agreement, negotiated in November 1987, stipulates the exchange of scholars in a wide variety of fields including business management, creative writing, and pedagogy.

Thus far in the 1988–89 academic year, approximately 50 scholars, lecturers, teachers, and others have traveled under the auspices of the Fulbright program. The nine researchers and lecturers and six graduate students who travel in each direction annually represent the foundation of the program. Additional grants are given as funding becomes available. In 1987, USIA inaugurated a secondary school teacher exchange by sending an English

teacher to spend 1 year at the bilingual *gymnasium* in Szeged. There are now eight teachers participating in the exchange. In addition, there are over 20 private U.S. organizations maintaining or promoting contacts with educational institutions throughout Hungary, and the number increases every year. Finally, the Salgo chair in American studies is in its fifth year at the Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest. This academic year its occupant organized a conference on American studies, which was attended by a number of scholars from other East European countries, courtesy of a USIA grant. The Hungarian Ministry of Culture welcomes all of these initiatives, and lack of funds is apparently the only impediment to further expansion of the educational ties between the U.S. and Hungary.

Members of the Romanian, German, Serb, and Slovak ethnic minorities make up a very small percentage of the Hungarian population. Despite a shortage of minority-language speaking teachers, minorities have full legal equality and substantial opportunities to obtain at least some education in their native language as well as to foster their native culture. However, a large number of Gypsies (estimates range up to 5% of the population) live in Hungary and are not recognized as an official minority, although they do have a national council that reports to the Council of Ministers. As individuals they have equality before the law. In practice, the Hungarian Government engages in many programs specifically designed to raise the Gypsies' standard of living and help them adjust to the mainstream of Hungarian society. Gypsies, however, are on average considerably less educated and poorer than the native Magyar population or the recognized ethnic minorities. A disproportionate number of Gypsies are unemployed, and of those employed, a majority hold unskilled jobs. Candid discussion continues to appear in the press and specialized literature about the social and economic difficulties experienced by Gypsies, including the fact that considerable prejudice exists against them.

German Democratic Republic. U.S. and G.D.R. officials are currently negotiating a cultural agreement which, once concluded, should significantly increase bilateral cultural exchanges. In the meantime, however, improvements come slowly and grudgingly from the East German side. Exhibitions must have permission from the state, and exhibit halls are controlled by various G.D.R. authorities.

Each year various American performers visit the G.D.R. and Berlin on commercial arrangements, and important G.D.R. musical groups regularly tour the U.S. In recent years art and photographic exhibits from each side have toured the other's country, and there are plans for more. USIA sent a representative to the Leipzig documentary film festival in November 1988.

In the G.D.R. the state controls cultural offerings and cultural policy. Official policy supports cultural expression which supports and strengthens the ideology of the Communist Party. The G.D.R. does, however, bring in foreign performers and arranges for a number of American performers and groups to visit. In February, the American rock group, Kool and the Gang, performed in Berlin. In addition, through access to West German television, G.D.R. citizens are able to enjoy a wider variety of cultural offerings than those offered by the G.D.R. media. The only Western cultural center in East Berlin, the French center, enjoys good attendance.

Access to the American Embassy library is generally possible and has very substantially improved in the last several years, though G.D.R. security authorities occasionally stop and question departing visitors. On specific occasions selected G.D.R. officials and professionals are permitted to visit the Embassy library for invitational events. Many of these same people would be discouraged, however, from entering the Embassy routinely to use the library.

About 30 U.S. titles each year are translated and printed by government-owned publishing companies, often, but not always, titles in the public domain, but the printings are small and the books often hard to obtain. Among recent examples are a collection of plays by Arthur Miller, a collection of six stories by Rex Stout, "Love Medicine" by Louise Erdrich, "Another World" by James Baldwin, "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" by Ken Kesey, and "V" by Thomas Pynchon. The U.S. Embassy sends books to recipients in the G.D.R. and has exhibited books both in the Embassy library and at the book fair in Leipzig. Under a G.D.R. law which came into force last fall, books "whose content violates the preservation of peace or in some other way is counter to the interest of the socialist state and its citizens" may not be imported or distributed, but the government has been liberal so far in interpreting this elastic phrase.

Bilateral educational exchanges have expanded in the past 2 years as the G.D.R. has begun to encourage more personal contacts. Getting agreement to an exchange can be difficult, but once this exists, support from the G.D.R. side is usually good.

The Fulbright program is in its second academic year. In addition, an active IREX program continues, as well as several small direct university-to-university exchanges. The American Council of Learned Societies has an exchange in the social sciences with the G.D.R. Academy of Science, the National Academy of Sciences runs a small exchange program with the G.D.R. Academy, and the G.D.R.-U.S. Friendship Society offers a small number of scholarships to U.S. students.

Access to archives is one of the most serious continuing difficulties encountered by academic exchange participants coming to the G.D.R. The state archive system is under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. This means that other offices (i.e., the Ministry of Higher Education and the Academy of Science) have to negotiate for the researcher they are sponsoring. Most U.S. scholars have felt, however, that the access they had to archival sources was sufficient to make their research time productive.

The Sorbs, numbering about 45,000, constitute the only substantial ethnic minority in the G.D.R. There is no apparent cultural or governmental discrimination against this group. Schools in areas with a Sorb population have specially designed curricula that emphasize aspects of the Sorb culture, and instruction is offered in the Sorb language. Sorbs are well integrated into the general population. In this reporting period, a Sorb was appointed Minister of Health.

Czechoslovakia. Overall bilateral relations in the field of culture and education have sustained a fairly high level of activity during the reporting period. On April 15, 1986, the Czechoslovak and U.S. Governments signed their first bilateral exchanges agreement and program document. In April 1988, a new program document for the exchanges agreement was signed for a 3-year period. The agreement has expanded exchanges in the fields of social science and the humanities and, to a limited extent, in science and technology. Despite some strains in implementation, there has been a heightened level of exchanges in cultural and educational areas.

The Czechoslovak Government does not openly discourage direct contacts between foreigners and Czechoslovaks in cultural activities, but only as long as such contacts are conducted through official

Czechoslovak channels. Independent efforts to cultivate such relationships are often frustrated by the need to obtain official sanction for some aspect of the activity. Also, those who would initiate such activities risk suspicion and problems of various kinds. Consistent with the above, local organizations participating in cultural exchange activities are all government related. One nongovernment organization, the Society for Friendship with the U.S.A., has sought among its goals to develop a cultural exchange relationship, but it has not been able to obtain legal recognition.

Similar to the situation in cultural fields, the Czechoslovak Government does not discourage direct contacts between foreign and Czechoslovak scholars and scientists, as long as these contacts flow through official channels and approvals are sought at various stages. While such contacts are easier to develop in the educational field, the general awareness of risks and suspicion that can result limits their development.

In the area of exhibits, during the reporting period an important exhibition of modern art from the Guggenheim was shown in Prague. Also, a USIA-sponsored exhibition, "American Abstract Artists: a Living Tradition," was shown in Prague and Bratislava. Several other smaller exhibits were also shown in both cities. Also during the reporting period, important exhibits of contemporary Czechoslovak photographs and graphic art appeared in Pittsburgh and Cleveland.

American performances continue to appear in Czechoslovakia on a commercial basis, most notably during the annual Prague Spring Music Festival. In addition to the Prague Spring, the state impresario agencies, *Pragokoncert* and *Slovkoncert*, hosted performances and/or concerts by American groups or individuals which included the Moody Brothers in February and the Portland Youth Philharmonic in March.

The Czechoslovak authorities continue to show interest in several visits by Czechoslovak specialists to the U.S. Under the international visitors program, 20 Czechoslovaks traveled to the U.S. during the reporting period. Included in this number was a group of nine university officials who participated in a 3-week special project to several American universities to familiarize them with American higher education and lay the groundwork for direct university-to-university ties. Other grantees participated in programs in the following fields: graphic art, theater, English language teaching, writing, communications, art history (photography), museums, drug abuse control, and economics.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Czech and Slovak Ministries of Education have shown a greater readiness to accept U.S. Embassy programming of American specialists in American literature and other fields at Czechoslovak institutions, although many Embassy letters regarding the possibility of programming these speakers still go unanswered. Five experts were programmed during the reporting period. Eleven additional lectures on a wide variety of topics were held at the American library.

The Czechoslovak Government undertakes to disseminate and translate written works from socialist countries. American literature, on the other hand, while available in translation, seems chosen with an eye to its negative view of American society rather than for its literary merit. A number of quality American bestsellers do get translated nevertheless, and American fiction is translated quite regularly in the magazine, *World Literature*. Customs duties have not been lowered to promote dissemination of or access to books, films, and other forms of cultural expression from the U.S.

With the signing of the bilateral exchanges agreement in April 1986, the Fulbright program expanded from two Americans in Czechoslovakia and three Czechoslovaks in the U.S. to the possibility of 14 scholars in each country. During the reporting period two Fulbright program graduate students arrived in Czechoslovakia for the first time to study. Fourteen Czechoslovak scholars were affiliated with educational institutions in the U.S. during the reporting period, some on a short-term basis. One American short-term English teaching academic specialist participated in a 2-week-long Czechoslovak English teaching seminar as part of a program under the agreement that increases participation in these specialized seminars.

Progress has been made in university-to-university affiliations with agreements to have direct relations established between the University of Pennsylvania and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, the Community Colleges for International Development and the Czech Technical University, Charles University and the University of Nebraska, and others. Discussions continue between other Czechoslovak and American universities.

During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy heard no complaints from American exchangees regarding access to archives and/or libraries. However, some exchangees have complained that access to "special collections," not normally available to most Czechoslovak library patrons, involves a difficult and cumbersome process. The card catalogues for these special collections are not publicly available.

Bulgaria. The U.S. and Bulgaria signed a new cultural agreement in December 1988, valid for 1989 and 1990. This agreement provides for a U.S. exhibit in Bulgaria in 1990 and sets up a training program for Bulgarian managers. Cultural contacts continued to expand at a modest pace. For the first time, 15 Bulgarian undergraduate students received fellowships to study in the U.S. Access to American culture is limited, although interest among the populace remains high. Each year various books are translated. Bulgarian authorities tend to focus, however, on books which are of technical interest or in some way critical of American society.

The Fulbright program functions reasonably well. Undergraduate exchanges have been initiated. The U.S. Embassy library has a selection of college catalogues and advising materials.■

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